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PREFACE 
The written history of modern South Africa is limited by the mora-
torium on archival material common to' all contemporary research, and 
the present study is intended, in part, to help fill this gap . It has 
a two- fold design : first, to point out some of the anomalies in the 
relationship between administration and policy and secondly, to show 
the extent to which they are interdependent in Dr. D.L. Smit ' s career. 
In t he process, I hope to clarify and to comment on some of the mecha-
nics involved in Native Administration . 
The term ' Native' is used designedly here . I have used it where-
ever it is chronologically apposite ; otherwise the term 'Black' is 
used throughout, though without the all-embracing, ' non-white ' conno-
tation it carries in South Africa today . The term ' liberal' presents 
a more compli cated problem. In the South African context it is used 
to represent varying shades of political opinion, from that held by 
Hofmeyer, who was an advocate of social and residential segregat ion, to 
that of the now defunct Liberal ,Party . I have purposely enclosed the 
word in cautionary commas to indicate my dissatisfaction lfith it. 
The research i s based mainly on unpublished collections and on 
government reports, the bones of which are provided by the Smit papers. 
These also provide the reason for the chronology of the work, which is 
divided into sections intended to reflect Smit ' s own interests and 
those aspects of his career which best demonstrate his influence . Thus 
the brief treatment afforded his earlier career is because of its 
relative historical insignificance. 
Smit has been a difficult subject to study because of hi s simplicity. 
From the available evidence he emerges as what E.M. Forster would have 
called a perfectly 'rounded ' character and there are no distinctive or 
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or eccentric features of personality to latch on to. Although this is not 
a biography, I have felt a biographer's responsibility to my subject who 
is, after all, the centre of the study.. I have at times found his 
honesty almost daunting; it was this virtue, however, combined as it 
was with sufficient quantities of 'virtu' to win even Machiavelli's 
approval, which made him an administrator worthy of s tudy. 
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CHAPTER I 
PART I: A Civil Servant 
Douglas Laing Smit was born in the little village of Seymour, in 
the Eastern Cape, on 21 March 1885. His parents, N. H. Smit and Mary Anne 
Sargeant were both the children of missionaries - the Rev. N.H. Smit, who 
worked among the coloured people at Grahamstown and the Rev. Wi lliam 
Sargeant, a Methodist from the Salem area. Douglas himself went to the 
government school at Seymour, but always considered that the most enduring 
aspects of his early education were acquired from the Rev. Robert Martin, 
who was the Anglican rector of the village . l ) From his grandparents he 
inherited an abiding respect and admiration for mission work in South 
Africa, and from Robert Martin that faith in Christianity and the ultimate 
goodness of God which remained with him throughout his life . 
The very first thing one encounters in the Smit Collection is a 
letter, obviously cheri shed and carefully preserved, from Lord Roberts 
at Army Headquarters in Cape Town in 1900. The writer regretted the in-
ability of the British army to accept the services of the fourteen year 
old Smit, although the boy ' s concern was deeply appreciated. 2 ) This 
was early evidence of another kind of faith , which was also to prove an 
enduring one . Armed, then, with an unshakeable belief in the justice 
of God and of the British Empire, Smit entered the Cape Civil Service 
in February 1903 , the year after he left school. 
It was in the Department of Justice, in Grahams town, that he fi r st 
started to work. He served under Francis Graham in the Grahamstown 
1. From Smit ' s career outline, written at the request of Senator E. C. 
Welsh on the former ' s retirement in 1945, Smit Papers, 10/45. 
2 . 6 February 1900, 1/1900. 
4 
Magistrate ' s · Office and passed his Civil Service Lower Law Examination 
in the same year. His superiors were delighted with his hard and 
conscientious work and after six years of working and studying in Grahams-
town, he was appointed as a relieving offi cer in the Depart ment . In 
1912 Smit became the first civilian Public Prosecutor at East London 
in the service of t he first Union government. 
In July, 1912, he married Charlotte Reay Shaw, a descendant of the 
well known Grahamstown missionary . A great deal of his energy as Public 
Prosecutor in East London was devoted to stamping out the illegal l iquor 
traffic there . His concern with this, and with other activities which 
he regarded as leading to corrupt ion and exploitation stemmed from the 
fact that he himsel f never drank alcohol and regarded it as one of the 
greatest soci al evils . The image of the single-minded Puritan is by no 
means apposite to Smit however, who had a lively and perceptive mind 
and a keen sense of humour . 
By 1916 Smit was pushing hard for promotion . In this cause he en-
listed the services of his family, of Sir Thomas Graham of Grahamst own 
and of Sir James Rose-Innes. His sons , Charles and Allan had been bor n 
by this time, and i n December 1917 he was promoted to being Public 
Prosecutor in Cape Town, with a substantial salary increase to support 
his growing family . 
Between 1918 and 1933, Smit moved around the Union, servi ng the 
Department of Justice in various capacities . From Cape Town he went to 
Port Alfred as magistrate in 1924, and thereafter spent three years as 
Public Pro secutor in Johannesburg. Although the latter post represented 
a considerable step up the service ladder, with a Senior Clerk rating, 
he spent most of his time in Johannesburg trying to get a transfer. Hi s 
wife had been told by doctors that the altitude would be fatal to her 
heal th, and she was forced to move to the coast . (Later, with the 
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advances in medicine, and when her condi tion had been r ather more scien-
tifi cally diagnosed, she was able to spend long periods on the Highveld 
without any injurious effects at all).. There also appear to have been 
other reasons why Smit disliked his work in Johannesburg, but these 
1) 
were never clearly expressed. Early in 1927 he achieved his transfer 
and was posted to Aberdeen, first as a magistrate and then as civil 
commissioner. 
After a year spent as a magistrate in Port Elizabeth, Smit returned 
to East London as an additional magistrat e, with his wife and t hree 
children (a daughter, Peggy, had since been born). He had, by this time, 
built up a considerable reputation for hard work and acumen within the 
Department. In 1933, after thirty years in the Civi l Service, he was 
appointed under- secretary for Justice. He was at the top of his career 
at this stage, with the comfortable expectation of the Secretaryship 
before very long and might have;~solid and unspectacular future in 
the Department had there not been a change of government the following 
year . 
Smit ' s lengthy service in the Justice Department , as well as its 
peripatetic nature meant that he had become a familiar and respected 
figure in South Africa and had caught the attention of several politi-
cians, including General Smuts . When, therefore, the advent of the · 
Fusion government in 1934 coincided with the retirement of Major Herbst 
as Secretary for Native Affairs,it was on Smuts's recommendation that 
the new United Party government appointed Smit to fill the vacancy. 
He was appointed over the heads of several senior and experienced Native 
Affairs officers , who se resentment was not unjusti f ied, particularly 
1. Letters to and from the Department of Justice, 1926, Ibid., 3/26 and 
4/26 . 
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as the Department of Native Affairs offered far fewer opportunities for 
promotion than did the Department of Justice. As a magistrate though, 
with the peculiar arrangement which existed between the two departments 
(see pp. 8-10, Smit had considerable experience of Native Affairs. The 
NAD, in 1934, had little of the political importance it was later to 
acquire but the choice of Smit as Secretary might well have been an 
indication that, wit!l the Hertzog legislation forthcoming, the government 
had begun to realize the need for a strong department to administer it. 
On the evidence of those who knew him and of a letter from Sir 
Thomas Graham on his appointment in 1934,1) it seems clear that, while 
Smit admired Smuts wholeheartedly, he did not extend this admiration and 
trust to the Fusion government as a whole and that there were aspects 
of the new· government about which he had misgivings. There is very 
little evidence, before 1934, as to the kind of political ideas Smit 
held, although his letters quite clearly reveal that he shared the pater-
nal attitude towards Blacks of most of his contemporaries. The reason 
for this appears, again, to be the general lack of attention towards 
the activities of the Native Affairs Department, despite the ' Swart 
Gevaar' tactics of 1924. It was Smit's administrative experience in 
the Native Affairs Department which shaped many of the ideas which he 
only began to artiCUlate publicly after 1942. 
PART II NATIVE AFFAIRS 
The tendency in modern government to grant legisla-
tive powers under enabling, rule-making clauses to 
departmental officials, and to give them extensive 
authority which is virtually outside the scope of 
the courts, is more evident in Native Affairs than 
in any other spheres of state activity. 
(H.J. Simons, "Civil Rights and the African Popula-
tion," SAIRR Papers, B72(l)) 
1. 6 July 1934, Ibid., 2/34. 
/ 0 
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In 1941, after he had been Secretary for Native Affairs for seven 
years, Smit was described by R.F . Hoernle as "a liberal handicapped 
b h o ffo ° 1 °to "I) y ~s 0 ~c~a pos~ ~on . It is not proposed to deal with the assump-
tion of Smit ' s ' liberalism ' in this chapter, but to show, by means of 
a brief overview of the structure of the Native Affairs Department and 
its functions within the newly defined policy of 1936, that Smit ' s offi-
cial position, while it muzzled his voice and imposed limitations on the 
range of his activities, nevertheless provided him with the means of 
undermining the pillars of the very system within which self styled 'li-
berals ' were able to do very l ittle more than "ambulance work". 
The South Africa Act of 1909 effected the separation of Native 
Administration from that of the other government departments . I n 1920, 
the Native Affairs Act established the Native Affairs Commission, an 
"independent body of experts" which would give "calm and dispassionate 
consideration to any complex and difficult question which might arise,,2) 
and, in 1927 , the Native Administration Act conferred those special 
executive and legislat ive powers on the Minister of Native Affairs (the 
actual "supreme chief" in terms of the Governor General ' s designation) 
which enabled his department to operate virtually independently of the 
White legislature. 3) 
From 1927 then, the Governor General was the supreme chief of every 
tribe in Natal , the Orange Free State and the Transvaal . Because Cape 
pOlicy had consistently aimed at the destruction rather than the per-
petuation of the tribal system , the executive powers enjoyed by the 
1 . R. F. Hoernle to Bishop Clayton of Johannesburg, October 1941, Ibid., 
25/41 . 
2. Howard Rogers, Native Admini stration in the Union of South Africa, 
(Revised Edition by P.A. Linington, Johannesburg : University of the 
Witwatersrand Press, 1949), p. 17. 
3. Although Parliament had the power to amend or repeal proclamations, 
which were required to be laid on the table of both Houses , Simons 
found no evidence, for the period 1927 to 1945, that it ever did so. 
(Civil Rights and the African Popul ation," SAIRR Papers, B72(l)) . 
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Governor General were not extended to this province along with the power 
to legislate by proclamation. l ) Section 25 of the Act empowered the 
Governor General t o amend by proclamation any law applicable in Native 
areas (defined as areas within which two thirds of the population consisted 
of Natives) or t o proclaim new l aws therein. I n terms of section 27 of 
the Act, he was also empowered to legislate in this manner outside these 
areas , on specially defined subjects or for particular classes of people . 
Section 29 made i t a punishable off ence for any person "to say or do any-
thing with intent to promote feelings of hostility between Natives and 
Europeans. " The punishment for such an offence was to be exclusion (in 
the case of a ' non Native ') from the area in which the. offence was com-
mitted, and confinement (in the case of a Native) to a particular Native 
area. Armed with these powers, then, the Minister of Native Affairs be-
came, in 19)6, the guardian of the South African Trust, the mechanics 
of which devolved l argely on the organizational abilities of the Secretary 
for Native Affairs. 
For the purposes of administration, the Union was divided into a 
number of large districts under the control of a Chief Native Commissioner , 
directly responsible to the Secr etary . Small er uni ts within these dis-
tricts were under the control either of a Native Commiss ioner, or a magis-
trate, or both. Where an area had a predominantly Black population, the 
magistrate was almost always an officer of the Native Affairs Department . 
I n areas where there was a l arge Whit e population as well, the magistrate 
was usually an official of the Department of Justice who ·held a watching 
bri ef fr om the Native Commissioner for those Blacks who fell under his 
jurisdiction. 
I n the Cape Province, the two main areas of Native Administration 
1. The executive powers comprised largely tribal matters, such as the trans-
fer of the contractual powers of chiefs, definitions of boundaries , arbi-
trat:i:m of disputY1 etc . 
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were the Transkeian Territories and the Ciskei. The former was 
administered by a Chief Magistrate and Native Commissioner, and 
twenty- seven magistrates and Native Commissioners who were all 
officers of the Native Affairs Department. Both areas boasted a 
General Council whose revenues derived largely from contributions 
from district and local councils. The Ciskei was under the control 
of a Chief Native Commissi oner stationed at Kingwilliamstown. The 
six predominantly Black districts of Herschel, Glen Grey, Keiskamma 
Hoek, Middledrift and Peddie were under the control of magistrates 
and Native Commissioners who were all officers of the Native 
Affairs Departmellt. There were also Commissioners at East London 
and Port Elizabeth and Assistant Commissioners at Whittlesea (in 
the Queenstown district) and Capetown. In the remainin~ districts 
magistrates of the Department of Justice were responsible for the 
administration of Native Affairs, subject to the supervision of 
the Chief Native Commissioner. 
In Natal, a Chief Native Commissioner with headquarters in 
Pietermaritzburg was responsible for the administration of the whole 
area, including Zululand. Before 1928 all districts in this province 
had been administered by the Department of Justice, but "in view 
of the existence of large Native populations" eleven districts were 
1) placed under NAD control in that year. Native Commissioners, at 
the instigation of the Native Affairs Department, were appointed to 
Dnrban, Pietermaritzburg and Umbulu (in the Umlazi district) and 
in 1937 a new office of Assistant Native Commissioner was established 
in Estcourt. 
1. Report of the Department of Native Affairs for the years 1937-
38, p . 4. 
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It was in the Transvaal that some of the holes in this system 
or rural administration were most glaringly apparent. All magistrates 
in this province were employed by the Department of Justice . Most of 
them were regarded as "ex officio Native Commissioners and in this 
capacity ... for practical purposes officers of the Native Affairs 
1) Department . " This meant, in effect, that the administration of a 
great many areas depended on untrained and largely unsupervised Jus-
tice officials, who, with far greater prospects of promotion in that 
department, were replaced at frequent intervals by further inexper-
ienced officers, who regarded the posts as temporary stepping stones 
in their careers. In a critique of the system of Native Administra-
tion pUblished by the Rand Daily Mail in 1925, Edgar Brookes selected 
this point as one of the main objects of his attack. 2 ) In the mor e 
densely populated Black areas, Native Affairs were administered by 
Native Commissioners, Additional Native Commissioners and Assistant 
Commissioners, while in other areas stil l, Native Affairs work was 
especiallY allocated to particular members of the Magistrates ' staffs . 
Until April, 1936, the Under Secretary for Native Af fairs acted as 
Chief Native Commissioner for the Transvaal as a whole, but a separate 
office of CNC for the Northern Areas (with headquarters in Pretoria) 
was created at that time, with jurisdiction over all those areas 
which were not controll ed by the CNC for the Witwatersrand , over the 
Orange Free State and various magisterial districts in the Cape. New 
offices of Native Commissioner and Assistant Native Commissioner were 
established by the NAD in Potgietersrust and Lichtenburg in 1937. 
In the Orange Free State, Department of Justice magistrates acted 
1 . Ibi d. , p. 2. 
2 . Rand Daily Mail, 6 July, 1925. 
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as the representatives of the NAD where they were assisted, in the 
Harrismith and Thaba Nchu districts by Assistant Native Commissioners 
who were officers of the Native Affairs Department. The system was 
based on 
an understanding between the Departments of 
Native Affairs and Justice that, in respect 
of magistrates under the control of the latter 
in certain districts where there is a larGe 
Native population the selection of the officer 
to occupy the post should be the subject of 
consultation between the two departments. 1) 
In addition to the various sorts of White official , the NAD exercised 
control through the agency of nearly two thousand chiefs and headmen 
in all f our provinces. A large number of these had civil jurisdiction 
over their areas under Section 12 of the 1927 Act while a fair number 
had been given criminal jurisdiction under the same act. 
In all, there were six major l egislative enactments administered 
by the Department of Native Affairs before 1936. These included the 
1911 Native Labour Regulation Act , which was carried out by a Director 
of Native Labour, who combined this offi ce with that of CNC for the 
Witwatersrand. Seven Native Commissioners under him each controlled 
a staff of Inspectors and pass officials who visited the compounds, 
dealt judicially with petty offences and gener a.lly "watched over the 
welfare and interests of Natives employed on the gold mines." 2)To_ 
gether this Act , the 1913 Natives Land Act , the Native Affairs Act of 
1920, the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act, the Natives Taxation and 
Development Act of 1925 and the 1927 Natives Administration Act formed 
the basls of Native Administration. Officers were, however expec ted 
to carry out, on behalf of other departments, "the provisions of in-
numerable other enactments. 0he department) acts as the agent of 
all other departments insofar as their activities touch the Native 
1. Report of the Native Affairs Department 1936- 37, p. 3. 
2. Ibid, p . 4. 
1) people . " 
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It was a loose , ill defined and badly co- ordinated system. There 
. 2) 
were apparently no meetings between Departmental heads and letters 
flew back and forth between the Public Service Commission, the NAD, 
the Department of Justice and the Treasury - all of which were con-
cerned i n the administration of Native Affairs . The Secretary for 
Native Affairs made most of the decisions in the Department, especiallY 
after Smit took over this post 3) while the weak ministerial control 
which had been a marked feature of Native Affairs before 19244) was, 
if anything , even weaker after 1934. 
Smit ' s hand was immediately evident. in the Departmental Report 
for 1935-36: 
The judgement of history on the South Afri can 
nation will be dependent largely on its treat-
ment of the Native problem and, although of 
course policy is the determining factor, a 
great and inspiring responsibility fall s on 
those who are called upon to translate that 
policy into action 5) 
This was unusually emotive language for a departmental report and 
there was nothing comparable in the style and content of earlier re-
6) ports . As far as the higher echelons of the Native Affairs Department 
were concerned, there is evidence that Smit ' s sense of responsibility 
\;as shared. I t was at the lowest levels of administration that the 
Department earned its reputat i on for oppression, invoked the censure 
of Brookes in 1925, became the subject of heated debates in the Senate, 
1. Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1935-36 , UG41- 1937 , p . 12. 
2. Information from Major F. Rodseth in a private letter , 29 November 1977 . 
3. Ibid. 
4. A.G. Smurth\;ai te, "The Policy of the Smuts Government to\;ards Afri-
cans 1919- 1924" (unpublished M. A. TheEi s , University of South Africa, 
1975), p. 166 . 
5. UG 41-1937, p. 4. 
6. With the exception, of course, of the Native Affairs Commission Re-
ports, especially those between 1936 and 1944. 
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lost the confidence of the rural members of the Native Repre sentative 
Council and bedevilled the progress of agricultural reform in the 
reserves .. 
Before the 1936 Land Act was passed, nearly all t he agricultural 
work undertaken by the Department had been financed from the Native 
Development Account establ ished by the 1925 Native Taxation and Develop-
ment Act and initially comprising one fifth of the revenue fr om Native 
taxation . Since a large proportion of this sum was allocated to Native 
Education, among other things, the economies whi ch the Department 
was forced to practise wer e often inimical to the progress of efficient 
administration. Economy was one reason why Justice officials were 
used so extensively i n the administration of Native Affairs . I t was 
economy t oo, which dictated that where Superintendents of rural 10-
cations were appointed they were usually men with some sort of agri-
cultural background who doubled as agricul tural officers. By 1935 
eleven such location superint endents had been appointed in large 
magisterial districts with scattered locations , whose duty was to 
"keep in close touch with the Native people, assist them to adminis-
ter their domestic concerns and act as intermediary between them 
and the Native Commissioner ."l) They had also, however, to 
report to the Native Commissioner the presence 
of unauthorized persons or persons who are pre-
sent for the pur pose of disseminating undesira-
ble propaganda among the Native people .. • and 
. . . to prevent unauthorized occupation of or 
encroachment on land and unauthorized entry of 
•.. stock into locations." 2) 
Their unpopularity was notor ious. The 1936 policy depended on 
co- operation and it was thi s kind of contact , (on which, in turn, 
1. Report of t.he Department of Native Affairs , 1935-36, p . 14. 
2 . Rogers, Native Administration, p. 10. 
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co-operation depended) , which soured its prospects. 
The Department must endeavour with sympathy 
and discretion to adjust difficult and delicate 
points of contact between Natives and non 
Natives and to provide a ·just and equitable 
balance where the interests of one race 
impinge upon those of others. 1) 
The testimony, throughout Smit's office, is to the effect that in this, 
at any rate, the Department failed - with the inevitable political 
consequences. In 1944 NRC Councillor Champion assessed the damages 
thus: 
... the officials of the government, without 
r ealizing what they are doing, are doing 
great harm in the minds of the Natives ... 
\~thout intending to do so, the government 
is teaching the Natives ... to hate the 
highest authority in the land. 2) 
The 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act and the Native Laws Amendment 
Act the following year, increased the responsibilities of the Native 
Affairs Department without substantially increasing either its personnel 
or its financial resources. It had , before 1936, been responsible for 
the expenditure of a number of trusts and estate accounts, as well 
as the Development Account. All these trusts 3) were merged in the 
South African Native Trust established in that year, with . the exception 
of the Umnini Trust in Natal, the Transvaal Tribal Trust Funds and the 
Natives Estates Account. 4) Between 1936 and 1945 the Trust spent a 
total of £21,683,750, of which only £3,582,526 came from government 
grants. Under the Land Act, the activities of the Native Affairs De-
partment which had previously fallen under the vague heading of 
1. Ibid., p. 15. 
2. Natives Representative Council Verbatim Reports, 9 August 1944, p . 59. 
3. The British Bechuanaland Fund, O.F.S. Imperial Grant- in- aid, Natal 
Nati ve Trust, Natal Mission Reserves Ac '· ount, the Putile Trust, 
Zululand Trust and Native Development Account. 
4. The last dealt with the assets of dead Native labourers and with com-
pensation payable to workmen under the 1941 Workmens' Compensation 
Act. It was the responsibility of the Director of Native Labour 
to administer. 
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'welfare and development' and included desultory and unsystematic at -
tempts at agricultural and land reform, were given formal definition 
and scope . Once the NAC, the Minister of Native Affairs and the Lands 
Department had decided to buy areas of 'released' land, the Department 
was responsible for their settlement and upkeep. Existing locations 
had also to be "afforded an opportunity to recover"l) - in order, 
that is, that the system of land purchase and resettlement did not 
become self perpetuating. 
A virtual sub- department of the NAD, under a controller of Native 
Settlements attached to the head office, was established following 
the 1936 Act . Despite this however , the actual staff increase was 
minimal in comparison with the expansion of the de jure responsibilities 
of the Department. The following table records the staff increase be-
tween 1935 and 1938: 
Head Office 
NAC 
Native Appeal 
Court 
District Admin. 
Chiefs and Head-
men 
TOTALS 
1935-1936 
\mi tes Blacks 
57 
4 
4 
504 
5 
2 
2 
935* 
1,626 
2,570 
• Including NA Police 
1936-1937 1937 - 1938 
Whites Blacks Whites Blacks 
5t5 5 98 9 
5 2 5 
4 2 5 2 
556 1,007* 681 1,105* 
1,'640 1, 626 
623 2,656 789 2, 742 2) 
The District Administration, then, absorbed most of the new personnel. 
Besides various categories of Native Commissioner, this section included 
1. Rogers, Native Admini stration, p. 155. 
2. Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1937-38, p . 4. 
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all agricultural staff (including Black and White staff at Fort Cox) 
as well as engineers and works superintendents. The latter were re-
sponsible for building dams, roads, and bridges, wells, boreholes and 
irrigation schemes. The establisbment and supervision of contour 
banks, fences and dipping tanks were all part of the duties of the 
agricultural section. This section worked through a number of Black 
demonstrators and dip tank attendants in the hopes of extending areas 
of agricultural progress through a mixture of example and compulsion. 
Once the settlement of Trust Land was begun, the Native Commis-
sioners found that the allotment of land and residential sites con-
stituted by far the greater part of their duties. While the chiefs 
and headmen in existing locations were expected to supervise the ad-
ministration of land, various new regulations had been promulgated with 
the result that the NC controlled, also, the use of common grazing land, 
the erection of any public buildings and a variety of occupation dis-
putes . He had also to hear grievances, attend quarterly meetings of 
chiefs and headmen, keep in touch with outlying districts and keep a 
1) 
watchful eye out for 'troublemakers.' Estates were administered by 
him, he dealt with pass issues and exemptions, chaired all local coun-
cil meetings, supervised the collection of revenue, presided over the 
Native Commission Courts and administered the relevant provisions of 
the 1934 Workmen~ Compensation Act. 
The rationale behind the pattern of Trust tenure applied in newly 
bought land in the 'released' areas, and in crown land vested in the 
Trust in 1936 was quite straightforward. The Trust set its face 
against individual ownership of the land from the start. The whole 
system of land segregation depended on the maintenance and development 
1. Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1935-36, p. 27. ' 
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of the areas set aside for Black occupation and the responsibility 
for this was vested in the Trust . The essential requirements of 
this development - such as stock limitation - had proved , in existing 
locations by 1936, to be almost impossible to implement . Land was 
henceforward to be both the carrot and the whip. Actual ownership of 
land remained in the hands of the Trust. Where tribes were moved 
wholesale from one location to another they were to occupy Trust 
land on a communal basis, pay rent and be subject to certain conditions 
of tenure besides . Individual allotments were apportioned by the 
Native Commissioner , via the Headman, again on a conditional basis . 
The most important conditions related to the manner of cul tivation of 
the allotment . I f this did not satisfy t he NC or comply with the 
anti-erosion methods laid down by him, the land was forfeited. While 
voluntary schemes such as"Betterment" (see p.112) attempted to remedy 
condi tions in non Trust land, it was via ' the" medium of tenure that the 
Trust hoped to f ulfil its statutory obligati ons in the released areas. 
The issues arising out of the administration of land in south 
Africa are (as Smit pointed out in 1936) mainly issues of policy and 
it is not proposed to di6~USS them here . What is important fo r the 
purposes of the present study i s that in 1936 the Administration was 
presented with a narrowly defined policy structure within which it had 
to operate. There was a certain amount of land, which had, with a 
specifi c sum of money and a marginal staff increase, to be settled 
and administered along definitive lines of development . By 1944 
administrative experience had exposed the major fallacies of the 
policy and it was from the administration rather than the Cabinet that 
the impetus for radical reform came in the shape of the ' New Recla-
mation Scheme ' - an administrative plan which had major policy 
making implications. (See pp.loB-128) 
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It was in those areas of administration over which the Native 
Affairs Department had less direct control, and where policy had yet 
to be defined, that Smit ' s impact as an administrator was greatest. 
In his foreword to the revised edition of Rogers' s account of the 
Department, Gordon Mears, who succeeded Smit as Secretary in 1945, 
said " .. • the education of the Native and the administration of cer-
tain of the industrial and social laws conferring benefits upon him 
are not the f unction of the Department of Native Affairs . Ill) For 
the period during which Smit was in office , ·however, this was not 
s trictly true . The Trust controlled the funds earmarked for expendi-
ture on ' Native Education' (which will be fully discussed in Chapter 
III) and apportioned them annually between the various missions and 
the Provincial Education Departments . Actual control, therefore, was 
di ffused , while policy varied from mission to mission and between the 
provinces. While educational policy became the subject of various 
official inquiries , actual policy had, by 1945, been shaped almost 
entirely by administrative action. 
Native Administration jn the urban areas was, like that of education, 
the subject of divided control. Ultimate authority lay in the hands of 
the Minister of Native Affairs, who in terms of the 1923 Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act , was required to approve location sites set aside 
by t he urban local authority, as well as the proposed abolition of any 
locations. Rentals charged by the municipality for the occupation of 
land or houses were subject to the approval of the Minister who was 
also r esponsible for licensing location superintendents appointed by 
the local authorities. The purpose of the licensing clause was ostensi-
bly to ensure "a satisfactory type of municipal officer fo r the adminis-
1. Foreword by W.J.G. Mears, in Rogers, Native Administration. 
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tration of Native , Affairs"l) but the evidence, by 1935, was that the 
position had, with some exceptions, become a sinecure for retired 
pol icemen or other municipal officials whose acquaintance with Native 
Affairs was s l ight and whose offici"al performance was anything but 
"satisfactory" as far as the l ocal residents were concerned. 2 ) 
The first year of Smit ' s office , 1934, coincided with the establ ish-
ment of a system of monthly meetings between the various Reef managers 
and superintendents - the first step toward greater co- ordination in 
the administration of urban Native Affairs. In 1935, the first De-
partmental Inspector was at l ast appointed , in terms of the 1923 Act , 
to supervise municipal activiti es in the urban areas . Native Affairs 
officials, had , by 1940, become regular visitors at the Reef managers ' 
meetings, for which they were sent both the agendas and the minutes. 3) 
The 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act seems to have been regarded 
by Smit as a mandate for increasing direct Departmental control in 
the urban areas . Curiously, the most i mportant feature of the Act 
was that i t established the principle of removal of ' redundant ' Blacks 
from urban areas, by means of a t\;O yearly census which would establish 
the l abour requirements of each area, and the number of Blacks who 
were superfluous in this regard. I t was certainly not this aspect 
of the l egisl ation which moved Smit to describe it, in a later report, 
as "the fulfilment of the gover nment ' s Native policy • . . which so material-
ly added to the Natives 1923 Act (sic) as to raise Native Administra-
tion in the urban areas to a position of prominence. ,,4) The only 
l. 
2. 
3· 
4. 
Rogers, Native Admini st ra,ti()n" p. 174. 
A memo submitted t o the Government Committee on Urban Areas (1935) 
by I . Bud Mbelle, a social worker and member of the Native Advisory 
Board in Pretoria, makes this quite plain. He pleads for superinten-
dents who are "properly educated." (SAIRR Papers B9) . 
This subject was also a favourite bone of conterition among the Native 
Representatives in the Senate. 
Records of the Non- European Affairs Department, Johannesburg, No . 18/6, 
Transcript by T. R.H. Davenport . (Hereinafter referred to as N. E.A. D. 
Transcript) • 
Report of the Department of Native Affairs , 1937- 3b, p . 17. 
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actual census undertaken in terms of the Act was in 1938 and there is 
evidence that it was Smit as well as the war who intervened to prevent 
local authorities from solving their housing problems - and, incident-
ally, the farmers ' labour problems - by means of the 1937 Act. (See 
p. 49) It was, after all, the NAD which had the responsibility for 
accomodating persons thus displaced, in the overcrowded rural areas. 
There is no doubt whatever though, that at this stage in the develop-
ment of the 1936- 37 Native Policy, Smit was prepared and concerned to 
keep its administration strictly to the letter of the law. He wasted 
little time after the 1937 Act had been passed in preparing to achieve 
" a closer degree of co-operation between the Department and the 
local authorities •.. ,,1) On September 28 and 29 1937, a conference of 
all the local authorities was held in Pretoria. The conference , which 
had apparently been convened as a result of Departmental initiative -
presumably, therefore, by Smit - included members of the Native Affairs 
Commission, was presided over by Smit himself and opened by General 
Smuts. The text of the Minister's speech had been drafted by Smit2 ) 
and its content made it clear that the NAD intended to make full use 
of the authority vested in it by the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 
the 1930 Amendment and the later Native laws Amendment Act . The census 
figures of 1921 and 1936 were extrapolated and compared in order to 
demonstrate to recalcitrant municipal authorities the dangers of the 
lethargic exercise of their powers of influx control . Only eleven 
local authorities in the Union had as yet "availed themselves of these 
powers" (in terms of the 1930 amendment.)3) The implication of these 
remarks was that the Department, in the event of this situation 
1. Ibid., p. 19. 
2. Draft speech for the Conference, Smit Papers, 13/37. 
3. Ibid. 
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continuing, would have to use its powers of compulsion in order to 
control the number of Blacks in urban areas . 
The out come of the conference "was evidently satisfactory as far 
as Smit was concerned . Published in 1939 , the NAD report for 1937-38 
referred to the conference as " •.. the most important Departmental 
step in urban Native Admini stration taken since the inception of the 
urban areas legi sl ation."l) It went on to describe the expansion of 
the "normal work of urban native administration" in terms of increased 
co- operation between the Department and the ULA ' s . In terms of actual 
staff expansion, the NAD had appointed another two Inspectors for the 
Urban Areas who concerned themselves with conditions in the locations, 
Native Revenue Accounts and proposed housing schemes, for which a 
limited amount of NAD money was avai l able f or loans. In effect, the 
legislation of 1937 had increased the responsibilities of the NAD 
without actually increasing its direct control of administration in 
the urban areas, or substantially increasing the number of its personnel. 
I t was the Department itself which had, by convening the 1937 confer-
ence and extending its contacts with local authorit ies, increased it s 
de facto control in urban areas and achieved the "general acceptance 
of the Department's advice by the authorities concerned. " 
"Most gratifying, " too,as far as Smit was concerned, was the dis-
covery that many local authorities were prepared to meet deficits in 
their Native Revenue Acc ount s , which had been the subject of long 
contention, either by grants or interest free advances from general 
funds . By 1939, a staggering 205 urban areas had declared themsel ves 
in terms of the influx control provisions of the 1930 Act and it was 
with some satisfaction that Smit reported in that year 
1. Report of the Department of Native Affairs , p . 19. 
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... that local authorities generally are becoming 
more alive to their responsibiliti~s and the De-
partment is confident that the next few years will 
mark a radical change in the conditions under 
which Natives live in urban areas . 1) 
In view of Smit's apparent volte face in the face of war time urban 
influx it would be as well to emphasize here that he supported the 1937 
Act, like Hofmeyer, quite clearly because he saw it as an opportunity 
for increasing Departmental control in the urban areas and thereby 
ensuring, as he said, that local authorities would treat "their respon-
sibilities" in a more serious light. The "radical change" which he 
envisaged in the urban areas, and which was almost certainly not of 
the nature of that which actually took place, was in the development 
of better housing and living conditions for urban Blacks. He himself 
ignored the removal provisions of the Act and actually took it upon 
himself, later, to instruct municipalities to do likewise. 
His attitude to this legislation becomes clearer when it is contras-
ted with that of the Native Affairs Commission. The latter regarded 
the Act solely in the light of its complementary function in the 
segregation policy 
Parliament decided that restrictive measures to 
prevent Natives from becoming urbanized should 
run concurrently with the development of the 
Native Reserves and passed the Native Laws 
Amendment Act of 1937. 2) 
From Smit's (administrative) point of view then, the need for 
influx control was of paramount importance in order to be able to ensure 
improvements in the standards of Black urban living. Control was never-
theless the operative word and control was not a word which figured 
1. Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1937-38, p. 22 . 
2. Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1939- 40, UG 42- 1941, p. 17. 
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in the vocabulary of 'liberalism'; thus it would appear that Professor 
Hoernle might have mistaken his liberal tendencies. 
The changes of the next few years were almost certainly not of a 
nature envisaged by most people in 1939. While the political vicissi-
tudes of the war years marked the end of the co- operative basis on 
which the segregation policy had hitherto depended, it was administrative 
experience which exposed the lack of system behind it, and it was on 
these two rocks that the policy ultimately foundered. Historically, 
probably the greatest significance of the role of Smit and the NAD 
generally in the demi se of segregation, is in the light which it throws 
on the 'apartheid' policy which replaced it in 1948. 
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CHAPTER II 
ADMINISTRATION OF POLICY DURING THE WAR YEARS 
Though the legislature unanimously accepted 
the Native Policy • .• there are many forces 
in the Union working for i ts demise. 
Native Affairs Commission Report, 1939-40, UG 
42- 1941, p . 15. 
The 1939 war vote saw General Smuts at the head of one of the most 
curiously ill-assorted cabinets in Union history . It cons isted of 
mostly ageing imperialists and Boer War heroes as well as two sons of 
ex-Free State presidents, on all of whom the war and the frequent ab-
sences of the Prime Minister were to put a heavy burden. Notwithstanding 
the undoubted ability of Hofmeyer, and perhaps Sturrock, to cope ' with 
this extra load, the ~inistration and the Native Affairs Department 
in particular, found itself forced to carry an unprecedented amount of 
responsibility. 
Smit, true to form, took these responsibilities very seriously indeed. 
Beyond the age of active service himself, he encouraged his staff to 
join the South African Forces, with the result that the Department ' s man-
power was reduced by more than a third. l ) A large part of this figure 
came from the agricultural field staff responsible for the maintenance 
and development of Trust land, and although Smit and his senior officials 
2) 
undertook to carry the work load of their servicemen colleagues, De-
partmental activities in this area were nevertheless drastically curtailed. 
Lack of finance was obviously one reason for the temporary hal t in land 
purchasing under the Trust, but the staff shortage in t he NAD clearly 
played the major part in this decision. Parliament continued to vote 
1 . 309 out of 900 NAD officials were away on active service by 1943. 
(Senate Hansard, 21 January 1943, col . 304). This was a far higher 
proportion than any other government department and represented 
something of a departure from precedent in that Smit himself had not 
been released for servi ce in 1914. 
2 . This was an undertaking which he took very seriously . Gordon Mears 
recalls arriving at the office for work at about 9 a . m. and finding 
Smit there in his pyjamas , having been there since the early morning 
gett ing in some work before breakfast - an apparently common occurre~ce . 
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money to the Trust but it was not used for land purchasing until after 
1944. Smit had repeatedly asserted that it was Departmental policy to 
buy no land which it did not have the resources to administer properly. 
With field staff at about half strength, it was all the Department 
could do to maintain the existing Trust lands, let alone add new ones. 
One of the most constant themes in Black and White political opposition 
during this period was the government's decision to halt the buying of 
new Trust land and it was undoubtedly to Smit's enthusiasm for the 
Allied cause that this situation was in part attributable. 
The new United Party government was one with which Smit felt far 
more at home than he had with its predecessor. From 1939 onwards he 
became increasingly outspoken, though not always in ways of which his 
superiors would have approved. At the end of 1939, he took it upon 
himself to write a sharp rebuke to W.G. Ballinger, who, in a reported 
interview with the Daily Dispatch had made some very pertinent remarks 
with regard to the futility of Black participation in the war effort. 
Ballinger was understandably surprised and annoyed by Smit's letter 
which he referred to as an "extraordinary communication to come from 
the head of a Department of State .•. truculent in tone and decidedly 
dictatorial"l). In the same way, however, Nationalists and UP's alike 
were surprised and annoyed by Smit's declaration in Pretoria, at the 
end of 1942, that segregation was "unworkable" and that no solution to 
the South African "racial problem" was to be found along the lines of 
further "repressive measures.,,2) A similar speech in Kingwilliamstown, 
in October 1942,drew the praise of ANC president A.B. Xuma, who added 
"no man's advice in Sonth Africa can bring greater relief to Africans 
1. W.G. Ballinger, 21 December, 1939, Papers Bc 347 AB VI. 
2. Senate Hansard, 25 January 1943, col. 152. 
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1) 
than yourself." Despite the fact that the recommendations of the 
Smit Report (see p . 33) had already been published and that Smit's 
attitude towards various aspects of" existing race l egislation had be-
come well known, this was the first time that he or any other Depart-
mental head had made such a categorical anti - policy statement . 
Smit's personal objectives as Secretary for Native Affairs become 
clearer at this point. While he was determined to put all his efforts 
into the ' development of the Native', particularly in education, he 
was also bent on doing this in an atmosphere of peaceful co-operation 
between White and Black and White and White. He continuall y stressed 
the need for co-operating and collaborating with the 'educated Native' 
and for drawing this ' class of Native' closely into the admini stration 
of Native Affairs rather than alienating it . Repressive legislation 
therefore, any restrictions which were not absolutely necessary for 
sound administration, were likely to invoke the censure of Black leaders 
and spike the administrative guns as well as creating unnecessary hard-
ship. Provocative statements such as those made by Ballinger were 
deplored f or the same reasons. 
The rapid growth of industry during the war years, its incessant 
demands for labour and the hardships of rural poverty accelerated the 
Black migration to urban areas which the 1937 legislation had been 
2) 
concerned to prevent. While liberal thinkers were encouraged to 
hope that industrial integration and Black urbanization would pave the 
way for the disappearance of the social and political colour bar, the 
Native Affairs Department was forced to turn its attention from that 
1. A. B. Xuma to Smit, 31 October 1942, A.B. Xuma Papers, 421031 e . 
2. Between 1936 and 1946, Durban, Pretoria and Cape Town increased their 
Black population by over 100%, while the number of Blacks in Johannes-
burg rose from 229 , 000 to 387,000. 
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enforcement of the 1937 Act which had so effectively galvanized the 
municipalities into action in 1938, to the urban situation itself -
to the cure, rather than the pr evention of the ills which Black 
urbanization created. This was a new departure, and one in which 
a variety of motives among policy makers and administrators was 
di sc erni ble. 
'Poor Blacks j unlike ' Poor l>'hi tes " was not a term in current use 
in South Africa before the outbreak of t he Second World War . The 
word 'native', at least in terms of Hertzog ' s 'civilized labour ' policy, 
was synonomous with lower living standards, consumer expectations and 
overal l ability. While the 1932 Holloway Commission Report had un-
covered the extent of poverty in the reserves and recommended immediate 
remedial action there along agricul tural lines,it had also hinted 
strongly that non- action in this regard might eventually affect White 
living standards as well. The implication was that Black poverty 
was not in itself a matter for state concern except where it posed a 
threat to White 'civilization' . Thi s was borne out in 1944, when 
Smit attempted to win the support of public (White) opinion for his 
expensive ' New Reclamation Scheme' by representing re serve poverty 
as a threat to the fertility of t he rest of the country . (See p~18 ) . 
The Holloway Commission warning that 
to continue employing Natives in the urban 
areas but t o treat them as if they should not 
be there is both illogical and short- sighted 1) 
went unheeded until after the outbreak of war . It was the growing 
inability of the Reserves to support their rapidly increasing popula-
tion which forced the attention of the state to focus on the economic 
condition of urban Blacks. 
1 . Report of the Native Economic Commission, 1930-1932 , UG 22- 1932, 
para. 73. 
2tl 
Outwardly, the policy towards Blacks in the Union which it was Smit's 
job to administer, seemed, at least during the early stages of the war, 
to be of a far more flexible nature. The war saw the extension of state 
control in diverse fields of society .and industry in most of the partici-
pant countries and South Africa was no exception. The creation of the 
Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission in 1939 and the ac-
tivities of the Social and Economic Planning Council, which reported three 
times before the end of the war, made it clear that the structure of post 
war society and industry was much on government minds. Early in 1942, 
Smuts's famous speech to the South Africrul Institute of Race Relations, 
which threw his party into the confusion from which it never recovered, 
seems to have acted as a green light f or Smit . From that point on he 
not only took a bolder iniative in his administrative duties but al so 
in his criticism of the legislation upon which they depended. 
1942 was the high water mark of optimism for lihite opponents of the 
segregation system as well as for its Black victims . In that year , 
Deneys Reitz persuaded the Minister of Justice to instruct that enfor ce-
ment of the Pass Laws in all the major centres of the Unionl ) be relaxed, 
the 8mit Committee came out with its report and Smuts's remarks to the 
SAIRR appeared to he"ald a complete change of policy.2) Considered in 
1. Johannesburg, Witwatersrand, Durban, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, 
Kimberley and Bloemf ontein. 
2 . The subs tance of Smuts's speech ;Ias to t he effect t hat segregation 
had "failed" and that it needed to be replaced with what he called 
"trusteeship"_ He talked of the "fear" of the White South African 
minority and said, quite definitely : 
"Attempts have been made to get round this fear by the policy common-
ly called ' segregation ' ... the policy of keeping Europeans and 
Africans completely apart for their own self preservation. We have 
tried to carry out this policy . Legislation giving effect to it 
has been placed on the statute book. But, I am afraid .•. that 
there is very great disappoint ment at the result s which has been 
achieved ... Isolation has gone and segregation has fallen on evil 
days too ." 
(Jean van der Poel (ed), Selections from the Smut s Papers, Cambridge 
University Press , 1973, Vol. VI, No. 556, p . 335) . 
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isolation, however, these events lose a great deal of their significance 
as far as any implications they may have had in the realm of pOlicy 
making was concerned. What they do demonstrate was the way in which 
the administration, led by Smit, was able to take advantage of the hiatus 
caused by the war in the implementation of the segregation policy in 
order to take some practical measures to alleviate its effects . They 
also highlight the need for effective collaboration between the policy 
makers and their administrators. Without actually resorting to legis-
lative enactments the Native Affairs Department was able to circumvent 
some of the more unpopular segregation legislation, while the -Inter-
D~partmental ~Jmmittee which reported in 1942, recommended the enactment 
or repeal of various laws which would eventually have had a major effect 
on the pOlicy as a whole . 
In August 1942) the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, 
Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives was appointed UIlder 
Smit ' s chairmanship.l) It seems that the iniative for the inquiry as 
well as a great deal of the evidence presented to it , came from the 
Institute of Race Relations and from Rheinallt - Jones in particular. He 
certainly claimed responsibility for the Committee, which actually 
seems to have been set up as a result of a memorandum written by him 
on "the possibilities of a socio- economic policy for the upliftment 
of the l abouring classes of all races ... " which was sent to Smuts in 
the first half of 1941. 2) The heads of Departments, whose task it was 
to investigate this enormous field, were required to do so in a non 
political capacity and the report which they finally issued bears the 
1 . The Secretaries of the Departments of Health and Labour were also 
members of this Committee . 
2 . Rheinallt- Jones to C.M. Jaffee, General Manager of South African 
Railways and Harbours, 13 September 1941, SAIRR Papers, B9 . 
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strong stamp of Smit's ideas on it. There is evidence that Smit took 
a keen personal interest in the Committee's investigations and that 
most of the suggestions contained in the report came from him. l ) 
The Smit Report was also a tribute to the efforts of the Institute 
of Race Relations and other concerned 'liberal' bodies who saw the 
appointment of the Committee as a chance to present their case which 
ought not to be missed. The SAIRR correspondence for September and 
October of 1941 shows quite clearly that the kind of evidence heard 
by the Committee during its five day hearing in Johannesburg was strong-
ly coloured by the influence of these bOdies. 2 ) Even the General 
Manager of the South African Railways and Harbours was in communication 
with Rheinallt-Jones on the subject of evidence for the Committee. 3 ) 
The· Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce appointed a special sub-committee 
to study the issues raised by the Committee, and the comprehensive 
memorandum which the Chairman submitted to it was drawn up on the ad-
vice, again, of Rheinallt-Jones. 4) An official Wits University 
circular, dated October 1941, stressed the importance of giving evi-
dence to the Committee, along with representatives of the African 
Townships Commission and the Joint Council. 5 Rheinallt-Jones wrote 
himself to Smit in September 1941, urging him to ensure that the 
question(of wages, housing, pensions and food prices were given due 
attention by the Committee. 6 ) That Smit was in touch with the Native 
1. Information from ; Major F. Rodseth in a letter to the writer, 2 
September 1977. 
2. The Committee's itinerary showed that it spent more time hearing 
evidence in Johannesburg than anywhere else. In October and Novem-
ber, 191+1, it visited Johannesburg, Pretoria, Kimberley, Capetown, 
Port Elizabeth, East London, Bloemfontein, Durban and Pietermaritz-
burg. 
3. 13 September, 1941, SAIRR Papers, B9. 
4. Chamber of Commerce to Rheinallt-Jones, 2 October 1941, ibid. 
5. 2 October 1941, SAIRR Papers, B9. 
6. 25 September 1941, Ibid. 
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Representatives is clear f r om a reassuring letter he wrote to Margaret 
Ballinger, also in September, explaining that the terms of reference 
of the Committee were designed to complement the a ctivities of the 
Wage Board, and that the activities of the Board would not suffer from 
the Committee ' s appointment. l ) The Native Representatives, thereafter , 
joined their evidence to that of the various institutions2 ) , and A.B. 
Xuma, on behalf of the ANC , submitted evidence to the Smit Committee 
early in October 19413 ) at the same time as the Non-European Affairs 
Committee of the Rotary Club. 4) 
There is nothing to indicate that the influence of the Institute, 
the Native Representatives and the ANC spread in a similar fashion to 
the other centres listed on the Committee ' s itinerary. No evidence 
could be found, however, that Nationalist groups interested themselves 
in the Committee ' s work. Although t he matter of procedure for giving 
evidence to the Committee was on the agenda of t he September 
meeting of the Reef Location Managers and Superint endents 5) 
1941 
none 
could be found of its actual content . The very terms of the Committee ' s 
reference and the kind of peopl e and insti t utions in which it provoked 
interest and concern, make it a likely assumption that most of the 
evidence which it considered followed the pattern established in JOhannes-
burg . So does the Report, which it issued in July, 1942. 
The Smit Commit t ee was "impressed above all by the poverty of the 
Native Community . 6) It accepted the conservative p .d.l. estimate of 
1. 19 September 1941, I bid. 
2 . Undated Memorandum by E.H. Brookes on evidence to be placed before 
t he Committee , Smit Papers, 14/42. 
3. Transcript of Evidence, 11 October 1941, Ballinger Papers, A410. 
4. Noti fi cat ion of intention to give evidence, 11 October 1941, SAIRR 
Papers, B9. 
5. Minutes of mee t ing of Reef Managers and Superintendents, 18 Sept-
ember 1941, N. E.A. D. Transcript . 
6. Report of t he Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health 
and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, 1942, para. 7. 
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£7 . 14.6 per month arrived at by the Johannesburg Municipal Non- European 
Department which had surveyed the income and expenditure of some nine 
hundred Black families, but found that the average family income amounted 
to only about two thirds of this figure. l ) Appalled by the amount of 
malnutrition it uncover ed, the Committee asserted firmly that 
it appears necessary to contravent the idea 
which still prevails in some quarters, that the 
basic requirements of non- Europeans differ from 
those of Europeans, 2) 
and, l ike the Holloway Commission , hinted darkly that Black pover ty might 
well be contagious : 
The total economic loss due to sickness caused 
or aggravated by malnutrition and undernourish-
ment may wel l be greater than the expenditure 
which would be necessary to prevent it by sub-
sidizing the nutrition of the people concerned. 3) 
Although Smit himself was quite genuinely concerned by the extent 
of Black poverty which the Committee found, he was clearly getting 
the measure of the South African el ectorate. The necessity to rest 
welfare measures partly on general economic considerations was revealed 
by the Native Farm Labour Committee, which reported in 1939. One of 
the major reasons advocated by White farmers for the prevailing 
shor tage of Black labour was 
That during times of drought and crop failure, 
the liberal or ill advised assistance rendered 
to Natives by the Government makes it unnecessary 
for them to seek employment . 4) 
The Committee also reported that it had encountered a great deal 
of bitterness among urban Bl acks . For the alleviation of the physical 
1 . Ibid., paras 17-22. 
2. Ibid . , para 55. 
3. Ibid" para 60. 
4. Report of the Native Farm Labour Committee, 1937-39, para 9 . 
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conditions it addressed itself to the provision of family allowances, 
sanitation and health services, cheaper and more plentifal housing, 
better social welfare and social worker services, cheaper transport 
and higher wages. These were all areas in which the Native Department 
could claim to have been working at least since 1934 and the main 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the implementation of such 
measures were the lack of cohesion between the Departments and Minis-
ters concerned. An obstacle already encountered for instance, in 
the matter of cheaper housing, was the refusal of the Minister of 
Labour to alter the prevailing situation whereby Black houses were 
built with expensive White labour . Nevertheless , the suggestions for 
the physical improvement of urban conditions were moderate, sensible 
and possible. Where the Smit report stepped out of line was in those 
recommendations which had policy making implications - the redress of 
the bitterness amongst urban Blacks which had given the Committee 
cause for concern was not to be achieved by an impressive list of 
welfare measures. It attacked the Pass Laws as one of the major causes 
of resentment and misery and suggested that their abolition would be 
preferable to the existing situation. More significantly, perhaps, it 
also recommended that Black Trade Unions be given statutory recognition 
in all other occupations than that of mining. 
The question of the Pass Laws was one which had been considered 
by a number of previous inquir ies, most notably the Holloway Commission 
in 1932. 1 ) None, though, had gone so far as to face the "abolition of 
the Pass laws" . Nor , in fact, did the Smit Committee face this 
prospect with any kind of enthusiasm. While the Report has been 
1. UG 22- 1932. The Smit Report ' s recommendations with regard to labour 
bureaux can be traced back to this report although the Godley Com-
mittee of 1920 had been the first to recommend the SUbstitution of 
a sort of ' reference book '. 
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consistently interpreted to have recommended the abolition of these 
laws, it did not discard the principle of control in which these regu-
lations were rooted. It was the existing state of affairs to which 
the abolition of the Pass Laws was to be preferred. Nor were all 
aspects of the existing situation to be discarded. Curfew regulations, 
for instance , were merely to be modified by shortening the hours of 
curfew. In industrial areas the registration of service contracts was 
to be continued, while the system, which, it was proposed , would replace 
the Pass Laws, consisted of a network of labour exchanges which would 
be set up on a voluntary basis in all urban centres. The enforcement 
of the Pass Laws was expensive in terms of Black co-operation as well 
as administration, and it seems that the changes advocated in the Smit 
Report stemmed as much from humane reasons as from an administrative 
reali zation that the costs of the segregation system as it then existed 
were far too high. I ts recommendations certainly did not herald the 
radical change in pOlicy to which they were fairly generally attributed 
and on which White Liberal and Black political optimism was allowed to 
capitalize. 
As far as the Pass Laws were concerned, Smit, once his mind had 
been made up, began to do everything in his power to modify them. In 
February, 1942 Xuma approached Smit with a view to persuading him to 
arrange an interview between an ANC deputation and the Prime Minister. 
The deputation, which Xurna hoped would include members of the Natives 
Representatives Council ("our case is one"), was to present a petition 
to the Prime Minister on all the most burning issues of the day: 
Education, Welfare, Land, Trade Unions and the Pass Laws. l ) Smit was 
unable to secure Smuts's presence at the meeting, but was able to 
1. A.B. Xurna Papers, 3 February 1942, 420202 a. 
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inform Xuma that Reitz, in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Native Affairs would receive the delegation . l ) The ANC 
contingent was cordially received by Reitz, who evidently promised 
to do what he coul d to meet their demands, while a letter from Smit 
to Xuma in March assured him that every consideration was being gi ven 
to the petition and the demands of the delegation. 2 ) 
The deputation, Smit ' s persuavive influence and the alarming in-
crease in the number of Pass Law offenders3 ) saw Reitz, in the Senate, 
declaring that "nothing is so conducive to irritation, t o bad feeling, 
to hatred, to disturbance of race relations between Whi te and Black 
than the pass laws ,,4) He went on to say that he and Smit had been 
evolving plans for the r eduction of these ills for some time, and that 
he proposed to approach Steyn, the Minister of Justice, on the subject . 
Smit ' s efforts were rewarded in May, when instructions were accordingly 
issued to police in various centres that Pass Law offenders were not to 
be arrested unless a more serious crime was suspected. Later that 
month, Smit wrote to Xuma, asking him to suspend judgement on this 
action until its results became apparent . 5) Xuma replied that he was 
grateful for action taken on two of his deputation's demands (teachers ' 
salaries had also been raised) , but that the question of the statutory 
recognition of Trade Unions had not yet been considered. Smit, fresh from 
the writing of the Committee Report , in which its recommendations on 
that subject had been made abundantly clear, was able to inform him, 
early in June, that Reitz hoped to be able to make a statement on this 
1. 13 February 1942, Ibid., 420213 b. 
2. l~ March 1942, Ibid., 420318 a . 
3. I n the Transvaal, between 1939- 41, the number had reached 297 ,695. 
(Senate Hansard , 26 March 1942, Col. 1583). 
4. Ibid., 1582. 
5. 30 May 1942, A. B. ~uma Papers 420530 c . 
matter fairly soon. He also wrote personally to the South African 
Railways on the matter of the delegation's request for better treat-
ment and catering for Black passengers and this , too, he assured 
Xuma, was receiving favourable consideration. 1) 
Smit was clearly extending himself to the limits of his offi cial 
licence and in Reitz, like Hofmeyer, he had a Minister whose ideas 
were gratifyingly similar to his own. The Minister's handling of the 
deputation, the action which followed it and the constant communica-
tion between the ANC President and the Secretary for Native Affairs 
on the subjects it had raised, did a great deal, in Xuma's words to 
"increase confidence in the government. ,,2) The combination of Smit, 
the ANC and Reitz was not enough, however, to effect any statutory 
change in the Pass Laws. The 1943 election was looming and Reitz 
was sent off to London as High Commissioner shortly after t hese events. 
I t seems clear that his replacement by Major Piet van der Byl was 
intended as a gesture to the electorate . "Politics", according to 
Smuts was "an unpleasant business, with all its racial taints and 
bitterness and extreme partisanship ••. " and Reitz "was getting stale 
here and out of touch with our tiresome public life. ,,3) If this 
assessment was based on Reitz's recent performance, then it was 
Smit as much as Reitz who was "out of touch". 
Van der Byl was a farmer and a faithful segregationalist alo~g the 
lines of 1936. He confessed, in his autobiography, that Native Affairs 
was the only political field of which he knew absolutely nothing and 
1 . 4 June 1942 , Ibid., 420h4: 
2. Xuma to Smit, 1 June 1942, Ibid., 420611a. 
3. Smuts to M.C. Gillet, 31 February 1942 , Smuts Papers, vol . 69, no. 262. 
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t hat all he came to know of his Department he learnt from Douglas 
S "t 1 ) ml . I f Smuts had decided that the Native Affairs Department was 
getting a little out of hand, then he ought to have chosen a more 
forceful personality than Van der Byl as Minister . It was Smit ' s 
i nfluence which continued to dominate the Department. 
By 1944, the Anti Pass Campaign which the ANC mounted in that year 
spoke volumes for the "confidence" in the government of which Xuma 
had spoken in 1942. Even had moderate Bl ack opinion retained any of 
this feeling, the pressure of the ANC Youth League, recently formed 
and which had never shared any such confidence, ensured that it was 
not allowed to get in the way of positive action. In 1946 the instruc-
tions to the police with regard to the Pass Laws were officially with-
drawn, al though Smit had managed to persuade Van der Byl to maintai n 
them even after the report of the Ell iot Committee in 1943 had recom-
mended that enforcement be reinstated in order to prevent the breakdown 
2) 
of the system of influx control. 
The recommendation in the Smit Report , in fact , based as it was 
on the evidence of the more ' liberal' section of academic, commercial, 
charitable and industrial institutions, and on the hope that the removal 
of some of the irksome restrictions created by the segregation pOlicy 
would pave the way for a more co- operative spirit between White and 
Black in the towns and hence smooth the path of administration there, 
turned out to have rather negative results . I t was all very well for 
industrialists to recommend the abolition of the Pass Laws, but it 
did not suit the requirements of either the mining or the farming indus-
tries. In the event , Black political optimism was allowed to capitalize 
1. Pieter Voltelyn Graham van der Byl, Top Hat to Velskoen, (Cape Town: 
Timmins, 1973), p. 214. 
2. The Elliot Committee on Crime on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria 
(1943) had been appointed as a result of an unprecedented crime wave 
in these areas . 
on a series of isolated and ul timately insignificant events, while 
Nationalist pressure, economic needs, UP divisions and electoral 
needs resulted in a strengthening rather than a reduction of legis-
lative controls . The resul t was that after 1943, accommodation between 
the government and Black political movements became increasingly 
impossible of achievement . 
The other contentious recommendation in the Smit Report, that 
Trade Unions for Black workers be accorded statutory recognition, 
had even less hope of achievement . There was far less scope for 
administrative action in this regard, and even if there had been, Xuma 
had made it cl ear that nothing short of an amendment of the Industrial 
1) Conciliation Act would satisfy Congress . The number of NRC members 
who were also Congress officials, and who j oined the spearhead of the 
later pass campaign (see p . . 93) makes it a likely assumption that 
the Council, too, would be satisfied with nothing less than legislation. 
What administrative action was available in this sphere, was out of 
Smit ' s hands . 
At the end of 1941, the various, unofficial Black Trade Unions had 
joined together to form the Council of Non European Trade Unions - an 
act which was followed with sinister speed by a proclamation in January 
1942 which imposed criminal sanctions on any Bl ack strikes. 2 ) Despite 
were this severity, a number of strikes later on in the yea~ settled by 
means of negotiations between the employer and the Trade Unions con-
cerned. Workers on the mines had, also in 1941, established the 
African Mineworkers Union, most of the iniative for which had come 
from the ANC. I ndustrial unrest in 1942 l ed to the appointment of 
1 . Xuma to Smit, 3 June 1942, A. B. Xuma Papers, 420603 a . 
2. This was War Measure 145, January, 1942. 
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the Lansdown Commission, which inquired into the wages and conditions 
of employment of Black mineworkers, the "economic requirements of 
Natives", their sources of income and the effect of increasing wages 
upon the gold mining industry and the South African economy. Like the 
Smit Committee, this Commission approved the recognition of all Black 
1) Trade Unions other than mine unions, and for much the same reasons. 
The reduction of the Pass Laws had encountered a great deal of opposi-
tion in various forms,2) but the recognition of Black Trade Unions was 
implacably opposed by the Minister, the Labour Party itself, and the 
TLC. The kind of administrative and political pressure which had 
been brought to bear on Reitz and subsequentlY on Steyn, with regard 
to the Pass Laws, was up against odds as far as the recognition of Black 
Trade Unions was concerned. 
In January, 1943, Edgar Brookes moved in the Senate that the Smit 
Report be recommended to the "sympathetic consideration of the govern-
ment. ,,3) This was a motion which Van der Byl felt compelled to reject -
on the grounds that the words "sympathetic consideration" might be 
taken to mean that the government "intends implementing the whole of 
4 this Report." While he did not specify exactly which portions were 
to be rejected, he went on to enumerate the list of improvements which 
had been made in the sphere of Native Welfare and Education and pointed 
to the action which had already been taken in regard to the Pass Laws. 
It must have been a rather bewildered Van der Byl who faced a barrage 
of criticism at his ·first appearance in the Senate in his new capacity. 
1.. Apart from the reiteration of the idea that mineworkers were 'raw', 
easily influenced and 'not ready' for unionization, the underlying 
theme of both reports seems t o be the firm conviction that gold 
was the bastion of the S.A. economy and therefore not to be jeopar-
dized. 
2. The Pretoria Municipality had, in fact, asked that reinforcement 
be reinstated and the Transvaal Agricultural Congress had submitted 
a memorandum to the government asking that the Pass Laws be left 
as they were. (17 August 1944, Smit Papers, 3/44). 
3. Senate Hansard, 20 January 1943, col. 64. 
4. Ibid, 1 January 1943, col. 291. 
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At a pre-session caucus meeting he had apparently asked Smuts whether, 
in view of the Prime Minister's remarks to the SAIRR in 1942 and the 
tone of the Smit Report, he was to continue to carry out the 1936 policy 
or to introduce amending legislation - the latter allegedly eliciting 
1) 
an unequivocal "out of the question" from Smuts. At the same session, 
he was not only confronted with Brookes's motion, but attacked from the 
Nationalist benches on his troublesome Secretary for Native Affairs. 
Not only was Smit responsible for the Committee Report, but he had also 
publicly rejected segregation - he said, in fact, "we shall never 
reach the standard at which we are aiming unless we abolish all colour 
bars. ,,2) 
From Smit's point of view, the new .Minister was a disaster. Smuts 
had got rid· of Reitz because he was out of tune with South African 
politics. If Van der Byl struck no discordant notes then it was 
Smuts ' s own speech in 1942 which had been out of key, and by 1943, with 
an election imminent, it seems as if he had already rewritten the score. 
In view of the theme of Smuts ' s 1929 Oxford lectures and his subsequent 
electoral reiterations in 1947 and 1948, far too much weight seems to 
have been given his public statement in 1942. Segregation, as it was 
then applied, had indeed "fallen on enl days" but while men like Smi t 
continued to believe that this proliferation of urban Blacks and indus-
trial dilution spelt the end of any kind of separation, others, including 
the United Party hierarchy , starting working out ways and means of using 
it to the advantage of the system. Smuts's habit of telling his audience 
what he thought it wanted to hear, in this instance had the worst possible 
effect. 3) 
1 . Van der Byl, Tophat to Velskoen, p. 216 . He also refers to Smuts's 
speech as "an unwise remark" - a sentiment which seems to have had 
the support of the majority of his party . 
2. Senate Hansard, 21 January 1942, col . 151. 
3. Van der Byl, presumably in the light of Smuts's attitude in the caucus 
in 1943, was moved to mske the following pronouncement: "It was a 
weskness in Smuts's profound and strong character, at times, to saY 
things he thought his audience wanted to hear, as he did that night 
in the Town Hall" (Top Hat to Velskoen, p. 216). 
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An interesting example of Smuts ' s tendency to cater for audience 
consumption is to be found i n the alterations which he made to a 
memorandum drafted by Smit for publication overseas, in connection 
with the move to incorporate the Protectorates. The memorandum , on 
' Native POlicy of the Gover nment of the Union of South Africa, l), is 
l iberally sprinkled with alterations by Smuts. Where Smit expl ained 
the 1923 Urban Areas legislation by saying that towns were White 
areas in which Blacks were al lowed only in terms of ' European require-
ments ' , Smuts changed the picture to one of ' s eparation ' in towns 
and the regulation of influx to "beyond the limits of their absorb-
tive capacity." Smit's statement that the "problem of urbanized 
natives threatens the whole principle of segregation" was simply 
crossed out . His explanation of the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act 
in terms, again, of White labour requirements, was crossed out, 
as was a whole section referring to the restri ction of Black r i ghts 
to purchase land in the Urban Areas. Smuts also crossed out most 
of the remarks relating to the removal of "surplus" Blacks . The 
effect of his amendments to Smit's explanations of both the 1923 
and the 1937 urban areas legislation was to make it appear that 
both Acts were undertaken solely in Black interests. Like Humpty 
Dumpty, Smuts was an adroit manipulater of words . 
Although it seemed, by 1944, that the recommendations of the 
Smit Committee were going the way of similar Commissions whose re-
commendations conflicted with the White electoral spirit, Smit 
himself was still optimisti c . In April , he wrote that "I am 
pl eased to say that the 'Smit ' Report has resulted in considerable 
improvement in the lo t of the urban Native in several ways ... ,,2 ) 
1. 7 February 1938, Smit Papers, 6/3~ . 
2. Smit to Dr . Her tslet , 18 April 1944, SAIRR Papers B9 . 
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and went on to list what he considered to be the most important of 
these : The decision of the government to pay Old Age pensions and dis-
ability allowances to Blacks ; the tendency to increase wages apar t from 
official wage determinations; municipal distribution of fruit , vegetables 
and milk; the establishment of health and nursing services; extended 
training facilities for nurses ; better housing; municipal interest in 
social work; the appointment of the Pretoria Bus 'Commission, which might 
have good results in the field of cheap transport. It was the list which, 
garnished with facts and figures and spiced by the personal appearances 
of various officials, was presented year after year to the Natives Re-
presentative Council; it was the list which made periodic appearances in 
overseas publications and it was the list with which Smit armed himself 
when he went t o London in 1945 and had several interviews with col onial 
officials there. I t was, of course , embellished with the progress made 
in education since 1939 and with the achievements of the South African 
Native Trust . Coupled with the record of the Council system and the un-
official activities of the advisory boards, it made its appearance in 
every official statement which . enamated i'rom the NAD and the government 
during this period. Of actual 'policy ' these statements contained very 
little . The state, in effect, was represented as a vast charitable insti-
tution, whose benevolence as far as its indigenous and indigent 'ward ' 
was concerned, was unlimited. 
Towards the end of 1944 Smit announced his plans to retire the follow-
ing year . He had turned down various other invitations in favour of 
membership of the Native Affairs Commission, on which a vacancy would 
then be due . His interests were still very much with Native Affairs, 
with whose 'development' he was as concerned as he was to prevent any 
kind of political confrontation in South Africa . In March, 1944 he 
founded the vernacular paper News of the War through which South African 
Blacks could get the "true" picture of what was happening in the 
rest of the world rather than the distorted versions which he be-
lieved to come from the other journals. The editor of the paper 
was Frank Brownlee, an ex magistrate, who was given an office at 
Nati ve Affairs Headquarters, in Pretoria. Smi t ';as evidently alarmed 
at the gathering momentum of organized Black opposition, and it 
was in this way - as a sort of sel f constituted censorship board, 
that he hoped to counteract some of the effects of statements such 
as that for which he had reproved Ballinger in 1939. 
In 1937 Smit had chaired the Commission which inquired into the 
Vereeniging Location Riots, in which several policemen had died. Al-
though this Commission had found no evidence of "Communistic activi-
ties" there seemed to be an exaggerated disposition on the part of 
the Administration to attribute disturbances of this nature to re-
volutionary influences. Lack of adequate housing was one of the main 
reasons behind the various urban disturbances of the war years, and 
this was an aspect of Native Affairs over which Smit had very little 
control . Under the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act (as amended in 
1930 and 1937), some four hundred and seventy urban Local Authorities 
were responsible for the "housing, welfare and control of the Natives 
resident within their respective areas. ,,1) The Native Affairs Depart-
ment had certain supervisory functions, which were largely exercised 
through three Inspectors of Urban Areas. This not very impressive 
number was further reduced by the "exigencies of war,,2) , which meant, 
in fact, that for the duration of the war, departmental supervision 
in urban areas was perfunctory. 
Sub-economic housing for Whites had been introduced in the Union 
1. Memorandum on Policy and Activities of the Native Affairs Depart-
ment, 1942, p . 8. 
2. Ibid., p. 9. 
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in the early thirties, and was belatedly extended t o Blacks during the 
war. Under the new scheme, the government made loans available to 
the Local Authorities for building sub-economic houses whose rentals 
. 1) 
were fixed by the Cent ral Housing Board. These houses were built in 
separate Black townships often some distance from the centres of employ-
ment and many people were reluctant to move into them. Even the low 
rentals fixed by the Board were higher than wages allowed and a great 
many people couldn ' t afford to live in the houses and pay transport 
2) 
costs. During the war, the shortage of building material and skilled 
artisans became acute and riots and squatter movements intensified. 
The two main squatter movements took place in 1944 and 1946, both in 
the Johannesburg municipal area. The shortage of hous ing also hel ped 
thwart the attempts to reduce the Pass Laws . 
It seems that this was an area where co- ordination was desperately 
needed, and for that reason, both the Fagan Commission Reports recommen-
ded that housing become the responsibility of a government sub- department 
under the Department of Native Affairs . Although Smit interested him-
self in the problem during the war , there was very little he could do 
about it . 
I n 1945, Smit was asked by Smuts to accompany the Union delegation 
to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco later that year. I n 
April, he was asked by E. J . Phelan, a cting director of the International 
Labour Organization in Montreal, if he would allow his name to be submitted 
for nomination to the Committee for Social Policy in dependent 
t ·t . 3) errl orles. He made it clear that Smit woul d serve this Committee 
1. Ibid., p . 10. 
2. Report of the Commi s sion appointed to inquire into t he disturbances 
of 30 August 1947 at the Moroka emergency camp , Johannesburg. 
3. 23 April 1945, Smit Papers, 64/45. 
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in a private capacity rather than as a representative of his government . 
The Committee was to be established on the grounds that labour had 
become dependent on social policy and Smit agreed to the nomi nation 
proposal. 
In May, Smi t was in San Francisco I.here he represented South 
Africa on the Committee of Trusteeships. He had always taken an 
active interest in the question of the incorporation of the Protecto-
rates, was keen that the mandated territory of South West Africa 
woul d eventual ly be incorporated into the Union, and, before he 
l eft, had made a study of the League mandate system and the problem 
of dependence . He was impressed by the lack of racial differentiation 
in San Francisco and wrote rather wistfully to his wife : "I wish some 
of the people in South Africa who have colour prejudices could see 
1) 
what i s really happening in the rest of the world." Most of the 
'rest of the world' , however , did not share South Africa ' s enthusiasm 
for the incorporation of her mandated territory. Nor did they share 
her objection to the international supervision of such territories. 
Smit and Smuts were virtually the sale representatives of this position 
and wer e forced to submit to the general consensus in favour of Trustee-
ship and .super vi sion. Before he left San Francisco for London, where 
his daughter was to undergo a major operation, Smit had his member ship 
of the IIO committee confirmed. 
During Smit ' s absence from South Africa in 1945 his correspondence 
with Gordon Mears provides the measur e of his concern with the South 
African racial situation as well as his enormous capacity for hard wor k . 
1. 29 April 1945, Ibid., 69/45. 
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He also wrote punctiliously to his wife , sometimes twice a day. 
From America, while busy all day at the Conference, he wrote to Mears 
of an intervieVI he had had with a South African Zulu, Nsomi, who had 
emigrated to the USA in 1941. He emphasized that Negroes in the USA 
were far better off than South African Blacks . Not only did they 
enjoy citizenship rights, but (and he stressed this as it was more 
feasib l e in the South African context), Trade Union rights. l ) He in-
vestigated various aspects of the 'colour problem ' in America, including 
the labour influx to the urban areas which had resulted from the war . 
The housing estates which had been designed to meet this influx par-
ticular ly impressed him, but they wer e non- racial , and of course "we 
could not contemplate any such arrangement in South Africa. ,,2)At this 
point, it s.eems likely that Smi t was basing this conclusion on his 
knowledge of the Union electorate rather than on any bel iefs which 
he might have shared with the majority of it. 
At the same time, he was concerned to present Native Administration 
in South Africa in the best possible l ight, and to this end requested 
that Mears should send copies of the latest NAD Report to him for 
distribution among various interested parties on the ground that it 
would make "good propaganda. " From London he reported interviews with 
Sir Alan Burns, Governor of the Gold Coast whom he was able to impress 
with his 'list ' despite Burns ' s well known opposition to South African 
pOlicies . He also interviewed Lord Nuffield and E.W. Smith, editor 
of Africa. 
In a more inquisitive spirit , he discarded his list and made exten-
sive notes of interviews with Margaret Read (Head of the Colonial 
1. 2 June 1945, Smit Papers, 126/45. 
2 . Smi t to Mears, 5 June 1945, Ibid. , 130/45. 
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Department of the Institut e of Education at London University) , DoS. 
Miller (Director of Education for Basutoland) and various colonial 
official s from whom he sought information on developments in the 
col onies . His notes, which were all sent to Mears, van der Byl 
and Hofmeyer, reveal that his main interest was in education . They 
also contained a good deal of information on the subject of Trade 
Unions, the recognition of which for South African Blacks he was 
still hoping to promote . His experiences of the political vicissitudes 
of the government in 1942- 3, in the field of Native Affairs moved 
him to the highest praise of the British Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, of which he wrote to Van der Byl in August. Emit had 
himself suggested a similar step in 1944, when the proposals for the 
rehabilitation of the Reserves were mooted, but had not been abl e to 
get Treasury support. 
Unfortunately one is never sure in South Africa 
of continuity of policy in Native Development 
and it seems desirable to avoid . .. sporadic en-
terprises , unco-ordinated and leading to nothing. 1) 
Smit was obviously disi l lusioned by the sound and fury which had 
seemed to augur so well for 'Native Development ' in the early war 
years and which had signified nothing more than the realization that 
the system of controls in the existing segregation system were in need 
of careful revision. 
At home, the government was coming under fi re on the l abour front. 
The ANC anti pass campaign was also in f ull swing, while strikes and 
squatter movements were intermittent . Not surprisingly, it was the 
' liberal ' criticism whi ch was most resented and Van der Byl therefore 
asked Emit to find out about the British government ' s post war plans 
for manpower control in order that he might publicly compare them 
1. Smit to Van der Byl, 23 August, 1945, Smit Papers, 175/45. 
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with the South African situation , to the advantage of the latter . 
The White Paper sent him by Smit declared that 
In the manpower sphere the aim must be, while 
seeking to mitigate the severity of the existing 
labour controls and while paying such regard as 
is possible to the natural desires of workers to 
seek work where they please and of employers to 
engage labour freely, to ensure that the available 
resources of manpower are employed in the places 
where, and on the tasks in which they are most 
needed 1) 
a statement which Van der Byl was able to use to full effect by pointing 
out that Blacks in South Africa were at least free to sell their labour 
where they pleased. Despite the obvious fallacies of this position, it 
was not until Smuts declared that the government had fully implemented 
the provisions of the Lansdown Report that he incurred the full wrath 
f . °t ° 2) o OppOSl lon. The Mine Wages Commission had recommended increases 
amounting to a total of £2.,642,"000 per year . In May 1945, the government, 
after due consideration of the Report , decided on increases which amounted 
to a total extra amount of £1 , 850, 000 - half of the recommended increase . 3) 
The strikes of August 1946, followed by the adjournment of the NRC and 
the advice of the Trade.s and labour Counci14 ), brought the matter to 
a head and it was in that context that serious consideration was at last 
given to the cautious Trades Union legislation with which the NRC was 
presented in May 1947 (see p . 105). 
In spite of municipal autonomy in the urban areas , Smit had steadily 
promoted closer co-operation between the Department and the ULA's, 
particularly on the Witwatersrand, which he was able to use with 
1 . Smit Papers, 175/45. 
2. Especially that of the Native Representatives. See letters from 
Ballinger and Basner to Smuts , Smuts Papers, vol. 78, no ' s 31- 34. 
3. Wages of underground and surface workers were increased to 5d and 4d 
per shift respectively and overtime on Sundays was to be paid at time 
and a half . 
4. The TLC advised Smuts to withdraw the anti- strike legislation. 
considerable effect after the outbreak of war . He was guest speaker 
at a meeting of Reef Managers and Superintendents in 1941, at which 
he urged leniency in influx control enforcement. He referred specifi-
cally to Section 16 of the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act (which 
provided for the removal of "surplus" Blacks) asserting that it was 
administratively impossible to carry out. He maintained that 'urbanized ' 
and ' detribalized Natives ' were totally unsuitable for settlement on 
the land and· that there was, in any case, not enough land for this 
1) purpose . In March, 1942 Smit followed up these remarks by an 
official circular letter in which municipal authorit ies were urged to 
"hold in abeyance" those aspects of the urban areas legislation "as may 
be deemed not wholly essential to the establishment and maintenance of 
good order . 2 )Although the association of Reef Managers had opposed 
t he Pass Law moratorium inisiated by Smit3 ) it seemed quite prepared 
to "promise assistance" by way of non action in the matter of removing 
its 'redundant ' Black residents4) and it was not until 1948 that this 
provision of the 1937 Act was again taken seriously by the Administration. 
By December 1945 Smit had returned from Paris and was busy touring 
Natal with the Native Affairs Commission. He confessed to his wife 
that he had found it "hard to adjust his views to those of some of 
5) the workers' delegates" , and resigned his position on the 11.0 
Committee in August the following year on the plea of hard work . The 
latter was quite justified as he was, in addition to being Native 
Affairs Commissioner, a member of a number of other bodies, including 
1. Minutes of a meeting of Reef Managers and Superintendents, 18 Septem-
ber, 1941 . N. E.A.D. Transcript . 
2. Circular Letter No. 11/313, contained in the minutes of a meeting 
of the above, 26 March 1942. 
3. I n May 1941, every ULA received a letter from Smit a sking its 
views on enforcement of the Pass Laws . The Association of Reef 
Managers decided that there should not, at the pre sent time , be any 
relaxation of Pass Law restrictions. ([bid., 15 May 1941). 
4. Ibid., 26 March 1942. 
5. To Mrs Smit from Paris, 6 October 1945, Smit Papers, 26/45. 
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the Union Advisory Council on Native Education. In 1946 he was 
awarded an honourary doctorate from Wits at the instigation of its 
principal, H. G. Raikes. Smit had been largely responsibl e for ob-
taining the admission of Black students to the University ' s Medical 
School, for finding the funds to build a Black Student ' s Hostel and 
for establ ishing a number of Departmental bursaries for Black medical 
students. 
In August 1946, Smit l1as chairman of the Committee which investi-
gated the riots at Lovedale Mission School . There had been a spate 
of such riots in the past few years and the Committee, in the prevail-
ing atmosphere of industrial and political unrest , completely exonerated 
the school authorities from any culpability in the riots . It found, 
instead , that outside influences, the l ack of suitable empl oyment avenues 
and the repressive legislation in South Africa were r esponsible. By 
thi s time, Smit, despite the hard line which he was offic ially taking 
on the activities of the NRC, was ready to put the blame for most 
of the unrest in the count ry on "repressive l egisl ation." His close 
association l1ith most of this legi slation in his capacity as Secretary 
for Native Affairs had been a rapid disillusionment and he I.as moving 
increasingly tOl1ards the more conventional ' liberal' position . After 
five months spent touring Natal , the Transkei and Ciskei with the NAC 
in 1947, Smit returned to East London where he and his wife had 
bought a house . Both their sons had trained for professions and both, 
by this time, l1ere married . In 1948 Smit campaigned, at Smuts ' s insti-
gation, for East London City , and took his seat on the Opposition 
benches in that year . 
So far as the l1artime physical and political upheavals in urban 
areas were concerned, Smit , despite the I nter Departmental Report , 
had been able to do very little. The NAD ' s hands and attentions were 
51 
largely tied up in the Reserves, and it was running at less than two 
thirds of its normal staff complement . For his unselfish attitude 
in releasing staff and his willingness to shoulder an enormous work 
load, Smit was consistently praised. It meant, though, that the 
efficiency of the Department was also reduced by a third and that 
its supervisory activities in the towns were suspended along with 
the purchase of new Trust land. At a time when Blacks were taking 
the brunt of wartime economies, when the urban areas were carrying 
unprecedented numbers of people and when the policy of segregation 
was being threatened from all sides, the Department would undoubtedly 
have better served its political masters had it been at maximum 
strength. 
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CHAPTER III 
TOWARDS AN EDUCATION POLICY 
Smit's greatest interest and concern, while head of the Department 
of Native Affairs and afterwards, was in the development of 'Native 
Education'. Its content and structure were controlled by the four 
Provincial Education Departments and by those missions which had 
not yet opted for registration, but it was officially financed 
out of a proportion of the Native Tax revenue together with a fixed 
government grant . In theory, allocation of these funds was in the 
hands of the Minister of Native Affairs, who was advised by the 
Native Affairs Commission. In practice, however, at least after 
Smi t took over the Department, money for Black education ,.as allotted 
almost solely at the discretion of the Secretary and of the NAC. I n 
the early post Union days, interest in Black education centred 
largely on its content . By 1921 it was becoming apparent that this 
was a problem which could be solved most efficiently under a centra-
l ized administration. In 1935, with the formula for a centralized, 
bi-partisan 'Native Policy' on the cards, the appointment of the Welsh 
Committee heralded the entry of the policy makers into the education 
debate, the nature of which provides one of the clearest single indi-
cations of the shades of contemporary opinion on race relations. 
At the time of Union, all education other than higher education 
was left in the hands of the provinces. The Cape, and to a far lesser 
extent, Natal, were the only provinces at this time which subsidized 
1) Black education in any way. The vast majority of schoo~were mission 
controlled and mission financed, and although the Cape government 
1. The Cape on a £ for £ basis ; Natal from a small annual grant , un~ 
evenly and erratically distributed. (P.W. Cook, "Non- European 
Education," in Handbook on Race Relations, ed. by E. Hellman, 
(Oxford University Press, 1949) , p. 364 . 
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schools were officially colour bl ind, in practice their pupils were 
a l l White, while those of the mission schools tended to be almost 
exclusively Black. A provisional period of five years had been 
estimated for provincial control of education in 1909, but it was 
not until twelve years after that that any kind of government action 
was taken. 
No discrimination was made in 1909 between the administration of 
White and Black schooling . Within a few years, however, each province, 
with the exception of the Transvaal which followed suit later , had 
found it expedient to appoint a Chief Inspector for Native Education 
on whose shoulders most of the responsibility for Black education 
came to rest . Between 1910 and 1922, Native Education was financed 
entirel y from provincial revenue funds without any kind of government 
sUbsidy. l ) Expenditure took the form of grants- in- aid to various mission 
schools, mainly for building purposes and for the payment of teachers ' 
salaries . After this, the school s were officially registered as 'aided ' 
and subject to irregular and u sually perfunctory inspections by the 
" 2) 
prov~nce. 
Natal was the only province in which the Education Department 
establ ished separate government primary schools for Black children . 
In the other provinces schools for Blacks were either state aided 
"" hIt" 1 "" t 11 d d f" d 3) A mlSS10n Be 00 s or en 2re y mlSS10n con ro e an lnance . 
number of factors, however, ensured that some sort of differentiation 
was practiced by the provinces : the appointment of separate Inspectors, 
the disparity between the amounts of money spent on Black and White 
Education and the adoption of differential primary school courses 
1 . Memorandum on Policy and Activities of the Native Affairs Depart-
ment, 1942. 
2 . C.T. Loram, The Education of the South African Native, (Cape Town: 
Longmans, Green 1917) gives some examples of the kinds of tests 
administered to a random selection of pupils by the Inspectors -
who often visited two or more schools in one day. _ 
3. Report of the Inter Departmental Committee on Education, DG 29- 1936, para. 
176 (Hereinafter referred to as the Welsh Committee) . 
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for Black pupils . 
Editorials, letters and ar ticl es by various people invol ved in the 
teaching of Black children, which appeared in i ssues of South African 
Outlookl ) during the first two decades of the century help to isolate 
the kinds of opinion on 'differentiation' and what sorts of forms 
that ' differentiation ' should take . A point on which educationalists 
of all shades were agreed, and at a time when educational policy all 
over colonial Africa aimed at at least a year and usually more of 
vernacular teaching, was that the medium of instruction for the initial 
period of a child ' s schooling should be a familiar one. As early 
as 1903, the editors of the magazine were questioning the value of 
"Western" education for Blacks and calling for a Commission to investi-
gate all aspects of Native Education in South Africa. 2 ) In 19~ simil ar 
senti ments were expressed in a letter from a Black schoolteacher3), 
and by 1919 an editorial claimed that the existing system of education 
for Blacks had the effect of detaching education to the extent that 
"native children tend to look on school as something unconnected with 
real life . ,,4 ) The need for differentiation seemed to be widely ack-
nowledged - but of a kind which better suited the needs of those being 
educated and which was a necessary part of the inexorable process of 
acculturation. 
The "Proceedings of a Conference of delegates from School Committees 
in the Orange River Colony" in 1906 provide a fair index of the kinds 
of ideas held by the White man- in- the- street on Native Education. At 
1. All the following references to issues of Outlo~k are taken from 
F. Wi lson & D. Perrot (eds), Outlook on a Century, (Lovedale - Spro-
cas, 1973) . 
2. Ibid., p. 191-93. 
3. I]id . , November 1908, p. 201. 
4. Ibid . , July 1919, p . 206. 
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the time of the Conference the Orange River Colony paid a total of 
£1,700 in the form of grants- in- aid to mission schools with a total 
1) 
enrolment of 10,000. Delegates to the Conference included a 
Dominee, a magistrate and a farmer, the last of whom voiced one of 
the stock arguments with which any proposal to increase expenditure 
on Black education was greeted. He proposed "that until reasonable 
facilities for elementary education have been provided for all the 
white children of the col ony, no further provision be made for native 
children . " The magistrate endorsed this with the observation that 
the effect of education on ' the Native ' was to produce criminals , 
while the dominee proposed that all Natives be taught to read their 
Bible, write and do a little arithmetic "and all those who don't 
want to submit to quit the country wi thin a certain time •• . " The 
ever present fear of the South African White farmer was also voiced: 
"as soon as the native has got a certain amount of education he runs 
into the towns and will not work on the farms , " as well as the addi-
tional warcry against the ' educated native ' : that education breeds 
a dislike of manual labour . Indeed, with Black teachers quoting 
Pestalozzi and pleading somewhat confusedly for a reorientation in 
Native Education in 1908, the wherewithal for the later justification 
of differentiation was easily provided: 
The aim of education is throughout concrete, i.e . 
education must take into ac count the condi t ions of 
life from which the child springs and in t he midst 
of whi ch the child will in all probability spend 
his whole life . 2) 
The total amount contributed by the various provinces to Native 
Education had reached £340,000 by 1922. By far the major share of 
1 . Ibid . , Editorial, November 1900, p . 195. 
2. Ibid . , August 1908, p . 201. 
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this was the Cape's. The Orange Free State spent £5,000 on Native 
Education, the Transvaal £46 , 000, Natal £49,000 and the Cape £240, 000. 1 ) 
In this same year that the Phelps- Stokes Commission reported its find-
ings on the state of Black education in South Africa, the Union govern-
ment decided to take a hand in controlling its finance . In 1921 the 
Transvaal had attempted to impose a direct tax on its Black residents 
on the plea that "its increasing expenditure on Native Education justi-
2) fied such a course." The whole situation was consequently reviewed 
at the end of that year by the Financial Relations Conference and the 
Financial Relations Fourth Extension Act no 5 of 1922 followed soon 
afterwards. This Act prohibited Provincial Councils from imposing 
direct taxation on the "persons , land, habitations or incomes of Natives" 
and fixed the minimum expenditure by each province as the amount spent 
by each in 1921-2 . I n addition, between 1922 and 1925, the government 
contributed an average of more than £4,000 per annum per province . 3) 
Although Malherbe sees the 1922 Act as the effective end of the 
principle of development (i.e . basing estimates on what had been spent 
in the past rather than what woul d be needed in the future),4) this 
was not really the case . In 1923, for instance, the government spent 
£10,000 on Native Education in the Orange Free State alone, excluding 
technical and industrial education. 5 ) The Provincial Subsidies and 
Taxation Powers Amendment Act no . 46 of 1925 was of far greater signi-
ficance . By that time, two reports on Native Education had recommended 
1. E.G. Malherbe, Education in South Africa, (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 1977), 
Vol. II, p . 542 . 
2 . Memorandum on Policy and Activities of the Native Affairs Depart-
ment 1942, p. 10. 
3. Welsh Committee Report , UG 29- 36, para . 150. 
4 . Malherbe, Education, p . 543. 
5. Welsh Committee Report, para 150. 
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centralization, albeit for different reasons and different kinds of 
centralization. Hertzog was the leader of the Pact government and 
1925 was the year in which ' segregation ' got its first official 
airing, at Smithfield. The 1925 Act , then, seems to have three 
aspects of major significanc e: first, it removed the responsibility 
of financing Native Education from the provinces altogether. Finan-
cially, at any rate, central ization was slowly creeping in. The amount 
fixed for Native Education was to be paid into a Native Development 
Account set up under the Act and this was to be allocated at the dis-
cretion of the Minister of Native Affairs , advised by the Native 
Affairs Commission. Where the 1921 Nat ive Affairs Commission Report 
had recommended centralization under the Department of Native Affairs , l) 
the Phelps- Stokes Commission of the following year, led by Jesse 
James, had advocated control by the Union Education Department - for 
the reasons that education was an expert field and the NAn therefore 
not qualified to administer it, and that Native Education was not , 
as the appointment of separate provincial Inspectors seemed to indicate, 
sui generis . 
Secondly, along with the fixed government grant, the amount paid 
into the Development Account was to be one fifth of the revenue from 
the Native General Tax each year . The government evidently agreed 
wholeheartedly with its rural Free State supporters in this respect 
and the idea that "they must pay for what they get " became an in-
creasingly important aspect of the debate. Finally, Malherbe ' s point 
applies better to the 1925 Act. An amount of £340,000 was to be paid 
annually into the Development Account along with one fift h of the 
1. UG 15-1922. 
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Native general tax . Expansion and development, any kind of planning 
ahead in the field of Native Education, were effectively limited by 
its financial arrangements. Nor was it expressly stipulated in the 
Act that this proportion of the tax was to be used exclusively for 
education . Section 13 provided that the money be used, "among other 
purposes" , for the maintenance, extension and improvement of educa-
tional facilities and for the development of 'Native welfare '. It was 
going to have to be an elastic sum of money, to which anticipated 
increases in poll tax receipts would make very little difference . 
When,in June 1934, Smit repl aced Major Herbst as Secretary for 
Native Affairs, the United Party government was well into its first 
term of office and t he land and franchise segregation legislati on was 
near the end of its long review by a bi- partisan Committee . Despite 
the fact that Havenga was Minister of Finance and Grobler his Minister 
of Native Affairs, the effects of Smit ' s appointment on Native Edu-
cation were almo s t immediatel y felt. By the following year Grobl er 
was complaining of over-expenditure in that field and the year after 
that, the proportion of the Native General Tax which was allocated 
to the Native Development Account was increased from one fifth to 
seven twentieths . Mainly because of his personal interest and concern, 
Smit was able to use his position in the hierarchy of the admini stra-
tion of Native Education to advantage . Whereas Herbst had tended to 
meet all requests for money , meetings, changes and development (and 
he got a great many) with a bland intransigence, 1) Smit was actively 
concerned to be of assistance and probably in a better position to 
offer it . At the end of 1935, the last member of the NAC with any 
1 . In a letter to Rheinallt Jones in August 1928, for instance, he 
said quite categorically that there was no point in even trying 
to obtain more money for education. (Her bst to Rheinallt Jones , 
18 August 1928, SAIRR Papers, B9). 
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expertise in the field of education (Dr. Roberts), had been repl aced 
(by G. Heaton Nicholl s) and Smit had stood in f or the Minister as 
deputy chairman. In that capacity, then, and as Secretary for Native 
Affairs, on whose advice the Minister allocated the funds earmarked 
for education , he could effectively influence both halves of the 
machinery through which the financial arrangements were made . 
That his influence made itself felt there, i s in no doubt whatever. 
By 1940 , Departmental expenditure on Native Education stood at 
£996 , 515, an increase of more than 200 percent Over the growth rate 
for the period 1925 to 19341) . By 1945 it was £2,241,1242 ) . In 1935 
only 0,6 percent of al l Black chil dren at school were secondary school 
pupils - mostly in the Eastern Cape3 ). By 1945 this percentage had 
risen to 3,4 percent and the number of secondary schools to a hundred 
and seventy three oppo sed to twenty in 1936 . 4 ) While pressure from 
various interested bodies certainly seemed to increase after 1936, it 
had not been negligible in previ ous years, as all the provincial Advisory 
. Boards on Native Education, the missions and the provincial and national 
African Teachers' Associations had put their weight behind the effort 
to obtain more money and greater co- ordination for Native Education. 
The real reason for the change in growth rate seems to be the changes 
in personnel : first in the Native Affairs Department, when Smit became 
Secretary, and secondly , in 1939 , when Hofmeyr : took Over the portfol io 
of Finance from Havenga. 
The system of administration, by 1936, was elaborate and inefficient. 
Each Province had an Advisory Board and a Chief Inspector for Native 
Education. The Boards comprised mission representatives , Black school-
1. Between 1928 and 1934, expenditure increased from £540,825 to 
£634 , 4~. Over the same number of years, 1934- 1940, it increased 
from £634,458 to £996,515. (Figures from Race Relations Fact Sheet, 
SAIRR Papers, B12(e). 
2 . Ibid. 
a.. r.ook, in ~dbook, p. 368. ~ Ibid . , p . 7. 
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teachers and 'advisers '. These l ast were usually prominent White 'lib-
eral' figures . Edgar Brookes and Rheinallt Jones, both Native Repre-
sentatives under the 1936 Act, were members of the Natal and Transvaal 
Advisory Boards respectively. The number of actual government schools , 
1) 
was few, but ther e were over 4,000 ' aided ' schools in the Union, all 
of which wer e subject to some fo rm of control by the various Education 
Departments. They were required to appoint a Superintendent "in accor-
dance with the r egulations appli cable to Superintendents of Native 
Schools" and were run by Committees consisting of Chur ch and Education 
Department officials as well as member s el ected by parents with chil dren 
2 ) 
at the school. There were also sub- categories of these aided schools 
in the Transvaal where the Education Department and Eiselen , the Chief 
Inspector for Native Education, were keen to r educe mission control. 
Mere ' aided ' schools wer e less generously subsidized than those which 
submitted to a greater degree of control , amalgamated with other de-
nominations, accepted the appointment of a Superintendent by the Edu-
cation Department and were known as Amalgamated Schools . 3) 
Black teacher s were , by 1936 , organized into Associations which 
kept in close touch with the Advisory Boards, in which they found their 
most consistent champions in the perpetual struggle to obtain a reason-
able l ivi ng wage f rom the Department . The Boards would submit financial 
estimates to the Chief Inspector who passed them on to the Provinc i al 
Admi nistration, which in t urn submitted them to the Department of Native 
Affairs. These estimates were considered by the NAC and t he Department , 
whi ch would make their allocations out of the funds available . 
1. 232 al together, of which 216 were in Natal and none in the Free State. 
(Cook, in Handbook , p . 364) . 
2. Memorandum on the status of the various schools, Rheinallt Jones 
Papers c44' b/21 (undated). 
3. Ibid. 
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There is evidence that by 1940 the various interested organizations, 
from the missions to the Advisory Boards, had got Smit ' s measure . The 
middlemen - the NAC and the Chief Inspectors - .were increasingly bypassed 
in favour of a direct approach to the Secretary himself, and throughout 
his office Smit was at the receiving end of an ever growing flow of 
correspondence with regard t o the financing of Native Education. (see 
p. 73 ). 
The appointment of the Inter Departmental Committee on Education in 
1935 should be seen in the context of the segregation legislation then 
in preparation. The Committee's terms of reference were clearly directed 
at the establishment of some sort of centralized controll ) and the 
appointment of educational experts2 ) who were expected to define the 
aims of Native Education, its methods, scope and language medium, 
indicated that centralization was a foregone government conclusion . 
The effects of the cautious findings which the Committee reported in 
1936 were, however, controversial and possibly unexpected. 
After describing the history of Native Education before Union and, 
province by province, tracing its development to 1936, the Committee 
decided in favour of government control on the grounds that financial 
and administrative responsibili ty should go hand in hand. It contended 
that provincial control W8.S open to po Ii tical abuse and that control 
divided between the provinces, the NAC and the Nat ive Affairs Department 
was unsatisfactory.3) It went further than this, and on the contentious 
1. "Whether , in view of the extent to which the Union Government has 
assumed financial responsibility for Native Educat ion it should take 
over its administration from the provinces." (Welsh Committee Report, 
Clause ii). 
2. Its members were : W. T. \olelsh (Chairman), M. P.C. D.M. Malcolm, Chief 
Inspector, Natal Education Dept ., G. R. Welsh, Chief Inspector, Cape 
Education Department, G.R. Franz, Chief Inspec tor Transvaal Education 
Department, N.F. Kuschke, Chief Inspector O.F.S. Education Departme~t , 
E.G. Malherbe, Union Education Department, J.L. F. Venter (Secretary). 
3. Welsh Committee Report , paras. 252-290. 
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issue of 'which Department?' carne down on the side of the Union Education 
Department for a number of reasons, of which the most important was that 
Native Education should not be differentiated from White education. In 
a more practical vein it stressed that education needed administrative 
specialists, that it was unnecessary to duplicate the existing educational 
machinery and that the Native Affairs Department was already overburdened. 
Finally, and in this it had the whole African colonial experience as 
precedent, it urged that education was one of the areas of White control 
of which Blacks were most suspicious and that control by the Department 
of Native Affairs, with the sinister associations which it held f or many 
Blacks, would merely increase this suspicion and lead t o more resentment. 
In defining the aims of Black educat ion, the Committee was fairly 
open about its ends: " the education of the White child prepares him 
for life in a dominant society and the education of the Black child for 
a subordinate society . ,,1) It accepted that the social, economic and 
political structure of the country effectively limi ted Native Education 
and concluded that 
a full liberal philosophy is not at present 
applicable to Native Education ... We feel that 
this avowedly interim synthesis is all that 
can be offered. 2) 
Having decided, then, on a rather craven practical approach, the Committee 
went on to present the following definition of the 'aims' of Native 
Education - in which echoes of the "social, economic and political 
structure" imposed their own limitations: 
The effective organization of the Native '5 
experiences so that his tendencies and povrers 
may develop in a manner satisfactory to him-
self and to the community in which he lives 
by the growth of socially desirable knowledge, 
attitude and skills. 3) 
1. Ibid., para. 458 . 
2 . Ibid., para. 463. 
3. Ibid., para. 467 . 
Reactions to the' publication of this report were widely varied. 
On the whole, that of Black educationalists was inclined to be unfavour-
able. While they fully approved the Committee's recommendation that 
the financing of Native Education be henceforth entirely out of general 
revenue, allocated by the Education Department, and on a per caput 
basis,l) they were less enthusiastic about the prospect of centralized 
administration and resentful of the way in which the Committee had found 
it necessary to define its aims. The Transvaal Advisory Board received 
a number of objections from schoolteachers, at least one of which was 
passed on to E.G. Malherbe by Rheinallt Jones. Malherbe's comments 
give some indication of the dilemma in which the Committee members 
found themselves. 
The aims and objects as actually formulated by us 
do not place any limitations on the Native. It 
is the political and economic situation in So'~th 
Africa that places limitations on Natives •.. Our 
Commi ttee, 'oJhile recognising those limitations, 
in no single instance justified them. 2) 
Whatever the feelings of the United Party Cabinet about the report, 
its Minister of Education, at any rate, was delighted with it. Hofmeyr 
lost no time after the publication of the report in preparing a memo-
randum on Native Education "as a basis for discussion by the Cabinet 
at an early date. ,,3) The memorandum dealt solely with the administra-
tive recommendations of the Report, all of which Hofmeyr evidently wel-
comed, with one or two reservations: he felt, first, the NAD should 
be more adequately represented on the proposed National Board of Educa-
tion and, secondly, that the constitution proposed by the Committee for 
the various departments should be simplified. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
Before the change of government at the end of 1939, Smit maintained 
Welsh Committee Report, para. 304. 
Malherbe to Rheinallt Jones, 6 February 
Memorandum of 11 November 1936, Hofmeyr 
1937, SAIRR Papers, B9. 
Papers, Dd. 
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a cautious silence on the question of the transfer of Native Education. 
In April 1939, the Minister of Native Affairs delivered a speech at 
Umtata to a meeting of Chiefs and Headmen, the notes for which had 
been prepared by Rodseth . On the question of Education, the Minister 
stated quite unequivocally that it was proposed to transfer c"ontrol 
from the provinces to the Department of Native Affairs . Attached to 
Rodseth's notes was a memorandum on "The Proposed Assumption of Control 
of Native Education by the Government " which made it qui t e clear that 
the government favoured control by 
order to bring education into l ine 
the Department 
"th l ' 1) Wl po lCy. 
of Native Affairs in 
HofmeYr ' s memo r an-
dum of the previous year must be assumed to have been completelY ignored. 
Both this memorandum and the entire Committee Report were clearl y not 
what the government wanted to hear. 
The change of government , so far as Smit, Hofmeyr and progress 
in Black education were concerned , was fortunate . By Jul y 1941 Smit 
was obviously confident of ministerial backing when, at the Lovedale 
Centenary celebrations, he was able to say that the Native Affairs 
Department had no intention of assuming control of Native Education. 
Not only was it unwilling but it was also entirely unqualified. 2 ) The 
way seemed to be open for legisl ation of the kind suggested by the 
Committee and proposed by Hofmeyr in 1936 . The attitude of the pro-
vinces, however, and the exigencies of war time governing put paid to 
any chance that Black education would acquire the centralized and 
specialized administrative machinery it needed bef ore it was too late . 
As early as 1937, soon after the Helsh Committee issued its 
report, the Natal Provincial Administration, backed by its Advisory 
1 . 24 April 1939 , Smit Papers, 3/39 . 
2. Draft speech, 21 July, Ibid., 16/41 . 
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Board on Native Education, came out in total opposition to the transfer 
1) 
of control. In August, a meeting of representatives from all four 
Advisory Boards met in Pretoria. The meeting was convened and chaired 
by Senator Brookes who explained that the government was "not prepared 
to force the issue in face of Natal's opposition. ,,2) The Natal Board 
therefore, wished to submit proposals which, it hoped, 
would permit of the co- ordination of Native Edu-
cation through an Advisory Board under the Union 
Department of Education, without requiring centra-
lized control, and the removal of the control of 
the finances of Nati~~ Education from the Native 
Affairs Department." 
What i t proposed was a Union Education Advisory Committee which 
would advise the provinces and the government on all aspects of Native 
Education - a move which they saw as the first step towards the eventual 
realization of the proposals of the Inter Departmental Committee. As 
soon as this proposal had been accepted by the Conference, the repre-
sentatives, by pre- arrangement through Smit, met the Acting Minister 
of Native Affairs (Smuts), the Minister of Education, and Smit himself. 
Reaction was fairly favourable, apart from Smit's gloomy prognost i cation 
that the NAC would oppose the proposals tooth and nail : the l atter in 
fact, had already prepared a memorandum reaffirming the recommendations 
of the 1921 NAC report, but in spite of this the delegation dispersed 
in a reasonably t · . t' f f' d 4) op lmlS lC rame 0 mln. 
The Native Affairs Commission took it s duties with respect to 
Native Education very seriously. In 1925 it had been named as adviser 
1. 
2 . 
3· 
4. 
While the reasons for Natal ' s opposition are obscure, it should be 
noted that nearly all the Black government schools in the Union were 
in this province . 
I t seems likely that the government, in view of its own divisions 
on the subject of transfer , was quite unable to ' force the issue'. 
Minutes of Conference of Representatives of the four Provincial 
Advisory Boards on Native Education, held in the Provincial Building, 
Pretoria, 23 August 1937, SAIRR Papers, B ~o (a), 
Ibid. 
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to the Minister in the mat ter of the allocation of education funds 
and was reappointed in this capacity in 1936, when, in the interests 
of simplicity , the Development Account was merged with the Native Trust 
Fund. The ' experts ' appointed by Smuts in 1920, and of which the 
Commission was expected to consist,l) had been gradually replaced by 
M.P.' s , ex- cabinet ministers and potential cabinet ministers , 2) all 
of whom had given the Commission an increasingly political orientation. 
Its influential role in such a specialized field was consequently a 
perpetual source of resentment among educationalists. In 1928, for 
instance , when the Commission could actually lay claim to educational 
exper tise among its membership in the persons of Drs. Roberts and Loram, 
a meeting between Heads of Institutions and the NAC, at East London, 
3) 
made this resentment very cl ear . In 1936, shortl y after the publi-
cation of the Welsh Report, a letter from Rheinallt Jones to the Rev. 
S . Makiwane, a concerned member of the Transkeian Council, represented 
the choice as between two evils. The writer expressed extreme wariness 
at the prospect of government control, but, he said, "even now the 
Native Affairs Commission throttles Native Education and there is no 
educationalist on the Commission.,,4) 
The report which the Commission issued in 1937 might have led him 
to even stronger forms of metaphori cal allusion . It was a quite unequi-
vocal document, in which the influence of Heaton Nicholls, to whose 
handiwork much of the 1936 segregation legislation owed its final form, 
was paramount . The whole of t he second chapter was devoted to an 
exposition on Native Education, during the course of which the 
1. Report of the Native Affairs Commiss ion, 1921 UGl5-1922, para. 2. 
2 . The membership in 1936 was as f ollows : G. Heaton Nicholl s , M. P., 
J.M. Young, W. R. Collins , M. P., (later Minister of Agriculture) and 
Gen . E.A. Conroy, M. P. (later Minister of Lands). Each province was 
now represented on the Commission . 
3. Minutes of a meeting between Heads of Institutions and the Native 
Affairs Commission, 19 January 1928 , SAIRR Papers , B65 (d). 
4. 6 October 1936, Ibid. 
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Commissioners decided that " the present system coul d not be better cal -
culated to destroy the aims of Native Poli cy . "l) It attacked the 1936 
Welsh Committee Report fo r assuming t hat the existing state of political 
affairs was of a temporar y and transitor y nature ,2) and stressed the 
need for directing Native Education in conformity with Native POl i cy . 
Paragraph Lfl is worth quoting : 
I f common ci tizenship in a singl e society is to 
be the end , we should obviously set about a proper 
education for ci ti zenship instead of legisl ation 
for separ ate development . .. · The whole conception 
of parall el development with each race living har-
moniously side by side , must be dropped. Instead, 
all that we have to look forward t o is the develop-
ment of an individualized mixed society of White 
and Black with each individual unit dra\ffi into the 
vortex of competition until the hereditary instincts 
of one side or the other gather in centripetal 
force around a modern class ide~ology and usher 
in the class war . The Native Affairs Commission 
emphatical l y rejects thi s vi ew. Its mere state-
ment from an authoritative source shows the need 
for directing Native Education in conformity with 
Native Policy . 3) 
The real issues behind the interminable administrative squabbles 
were at l ast being openl y aired. The 1936 Committee seemed to share 
the prevailing liberal optimism with regard to the transience of the 
segregation policy - an interpr etation which differed radically from 
that of the NAC. As f ar as the latter was concer ned there was to be 
no recogni tion by the White ' trustee ' of the eventual maturity of his 
' ward ' . The rel ationship was to be a permanent one and the system of 
education had to be organized around that fac t. 
There is no concrete evidence that Smit was directly responsible 
fo r increasing the proport ions of the Native Tax allocated to the 
1. Report of the Native Affairs Commi ssion, 1936- 37, UG48- 37, para. 40. 
2 . Ibid. , para 4l. 
3. Ibid . 
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Development Account before 1939. 1 ) As soon as Hofmeyr became Minister 
of Finance, however, their joint interest began to make itself felt. 
At the end of 1939, Smit appealed to the Minister for a further allo-
t · f th t 2) .. f hi h d h H ca lon 0 e ax, provlslon or w c was ma e w en ofmeyr presen-
ted his budget in March the following year. 3 ) Smit had long been 
advocating financial increases for Native Education and in Hofmeyr 
he at last had a Finance Minister who was prepared to do his utmost 
to grant them. There was no question at this stage of an increase in 
the grant from general revenue. That had been set at £31[0,000 in 1925 
and the figure remained unchanged fifteen years later. According to Paton, 
Hofmeyr increased expenditure on Native Education as far "as he could 
dare to do,,4) and it seems that he did not dare, at this stage, to al-
ter the principle behind the financing of such education. There is no 
doubt that he wanted to. At the end of 1940, Smit was still optimistic 
about the prospect of further increases. 5 ) By 1943, however, the Na-
tive Tax had reached the end of the road. The whole amount was to 
be paid into the Trust Fund, of which four fifths were to be used 
for Native Education and the rest for 'purposes of welfare. ' 
Between them, Smit and Hofmeyr had increased expenditure on Native 
Education by 1943 to £1,673,881 - an increase of 84 percent over the 
1939 figure. 6 ) This figure included expenditure on higher education, 
types of agricultural education, and school feeding. Additional money 
was spent by the Native Affairs Department and by the Transkeian and 
Ciskeian General Councils. In 1934, when Smit entered the Department, 
the total number of schools in the Union on which the state spent money 
1. He certainly increased expenditure, though, and this in itself would 
have necessitated an increase in revenue. 
2. Rheinallt Jones to the Secretary of the Native Education Department 
of the Transvaal Education Department, December 1939, Rheinallt Jones 
Papers, C44/a (This indicates that the TED had already established 
a Natives sub-department). 
3. Smit to Hofmeyr, 21 March 1940, Hofmeyr Papers, Dd. 
4. Alan Paton, Hofmeyr, (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1964),p.355. 
5. Smit to Rheinallt Jones, 17 October 1940, Rheinallt Jones Papers,c44/ajl2. 
6. Notes on "The Growth of expenditure on Native Education," 1928-1945, 
SAIRR Papers, B12/e. 
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was 3, 336 . At the end of 1945, when he left it, the number had increased 
1) 
to 4,547. There are two outstanding points to be made in regard to 
the education statistics for the period 1936 to 1946. The first is 
that the number of secondary schools had increased from 20 to 1732 ) and 
the second, that the number of purely government schools had increased 
from a handful in the Cape and 80 in Natal, to a total of 232 for the 
Union. 3) These were important developments and ones which, on the 
evidence, owed a great deal to the efforts of Smit and Hofmeyr· 
Smit's determination to devel op land and agriculture in the Reserves 
extended to the provision of adequate fac i lities for agricultural train-
ing . Although this kind of training was not regarded with quite the 
same degree of suspicion and resentment as the other forms of industrial 
and technical education, it struggled against a purely practical impedi-
ment, which was the lack of empl oyment avenues for certificated agri-
culturalists. The Holloway Report of 1932 had cited this as one of 
the main reasons for the general l ack of enthusiasm for this kind of 
training among young Blacks . The 1936 trust and Land Act had multi-
pl ied these employment opportunities but to nothing like the required 
extent . The agri cultural col lege of Fort Cox had been founded by the 
Department in 1931 and although the Transkeian General Council followed 
suit by starting another two such school s, these were closed within 
a few years due to the lack of both support and funds . 
The texts of various speeches made by the Minister of Native Affairs, 
the Governor General and the Secretary/ at rural gatherings in the 
Reserves throughout this period/were characterized by the stress which 
they l aid on the need for agricult ural education. By 1940, this kind 
1. Cook, in Handbook , p . 364. 
2. Ibid . , p. 369. 
3. Ibid . , p. 364. 
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of emphasi s was even stronger, but the pressure had shifted from 
separate colleges to the school curricula. The reclamation of the 
' Native Areas' was to be one of the main planks in the Department ' s 
programme of post war reconstruction and, with this aim in view, the 
NAD gave the lead to the Education Departments by promoting subjects 
such as gardening and nature study from the earliest years of primary 
education. There was no question of the same sort of emphasis at White 
schools ; differentiation was rearing its head with Smit ' s approval, 
but it was of a more practical and non- political nature than that re-
commended by the Native Affairs Commission. 
Sreit was a firm believer in the need for time, and, quite clearly 
thought that there was going to be plenty of it. He told the Natives 
Representative Council at its first meeting in 1937 that the crux of 
the whole educational question was finance , and that was the issue on 
which most of his energy was spent . Although he told the same session 
of the NRC that "You cannot apply the same scales to Natives as you do 
to Europeans ..• the standard of l iving is different ,,,l) he seems to 
have regarded education as the means whereby those "standards" would 
gradually be changed. It is hard , despite the f r equency with which he 
made remarks of this nature, to convict him of colour prejudice in its 
South Af ri can political sense . While he was in a position to influence 
policy, he could not direct it, and, working via his favourite maxim 
that 'Rome wasn't built i n a day ' , he acted, as he told Hoernle in 
1941, "from day to day, snatching opportunities for Native Advancement 
2) 
as they present themselves." 
As Minister of Education, from 1934 to 1945, Hofmeyr· was in effect 
1. Verbatim Reprints of the Natives Representative Council, First Session, 
December, 1937, p. 52. 
2. Smit to Hoernle 31 October 1941, Smit Papers, 25/41. 
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Minister of higher education only. He could advise the Minister of 
Finance on the estimates for White education but had nothing to do with 
the financing of Black education, except that which was officially 
classified as 'higher '. It does seem however, that he managed to 
stretch the definition of 'higher education ' as far as it would go . 
Fort Hare, which had been established in 1916, was controlled and financed 
by the Union Education Department; by 1946 the number of teacher 
training schools for Blacks had increased from 27 i n 1936 to 321 ) 
while industrial training had come to be regarded as 'higher ' and some 
of the financial onus thereby removed from the NAD . By 1946 there 
2) 
were 51 such schools or departments of schools. HofmeYr had also 
helped t o establish a school f or training Black social workers in 
Johannesburg, which, despite its low entrance qualifications, was of-
ficially classified as 'higher ' and for which the UED rather than the 
NAD assumed financial responsibil ity. 
The anomalies of this sort of divided control sometimes bordered 
on the absurd. I n 1943, an exchange in theSenate highlighted some of 
the difficulties encountered: during the debate on the policy of the 
Minister of Finance and Education, Hofmeyr came under fire from the 
Native Representatives over the l ack of money available for Native 
Education, and referred them to the Minister of Native Affairs on the 
grounds that Native Education was not one of his responsibilities. 
There is reason to sympathize with Brooke ' s frust r at ion: 
. . . unless the Mini ster of Finance has a few 
quiet words with his colleague the Minister of 
Native Affairs, we shall undoubtedly be referred 
back by the Minister to the financial difficulties 
of the situation , to the Treasury and to the 
/·1inister of Finance and that is our difficulty 
all the time. 3) 
1. Welsh Committee Report, para . 184 and Cook in Handbook , p . 371 . 
2. Cook in Handbook, p. 371. 
3. Senate Hansard, 31 March 1943, cols. 1113, 1233-5. 
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When the debate was resumed, Hofmeyr t r ied to clarify the situation : 
... as Minister of Education I have nothing to 
do with the financing of Education. I do deal 
with the financing of Native Education as 
Minister of Finance ... [ ;'utl I must needs 
be guided by what i s put before me by ... the 
Minister of Native Affairs . 1) 
The latter, of course, was guided by the Secretary, who was advised by 
the NAC and (ostensibly ) the NRC , whose advice was based on provincial 
estimates, which in turn were guided by the Advisory Boards and the 
Chief Inspectors. I t was all rather l ike the House that Jack built, 
and it was not until 1945 that its foundations approached anything 
near the strength required to support it . 
In 1941, Smit opened the D.L. Smit Dormitory block at Lovedale, 
a teacher s' training college in the Eastern Cape . The hostel for Black 
students at Wits University which was opened in 1944 was called the 
Douglas Smit Hostel , and so were a number of simil ar institutions. 
A l ar ge proportion of the letters Smit received on his retirement were 
f r om school or mission heads who were el oquent in their praise for his 
efforts and achievements in Native Education. Those were not empty 
gestures , nor did the grand sound of his farewells signify . nothing. 
The idea of training Black doctors had been Smit ' s, money for the 
hostel had been found from the Trust and the NAD on his recognizances , 
it was through his efforts that the Trust paid the boarding fe~ ; of all 
Black medical students and it was his efforts which had resulted in the 
2 ) 
establishment of five bursaries of £225 per annum for selected students . 
The missions had long ago di scover ed that i t paid to approach Smit 
dir ectly for money . No request , however large or small, was disregarded. 
An exchange of letters between Eiselen, Transvaal Chief Inspector for 
1. Ibid., col. 1255. 
2. Text of van der Byl ' s speech at the opening of the hostel, 27 November 
1944, Smi t Papers, 28/44; van der !SJl to H.R. Raikes, 14 August 1941+, 
ibid. , 15/44. Memorandum in ' Medical Training for Natives ' , 25 Nov-
ember 1944 , ibid. , 27/44. 
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Native Education and Rheinallt Jones makes it clear that Smit was as 
sympathetic and helpful as possible. l ) In March 1941,Father Stephen 
Carter of St . Peters, Rosettenville, decided to apply for money from the 
Native Affairs Department for the first time in the history of the 
school (which was not registered as 'aided). He had applied, he said, 
because he thought there was some hope of a grant while Smit was hold-
ing the reins and, "of course •.• he will not always hold that post . ,,2) 
The Native Representatives had also learnt the value of Smit ' s support 
where he was able to give it :, in a letter to Edgar Brookes about the 
cost-of -living allowances payable to Black schoolteachers , Margaret 
Ballinger wrote that she had tried to see Smit "wi th a view of getting 
3) him to put his weight behind our demand •.. 
From the middle of 1941, when Lovedale opened its new dormitory 
block, Smit was kept busy opening one new secondary school after the 
other. In August , the Transvaal got its first Black government seconda-
ry school, at Orlando, the biggest 'location' in the Union. The Johan-
nesburg City Council provided the site, the Trust provided the building, 
Hofmeyr had found the money which would enable the Province to run the 
school and Smit had provided the initiative. ~lhile he had nothing but 
praise for mi ssionary educated activities, there is evidence that he 
favoured the establishment of government secondary schools run in 
exactly the same fashion as those for Whites. Here he had the support 
of the Cape Superintendent for Education, Dr. Wouter de Vos Malan. 
Dr. O.D. Wollheim, who was employed by the Cape Education Department 
at the time, recalls that 
Both of them - and I suspect that Smit was at 
the bottom of the plan - wanted to experiment 
Vlith schools for Africans which were not con-
trolled by Missions. There had been recurring 
unrest and troubles at such schools and they 
thought that 
1. January-February 1941, Rheinallt Jones PaEers , C44/a. 
2 . Carter to Rheinallt Jones, 6 March 1941, Ibid. 
3. Ballinger t o Brookes, 30 July 1944, Ballinger Papers a/410/32(d) . 
for 
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schools for African scholars run exactly like 
those for Whites, with locally elected school 
Committees working under the supervision of 
the local school board might be the solution 
to the problems. 1) 
Smit ' s interest in the progress of compulsory education schemes 
Blacks i n colonial areasZ) and the amount of information he 
collected on this subject bear out Dr . Wollheim ' s further remarks : 
Smit ... felt that the time was ripe for a 
gradual extension of education, other than 
Mission controlled, t o a much wider range 
of children in the hope that over the years 
one might achieve a state where compulsory 
education might be applied - first to the 
age of twelve years, later extending to 
fourteen years, and ending up the same as 
for Whites. 3) 
Wollheim was chosen personally by Dr . Malan, in consultation with 
Smit, as the first headmaster of the newly established government 
school at Duncan Village, East London, in 1938 . Officially, Smit was 
concerned only with the finance of Native Education, but the evidence, 
throughout his office in the NAD, is to the effect that he deliberately 
involved himself in every possible aspect of it . 
The Duncan Village school was the first of its kind in the Union. 
Others followed , at Port Elizabeth and Kingwilliamstown, before the 
Transvaal and Natal followed suit . The Orange Free State, by 1946, 
still had no government schools for Blacks at all, let alone secondary 
4) 
schools. This fact or, and the leadership provided by the Cape in 
this field of Black education are interesting for two reasons : they 
underline the role played by individual initiative among administrative 
1 . Dr. O.D. Wollheim in a letter to the writer, 29 ~nrch, 1977. 
2. In 1945-6 he conducted extensive research in this field , particular-
ly in Northern Rhodesia, which was the only area in which compul-
sory education for Blacks had been effectively applied. 
3. Wollheim to the writer , 29 ~ch, 1977. 
4. Cook in Handbook, p . 364. 
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personnel in the development of Native Education, as well as the 
lack of co-ordination between the various provinces which control led 
it . 
In August 1941 Smit opened the Western Native Township Secondary 
School, in JolUULnesburg. This school had in fact had its origin in -
Missionary effort and was to be fed from the Mission schools in the 
area. Again, the Council had provided the site and the Trust the 
money, and, like Orlando, t he school was to be staffed entirely by 
Blacks. October 1942 saw the opening of the D. L. Smit Secondary 
School at Lemava, a M~ssion school this time . The Swiss Mission 
there had actually applied to the Department of Education for a grant 
for the school, the grant had been refused and it was Smit who had 
somehow found the money from the Department of Native Affairs. l ) 
The Dutch Ref ormed Missions seemed determined to match the endeavour 
of the other Missionary bodies . At the end of 1942 they opened a 
secondary school at Middelburg, Transvaal and by the end of 1944 
'Die Sendingskool van die Nederduitse Hervormde of Gereformeerde 
Kerk te Orlando' had opened in Orl ando . The Dutch Reformed Missions 
were later to provide the fiercest opposition to the transfer of Native 
F.ducation to the Union Department of Education. 
By the middle of 1943 Smit was looking forward to real changes 
in the prevailing attitudes. He himself had begun to substitut e 
'African' for 'Native ' in his numerous speeches at public functions, 
and he referred enthusiastically to the 'new world' after the war, 
in which education was to be a matter of primary concern. 2 ) In 
1. Text of Principal's opening speech, 5 October 1942, Smit Papers , 
6/42 . 
2. Text of Smit' s opening address at the Langa Secondary School, 
Cape Town, 6 March 1943, ibid., 4/ 43. 
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March 1943 the Western Cape acquired its first Black secondary school, 
and Smit, when he opened it, spoke of the growth of government secon-
dary schools in terms of an experiment "on which the future policy 
1) 
of Native Education will largely depend. " In a letter of apprecia-
tion which he received shortly afterwards, the principal, Mr. I.M. Mkize, 
was full of praise for the "liberal grants that your department has 
consistently made, sometimes in the teeth of the fiercest opposition, 
towards all aspects of Native development . ,,2) While there was obvious-
ly sense in Hoernle ' s contention that the limits within which the paid 
official could "shape " pol icy were narrow ones, the point here is 
that there was at this stage no policy at all with respect to Native 
Education - a fact of which Smit took the utmost advantage . 
Early in February 1944 it seemed that the ' great experiment ' was 
working well. A conference on ' The Control and Finance of Nat ive 
Education ' was convened by Smit in Cape TO'NIl and attended, at his 
invitation, by the Minister of Native Affalrs , the Minister of 
Education and Finance , the Secretary for Education (Mr . F. Hugo) 
and Smit himself. The Native Representatives were all there, as were 
representatives of the Provincial Education Departments , the Christian 
Council of South Africa, Dutch Reformed and Roman Catholic Missions , 
the Federated African Teachers ' Association and, (an indication 
that Smit had got the measure of Black politics?) the ANC rather 
than the NRC. Van der Byl reported that the whole of the Native Tax 
was now paid into the Native Trust , of which four fifths was to be 
used for education. The estimated expenditure fo r Native Education 
in 1944-5 was £1,894,000, however, an amount with which it was beyond 
1. Ibid . 
2. Smit Papers , 4/43. 
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the abili ty of the tax to cope. Clearly, something had to be done 
about money, and Hofmeyr, who came in at this juncture, went straight 
to the point . He made two: first , that it was surely impractical for 
the NAD to assume control of Native Education when the limit of avail-
abl e Trust funds had been r eached, and second, simply that the Depart-
ment of Native Affairs was not an educational Department. l ) 
Hofmeyr· recommended, as he had always done, that the soundest course 
woul d be to place control with the Union Department of Education - a 
move which was strongl y opposed by the Provinces , which "were not 
prepared to relinquish control of Native Education but desired more 
money in order to develop it . ,,2) He then produced the alternative 
solution which had been proposed by Natal i n 1937: that the posit i on 
of the Provinc es should remain untouched, but that the Union Department 
of Education should replace the NAD in the matter of financial control . 
Native Poll Tax revenue should henceforth be paid into general revenue 
and Native Education 
should become a state service, financed from 
general state funds, and under the control of 
t he state education authority . There should 
be a Union Advisory Board on Native Education 
to advise the Minister of Education, along the 
lines suggested by the Welsh Committee . 3) 
With the single exception of the Dutch Reformed Church, there was 
general approbation of these proposals. The tenor of Hofmeyer ' s re-
marks seemed to be that the Provincial Co·~cils were on trial, although 
the Minutes prepared by the Christian Council put it rather ambiguousLy: 
The impression was gained from Mr. Hofmeyr ' s 
remarks that the Provincial Councils had been 
led to realise that they must fully carry out 
their responsibilities as administrators of 
Native education if they are to retain their 
present position. 4) 
1. Minutes of the Conference (as reported by the Christian Council of 
South Africa), SAIRR Papers , B72(e). 
2 . Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. U,id . 
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If the Provinces, and particularly, one suspects from the record of its 
non achievements, the Orange Free State, failed to measure up to these 
expectations, then it was onl y a step to the implementation of the 
Welsh Report . 
The Native Education Act of 1945, in which the Natal suggestions 
were embodied, transcended one of the major ' in principle ' obstacles 
hi t herto pl aced in the way of non differentiated education for Blacks, 
in that the money came from general revenue and not specifically , from 
the proceeds of Native taxation . Moreover, its allocation was to be 
controlled by the Union Education Department, advised py a Board of 
experts , so that Provincial differences were at last going to be up 
against a fairly solid centralized control . 
Soon after the Education Act was passed, Hofmeyr . invited Smit to 
become a member of the Union Advisory Board on Education "in his 
private capacity , ,,l) as one of the three nominated members. 2 ) The 
Minister was obviously the nominator and did not, apparently, wish to 
lose the benefits of an association which had hitherto proved so profit-
able . Hofmeyr." had earlier expressed resentment at being advised by members of 
the NAC who were not educat i onal experts ; Smit himself was not an edu-
cational expert and Hofmeyr · in this instance , used his prerogative t o 
enli st sympathy rather than expertise. 
The Education Act of 1945) though it remained in force for a compari-
tively short period, represented the cUlmination of Smit's career 
in the Department of Native Affairs . All those who remember him, 
1. Cable from Hofmeyr to Smit, 9 October 1945, Smit Papers, 222/45. 
2. The composition of the Advisory Board included three government 
nominees. The chairman was the Secretary for Native Affairs ; other 
members were the Secretary for Education, a representative of each 
Province and two members of the NRC . 
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including Margaret Ballinger and Gordon Mears, are unanimous in his 
praise when they recall his influence on the development of Native 
Education. Mrs . Ballinger has call ed him a 'pioneer' in this fie l d, 
whose total opposition to the principle of segregated education was 
1) 
responsible for most of the improvements in this area before 1948. 
Dr . Mears selected this aspect of Native Affairs as the one in which his 
influence with his Ministers was most effective,2) while even Maj or 
van der Byl referred to him as that "rare " and "great " public servant -
"who actually influences government poliCy.,,3J 
1 . In n private interview, Cape Town, April 1977. 
2 . I bid. 
3. Van der Byl ro Smit, 20 March 1945, Smit Papers, 32/45. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NATIVE REPRESENTATIVES COUNCIL, THE NATIVE AFFAIRS 
COMMISSION AND D. 1. SMIT 
I have discovered this peculiarity among our 
IVhite people generally throughout the country, 
among the most sympathetic White people - that 
they like to criticize the government , but the 
African must not do so - Oh dear no! 
(Councillor MOsaXa, August 1944, Seventh Session, 
Verbatim Reports of the Natives Representative 
Council, 111:62). 
While the Department of Native Affairs expanded to meet the responsibi-
lities imposed on it by the 1936 Land Act and the newly created Native 
Trust , its Secretary found himself cast in a deci dedly unenviable 
role by the Representation of Natives Act . In the first place, by 
shepherding into Parliament three M.P. ' s and four Senators whose pur-
pose was solely that of promoting Black development and airing Black 
grievances, the Act gave to Native Affairs a prominence in debate and 
public attention which they had never had before. Secondly, because 
the creation of the twenty- two member Natives Representative Council 
was, along with the parliamentary r epresentation , ostensibly at any 
rate, an integral feature of the entire 1936 segregation structure , 
its successful operation was essential to the credibility of the pol icy 
as a whole . 
The Council was composed of twelve communally and indirectly elected 
Black member s, six White officials and fo'~r nominated Blacks ; it had 
the function of considering and reporting to the Minister of Native 
Af fairs on proposed legislation insofar as it might effect the Nat ive 
population, on any matter referred to it by the Minister and on any 
" matter especially affecting the interests of the Natives in general. 
Its chairman was the Secretary for Native Affairs and for nearly the 
whole of the Council"' s working life , it was Smit, in his capacity as 
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a White administrative official, who occupied the chair . 
I n spite of the potentiall y extensive scope thus conf erred on 
the Council by the Act, its members , duly elected, were called together 
for the first session only in December 1937, after the contentious 
Native Laws Amendment Act of that year had been passed. Not sur-
pri singly then , having been th»arted in its desire to make its 
statutory contribution to the legislation in draft, the Council, 
Thema and A. M. Jabavu in parti cular, was keen to express its opposi-
tion to the Act . Smit, in the chair for the first time, surrounded 
by stalwarts of the Native Affairs Department and the NAC (the latter 
customarily sat in on NRC debates) , and encouraged by the obvious 
differences in opinion between the rural and urban members of the 
Council, took a firm line from the start . He refused to al l ow any 
kind of policy discussion on t he gro:mds that policy was a parlia-
mentary matter and outside the scope of the Council and instructed 
Councillors to confine themselves to related administrative problems 
1) 
only. He did, however , with that curious a~bivalence which charac-
terized all his dealings with the NRC, make it plain that his Depart-
ment would do all in its power to encourage local authorities to 
make use of their powers of controlling ingress "so as to obviate 
as far as possibl e the bringing into operation of the removal provi-
. '/2 ) 
5~ons . 
There was an element of farce about the whole situation. Many 
of the Councillors had been part of the AAC oppo sition to the Acts of 
19363) and had only all owed themselves t o be nominated for election 
1 . Verbatim Reports of the Native Representatives Council, First Session, 
December 1937 . (Hereinafter referred to as NRC Verbatim Reports). 
Smit ' s ruling was definitely contradictory to the statutory func-
tions of the Council, but, in view of his administrative position, 
understandable : "I ask you to confine yourselves to the difficul-
ties you may have in administering the l aws." 
2 . Ibid., 8 Dec ember 1937. 
3. Notably A.M. J abavu, Z. K. Mathews and Godlo. 
to the NRC in order to test the efficacy of the new policy and because 
there wasnothing they could do about it. They came, therefore, reluctant-
l y, cri tically, yet prepared to give the new constitutional channel s 
every chance . For his part , Smit was opposed in principle to the segre-
gation policy as a long term solution to the 'problem ' of race relations 
in South Africa . In 1937, this opposition was neither as evident nor 
as convinced as it later became . I t stemmed from an intellectual recog-
nition of a common humanity and from an ' administration- eye view ' of 
the practical difficulties involved in such a course . There is no 
evidence, then or l ater, that this recognition ever became an emotional 
one , or that Smit envisaged the transition to common citizenship in his 
lifetime or even that of his children. Hence his obvioas paternalism 
and his energetic innovations with regard to Native Affairs \>Jere in no 
fl O t " 1) waY con ~c ~ng . As far as the NRC was concerned, the l ack of ideo-
logi cal commitment on both ' sides ' to what was, in fact, a political 
experiment, boded ill for its successful outcome . 
The pattern for NRC sessions for the next ten years was set . In 
1937 the Council \>Jas courteously but firmly relegated to the position of 
an administrative adjunct . It was presented with accounts and estimates 
of expenditure , its questions were ans\>Jered to the best of their ability 
by the government officials cal led in by Smit to cope with the prepared 
agendas , and policy matters became an increasing embarrassment to offi-
cialdom. By 1946 , Mears was washing the administration's hands of the 
Council altogether and asking to be relieved of the chair on the grounds 
that the NRC was a "pol itical institution" and determined, in its 
1 . Brookes i s right when he called him a 'paternalist ' , and so is 
Oscar Wollheim, who says : "1 cannot imagine him to have had any sort 
of colour prejudice and I am sure that he was do i ng his very best, 
under difficult cir cumstances, t o bring Africans a s quick~y as pos-
sible deeper into Western culture and the socio-economic worl d. " 
0 11 a letter to the writer, 29 March, 1977) . 
deliber ations, to r ange beyond those l imits lilth which an administra-
tive official could cope. l ) 
Despi te the obvious difficult,ies of his position, Smi t ' s attitude 
is difficult to understand. The man to whom Hoernle confided his 
correspondence with Cl ayton, and to whom Sir Thomas Graham had written 
with such optimi sm on his appointment in 1934, is difficult to recon-, 
cile with the hard line chair man of the NRC . As far as administrative 
questions were concerned, Smit was in his element . His knowledge of 
the whole gamut of Nati ve Administration was astounding. On many 
occasions he was abl e to reel off facts and figures without reference 
either to written statistics or to the assembled officials who had come 
provided with such information. His apparent lack of sympathy with 
the political grievances frequently voiced by the various Councillors 
was partly attributable to his inability to do anything about them ; 
his efforts as NRC Chairman were consistently directed towards making 
the Council aware of the immense practical difficulties of administra-
tion and somehow imbuei pg its members with a greater sense of 'adminis-
trative responsibility . ' 
One of the biggest grievances of the NRC was the continued exis-
tence of the Native Affairs Commission. Since 1921, when it issued 
its first report, the tone of Commission report s had become increasing-
ly unsympathetic towards those i nterests which it was supposed to 
represent . Its membership , faithful at first to Smuts's contention 
that the Commission should consist of ' experts' and that it should 
devote its attention to those matters (such as the Pass Laws and 
' Native Taxation , )2) which constituted particularly thorny 'probl ems' , 
had become more and more political over the years. From the sympathetic 
1. "Notes of discussion by the Native Affairs Commission in regard to 
the Natives Representatives Council , " 27 September 1946, Smit 
Papers, 31/46 . 
2. Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1921, para. 5. 
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interest revealed by the r eports of Loram and Roberts in 1921, the 
NAC, by 1937, .confined itself to upholding the letter and spirit of 
th t · 1· f th d· 1) M b h · f th e segrega 10n po 1CY 0 e prece 1ng year . em ers 1p 0 e 
Commission, under the Hertzog government, had become something in t he 
-
nature of a 'reward ' for favoured M.P. ' s or Senators with the result 
that, by 1936, three out of its four members were also members of 
Parliament . (See p . 66 ). 
Opposition to the NAC was not confined to the Natives Representatives 
Council. Criticism of the Commission and in particular of Heaton 
Nicholls , was heard from all quart ers of South African political life, 
from the ANC to the Senate . The influence of Heaton Nicholls , guiding 
light of the select committee deliberations on the 1936 legislation, 
was especially apparent in the NAC recommendation to the government to 
proceed with the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Bill without waiting to con-
suIt the NRC after elections had been held. 
Quite apart from this action on the part of the NAC, of which they 
were resentfully aware, the Councillors who laid down their objections 
to the Commission in 1937 had logic on their side . Although the two 
bodies were differently constituted, the functions which provided their 
rai son d'etre were essentially similar . The Parliamentary activities 
of the Native Representatives were considered to complement those of 
the NRC ; those who felt that the representative structure oJ 1936 (i. e . 
NRC plus Native Representatives) had led to the redundancy of the older 
body, had a strong case . I t was argued, moreover, that not only were 
the interests of the Commission (wnose members represented White electo-
ral constituencies), opposed to those of the Council, but that its 
1. Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1936, UG48- 37, paras20 to 
42. 
direct access to the government gave it an unfair advantage. The NAC 
was unhampered by having to rely on an administrative official as a 
channel for communication and was expected, if it so desired, to go 
over the head of the government and to lay its recommendations be-
fore Parliament. l ) 
For this reason, Nicholls argued, in somewhat contradictory fashion, 
as he replied to the criticism of the Commission which emerged at the 
first session of the Council, it was better to have M.P.'s and 
Senators on the Commission as they would obviously carry more weight 
with Parliament. 2 ) The Council's contention that its interests and 
those of the NAC were far from harmonious was ignored. In addition, 
the extensive activities of the NAC in connection with the Trust were 
used as a pistol to point at the heads of land-hungry rural members, 
mainly the chiefs, with the result that motions demanding the abolition. 
of the NRC both in 1937 and 1939 found no support in that quarter. 
A great deal of the Commission's work consisted of persuading 
White farmers to withdraw their demands for the excision of their land 
from the ' released areas'. If - as had been promised in Parliament 
in 1936 - the claims of those who wished to have their farms excised 
were upheld, then the Commission would have to determine what land 
should be substituted. Actual purchases were made by the Land Board, 
but the NAC was responsible for the allocation of such purchases, and 
3) for the propitiation of White farmers. This was one of the main 
reasons why, initially at any rate, the Council was divided on the 
subject of the NAC. In addition, urban members obviously tended to 
be better educated, have a greater degree of political sophistication 
and to have less to lose. 
1 . Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1921, para. 1. 
2. NRC Verbatim Reports, First Session, December 1937, p. 35. 
3. Senate Hansard, 26 March 1942, cols. 1533-1552. 
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At the 1939 NRC session, Nicholls, who seemed to have elected 
himself chief NAC spokesman, both in Parliament and at Council meetings, 
1) 
again replied to criticisms, this time in a lengthy speech. He made 
it clear that he regarded the Commission as a political body with an 
important role to play in Native Affairs, and the NRC as something 
less. He condemned what he called "academic ideas of equality" and 
advised the Council to take what was offered to it, rather than allow 
itself to be led astray by "socialistic tendencies". The reaction of 
men like Thema, Mapikela, Jabavu and Godlo to this address was bitter. 
Smit's immediate ban on any discussion of Nicholls's speech was largely 
ignored as the Councillors expressed their resentment both of its con-
tent and of the fact that the government was far more likely to lend 
its ear to representations such as they had just heard than to any which 
they themselves might make. Godlo included a personal attack on Heaton 
Nicholls in his general indictment of the Commission, and Jabavu alleged 
that he had documentary evidence to the effect that it was entirely 
due to NAC support for the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Bill that Black 
opposition to the legislation failed. 2 ) On all levels, then, from the 
personal to the political, the Council found itself at odds with the NAC. 
Notwithstanding the courteous assurances of the chairman at . NRC 
meetings, there is no evidence whatsoever that Smit went beyond the 
line of duty in referring its resolutions to the Ministers concerned. 
In spite of his numerous differences of opinion with the NAC, the NAD 
worked closely and co-operatively with it, and Smit's sympathies in 
the NRCjNAC dispute were obviously with the latter. He received a 
number of letters from private and public individuals, outlining their 
objections to the political character of the Commission's membership, 
1. NRC Verbat im Reports, November 1939, p. 157. 
2. Ibid., 2 December 1939, p. 249. 
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but gave no indication of his own feelings on the matter . In 1941, 
Senator Malcomess, one of the Native Representatives, wrote a long 
letter to Smit on the subject of the NAC in ,,,hi ch Black and White ob-
jections to the Commission were summarized. l ) The Commission, he said, 
was "a nuisance " , mainly because it brought pol itical pressure to bear 
on the Native Affairs Department : NAC members should not have t o 
give up half their time t o parl iamentary duties. The main bone of 
contention, again, seems to have been Heaton Nicholls. Malcomess pointed 
out that ther e was no co- operation between the Native Representatives 
and the NAC, and that the former resented being referred t o as "those 
friends of the Natives" by Nicholls in the Benate . 2 ) 
A similar letter from Colonel Stubbs, head of the ' Native Corps ', 
referred to the NAC as a home for "political misfits" and stressed the 
need for a change in composition . 3) Smit's acceptance of membership 
of the Commission in 1945, however, indicated his belief that the NAC 
stil l had a valuable function to fulfil despite the existence of the 
NRC - or, indeed, after so many years as chairman of that body , because 
of it. 
After 1939 the NRC passed no fur ther resolutions on the NAC and, 
except for adverse references at various points of debate, it did not 
again become an issue until 1944. The Council was far from united in 
its early opposition to the Commission, the war intervened and Nicholls 
went off t o London as South Af r ican High Commissioner . Although the 
NRC was opposed in principle to Edgar Brooke ' s membership of the 
Commission in 1942, (he repl aced Heaton Nicholls), he certainl y had 
a moderating influence there . I ndeed, his appointment suggests that 
1. Malcomess to Smit, 24 May 1941, Smit Papers, 12/41 . 
2. Copy of a letter from Malcomess to Smuts , Ibid. 
3. Stubbs to Smit, 6 February 1943, Ibid . 3/43. 
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the mounting criticism of the NAC , both in Parliament and outside of it, 
had found its mark. 
By 1944, internal divisions within the NRC had been so far over-
come that no less than four independent motions demanding the abolition 
of the NAC were set down on the agenda. Introducing his own motion, 
Godlo was 
•.• quite confident that times have changed and 
members of this Council have gained experience 
in regard to the working not only of this Coun-
cil, but of the Native Affairs Commission . 1) 
The cessation of Trust buying as well as the f requency with which land 
formerly designated 'released ' had been excised by the NAC at the re-
quest of White farmers,may well have been the major contributing factor 
in overcoming the fears of rural members . There were others: Hansard 
was widely quoted and utterances such as ' Heathen' and ' Barbarians ', 
f requent ly and incautiously made by NAC members, received vigorous 
objections. 2 ) Mosaka quoted from the latest NAC Report: 
As the emphasis towards urbanization grows, the 
threat to the existence of the gold mines by 
the drain on all their natural labour resources 
will be equalled o~ly by the parlous state of 
EQropean agriculture' 3) 
and concluded, with some justification, that the "members of the Native 
Affairs Commission are the most reactionary members of P3J'liament.,,4) 
The NAC, at any rate, was not concerned to coat the segregation pill 
with its custom3J'Y sugar. I t might , in fact, in the light of this 
statement, have agreed with Thema when he said 
1. NRC Verbatim Reports, Seventh Session, 9- 22 August 1944, p . 67. 
2. Ibid., p. 84. 
3. Ibid., p. 100. 
4. Ibid., p. 98. 
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This Land Act, this Urban Areas Act and all 
these other Acts . .• are intended to control 
our labour so that the vfui te man may grow rich 
by the sweat of our brows. 1) 
Nicholl s's defence of the Commission before the NRC was based 
largely on i ts activities in the field , and it seems clear that this 
was also the basis of Smit ' s support for the Commission. A great 
deal of NAC energy went into the propiation of Vlliite farming interests 
whi ch were reluctant either to allow their l and to become part of the 
' released areas ' or to see the growth of large Black areas on terri-
tory immediately adjacent to the i r own. Tnema and Godlo had declared 
that the NRC was as capabl e of handling these matters as the NAC,2) 
but it is doubtful whether an al l Black body would have met with any 
success at all . On the other hand, the Commission ' s duties did not 
stop with the acquisition of the l and . All Trust lands, once bought 
and settled, automatically became ' betterment areas ' and were subject 
to regular inspections by the NAC. Conf lict and suspicion ·were rife 
among the Trustees and those who occupied the land so acquired. 3 ) In 
many cases the Commission took issue with the NAD on the question of 
these Trus t Lands , even going so far as to accuse the Department, 
from time to time, of ' wasting' Trust money on agricultural education. 4 ) 
Strictures on cattle culling and dipping might have met with greater 
success had they been expounded by Black Councillors rather than 
Vlliite Commissioners . 
The clue to Smit ' s attitude to the NRC lies in his original state-
ment that "you are not here to discuss matters of policy.5) He hoped 
to find the Council ready with suggestions which might ease the path 
1. Ibid., p . 40. 
2. Ibid., Third Session, December 1939, p . 31 . 
3. Apart from some strong statements by Councillors at the 1944 Session 
on this subject, see Monica Wilso~ ' s section on ' Land Tenure' in 
M.E. Elton Mills and M. Wilson (eds) Keiskammahoek Rural Survey, 
(Pietermaritzburg: Shooter & Shuter, 1952) f or criticisms of this 
aspect of Trust tenure . 
4. Senate Hansard, 23 April 1941, cols. 1628- 1635. 
5. NRC Verbatim Reports, December, 1937. 
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of administration and hasten that ' development' to which his administra-
tive energy was applied. Instead, by 1943, he regarded his chairman-
ship of it as nothing more than a "very trying" part of his adminis-
trative duties. With the Council becoming more and more frustrated 
in the face of administrative inscrutability, Smit complained bitterly 
to his wife of the "urban element " and the "educated Native" whom he 
saw as having "only one ambition . . . the removal of class distinctions 
and the desire for political equality_"l) Although the debating record 
for 1943 was moderate and restrained in comparison with that of the 
following year, and Smit himself did not come under fire, the Council 
had clearly expected great changes as a result of the Smit Report and 
was not as easily satisfied, as Smit had appeared to be, with the 
minor changes which had followed its publication. 
Expecting gratitude for the impressive list of achievements in 
the various fields of Native Administration and welfare with which 
the Council was confronted at the beginning of every session, he 
found, instead, that the "educated Native does not s a.,y thank you for 
2) 
anything else we might do for him and his people . " In the same vein, 
however, Smit also complained of the imminent return to Pretoria of 
Van der Byl, whom he had been "breaking in" since Reitz ' s departure 
for England at the end of 1942. He appeared to have enjoyed a sense 
of peace and relief in his absence and the Minister's return, he said, 
3) 
would only add "to my work and worry." The substance of this lament, 
in effect, amounted to a desire to administer in peace, without poli-
tical interference from either Councillors or government Ministers -
both of whom were an equal nuisance and whose activities merely 
1. S~it to Mrs. Smit, 16 May 1943, Smit Papers 14/43. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. , 21 Ma.,y 1943, 16/43. 
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added to the burdens of administration. Whatever the dra'/backs of the 
Native Affairs Commission, it was at least operating in a sphere which 
was within his official frame of reference . 
There is plenty of evidence in the Smit Papers that Smit went out 
of his way to excite government attention on matters which he regarded 
as meriting it . In some instances , Smit's activities were directly 
responsible for policy decisions or for government intervention and 
action . There is no evidence, however , that he ever made use of his 
obvious influence in Native Affairs by using the proceedings of the 
NRC as a lever for reform. In April 1941, Senator Rheinallt Jones 
proposed a motion in the Senate which made this lack quite clear: 
"That this house, having had before it the resolutions passed by the 
NRC at its meetings in November and December 1940, has noted them, and 
commends t hem to the careful consideration of the government ." 1) 
While Jones was careful to praise the Secretary for Native Affairs 
and his Department for "the manner in which they have gone out of 
th " t ak th C"l " 2) h d" d t h elr way 0 m e e ounCl a success ... , e l n o say ow 
this was being done. Instead, the Minister was condemned for allowing 
the passage of Bills such as the Workmens ' Compensation, Miners' Phthisis 
and others "concerning Natives ," \,i thout prior consultation with the 
Council, and f or not bringing Council resolutions "more forcibly" before 
either House of Parliament . 
Yet, when Smit felt that the municipalities needed bringing into 
line with the Urban Areas legislation, he made his feelings known and 
something was done. When he decided that the Pass Laws were becoming 
a burden on the Administration, he collaborated with Reit z and something 
was done. He could not, sitting year after year in the chai r at 
Council meetings , have failed to realize that nothing was being done. 
1. Senate Hansard, 23 April 1941, col. 1619. 
2. Ibid., col. 1623. 
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He certainly noted the changing temper of Council resolutions, but as he 
attributed these to the 'urban element' in the NRC he may well have 
failed to mark the growing unity within the Council. It seems that 
Smit judged the NRC on its administrative usefulness , found it lacking 
and confined himself, thereafter , to his duty . Edgar Brookes, who worked 
closely with Smit on the NAC in later years, and attended many of the 
Council meetings in his capacity both as a Native Representative and 
as a Commissioner, has given it as his opinion that Smit was quite un-
characteristically lethargic when it came to bringing NRC resolutions 
'more forcibly' to the attention of the Ministers concerned. l ) 
When the Council met in August 1946, the Rand gold strikes were in 
full swing and the trials of those alleged to have instigated the riots 
at Lovedale were about to begin . For the past five years the war had 
featured prominently in NRC debates . Notwithstanding the considerable 
progress made in such fields as Native Education and Social Welfare, 
Smit had used it as a mitigatory plea for the stagnation in land pur-
chasing, housing, land reclamation and other matters. In the ear~y war 
years , the measures and the political climate described earlier had gone 
a long way towards raising hopes and expectations. In December 1943, the 
Council heard Hofmeyr .. , in the absence of Van der Byl who was visiting 
troops in North Africa, make his opening address . His words , coming so 
soon after Smit ' s own unfavourable comments on segregation, were 
encouraging: 
I have never accepted the policy of the development 
of the African 2) 'on his own lines', in so far as 
that "was merely a cloak for keeping him in what was 
regarded as being his place - a place of stagnation 
and servility . 3) 
1. Interview, Pietermaritzburg, June 1977· 
2. The replacement of ' Native ' by ' African' is noticeable in all official 
speeches from about 1942 onwards . 
3. ' Notes of Hofmeyr 's opening speech to the NRC', SAIRR Papers, B99(k). 
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It was with growing sceptism though, in the disillusioned aftermath 
of the Smit Report and the Pass Law experiment, with controll ing legis-
lation growing instead of diminishing, that Councillors looked fo rward 
to the promised new post- war world. The contrast between the moderation 
displayed in the recommendations of a Recess Co~mittee of the NRC which 
drew up plans for the reconstruction of the Council in 1943 (see p .100) 
and its 1946 demands is an effective indication of the extent of this 
disillusionment . By 1944, a great many Councillors were pinnin~ their 
faith on the ANC and its anti Pass Law campaign rather than on the 
unproductive constitutional channels through which their resolutions had 
been so ineffectual . 
Xuma ' s address to the emergency conference of the Anti - Pass Council 
in 1945 made it clear that Black conciliar bodies were moving more 
closely into alignment with ANC pOlicies. He cited the Bunga resolu-
tions of April 1944 and the August 1944 NRC resolut ions - in which 
the Council moved for the abolition of the Pass Laws and expressed 
support for the ANC campaign- as co- operative measures, indicating an 
extensive d~gree of collaboration between the government established 
1) bodies and the ANC. Not only were several Councillors also members 
of the ANC, but most of them held prominent positions in the latter 
organization . Thema was the Congress Speaker, Mathews, Godlo, Champion 
and Sililo were its advisers on Education, Locations , Lands and Social 
Welfare respectively, while Dube was a member of the Natal Native 
Congress and Mapikela of the Orange Free State African Congress. 2 ) 
Godlo, in fact, had been a member of the Committee which had drawn up 
the pamphlet African Claims, and it .was Mathews who wrote to Xuma at 
the end of 1945, reminding him that the peace settlement was in progress 
1. Text of Xuma ' s speech, 29 April 1945, A.B. Xuma Papers , 450429a . 
2 . List of members dated 10 August 1945, Ibid., 45C810. 
and urging him to organize a deputation to London . Hi s words, incident-
ally, provide some indication of the extent of Heaton Nicnolls's noto-
riety among those South Afr i cans in whose "interests" he had allegedl y 
been employed for nearly ten years : "We must stike a blow for freedom 
before Heaton Nicholls does us irreRt'rable harm in London. He is re-
presenting South Africa at the Council of Foreign Ministers. ,,1) 
In July 1946 , circul ar letters were sent from the ANC offices to 
each member of the Natives Representatives C01mcil. They contained a 
brief outline of the alleged failure of the 1936 "segregation experiment " 
and called on the Council t o support a motion of adjournment at its 
next meeting unless " the government accepts the appeal of the Africans" 
for certain legislative amendments. The letter ended with a remark 
calculated to touch the r aw nerve of an al ready frustrated body: "We 
feel that the Council has been made a toy and the dignity of our people 
been assailed. ,,2) On the evidence then, t:he Council ' s subsequent adjourn-
ment was a calculated move , made at the behest of the African National 
Congress and not, as Margaret Ballinger subsequently alleged, a 
"spontaneous decision, begotten of the circumstances arising out of 
the mineworker strike and the government's handling of the position both 
on the Reef and in the Council. ,,3) The agenda for the 1946 Session , 
which Mrs. Ballinger saw as evidence of the "explosive temper " of the 
Council, corroborates that of the Xuma Papers . The motionswere strongly 
worded and segregation itself, as well as the Pass Laws, was at issue. 
The proceedings of the Council, however , its unprecedented unanimity 
and the background against which it decided to adjourn are in themselves 
1. Matthews to Xuma, 14 September 1945, A. B. Xuma Papers, 450914. 
2. 26 July 1946, Ibid., 460726 . 
3. Ballinger to the Native Representatives, 22 August 1946, Ballinger 
Papers AtllO B2 (q) . This all egation i s repeated in Margaret Ballinger, 
From Union to Apar theid : a Trek to I solation , (Cape Town: Juta, 1965' ) 
p.193, when she says "Thus, without previous intention, and unorganized, 
the Council had come t o a deadlock." 
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suffi cient proof that the frustration was real and the anger not s imulated . 
In his opening address to the Council, Major F. Rodseth , acting 
chairman in the absence of Mears , whO was assist ing in the ' handling ' 
of the strike, not only omitted all reference to the prevail ing cr ises, 
but refused to a l low Council lors to discuss either of these matters before 
1 ) dealing with the agenda. From a motion condemning the "wanton shooting" 
by pol ice on the ~nd, and demanding the immediate recognition of Trade 
Unions , the Council moved angril y on to attack what it considered to be 
the root of all present evil - the segregation pOlicy itself . These 
were no parrot speeches, nor was there the slightest evidence of division 
or coercion in conciliar .. ranks. The Council was united in its support 
for Moroka ' s adjournment motion2 ) and the debate which ensued ranged 
over the length and breadth of the segregation policy since its official 
inception in 1936 . There were no quarrels with Mosaka ' s statement that a 
review of the ten years since the start of the "great experiment of se-
gregation" had led the Counci l to the unanimous conclusion that the 
"experiment has been a dismal failure . ,,3l' (Mosaka, moreover , was not 
a member of the ANC). The fo l lowing day, after Rodseth had refused to 
allow any further debate on the motion, it was carried unanimously and 
the Council adjourned to await the effects of its bombshell in the quarter 
for whi ch it was intended. 
The reactions of various parts of the Native Affairs Department , 
from its Minister to the NAC, go a long way t owards expl aining wby tbe 
Council bad reacbed tbe point where it felt some sort of drastic action 
was needed. Piet van der Byl , Minister since 1943, decided tbat the 
NRC had "gone on strike " because of "outside agitation" and tro-.lblemaking 
1 . NRC Verbatim Reports , August 1946. 
2 . raid ., "This Council baving since its inception brougbt to tbe notice 
of the government tbe reactionary cbaracter of tbe Union Native Policy 
of Segregation in all its ramifications, depre cates tbe government's 
continuation of a post- war pOlicy of Facism wbich is tbe antitbesis 
and negation of the letter and tbe spirit of the Atl antic Charter and 
the United Nations Charter ." 
3. Ibid. , p . 36 . 
96 
''1 ) influences. In this, of co~rse , he was partly right, but the assump-
tion was based on his unwillingness to look beyond the immediate political 
pressures to the total fai lure of the Council in the role which had 
been allotted it in 1936. Gordon Mears may have been nearer the mark 
in his assessment : that the NRC was taking advantage of Smuts ' s "mauling" 
at UNO to create embarrassment at home and achieve some of its objects 
2) through the new medium which it perceived in international censure . 
Neither really recognized the extent of the frustration which ten years 
of fruitless talk had cr eated. The Council had fai led in every respect 
of its original constitution. Not only was it not co~sulted on all 
legislation appertaining, even marginally , to Black interests, but its 
recommendations were directed into the same cuI de sac every year . The 
NAC, ardently segregationalist as half of it was, also failed to take 
the point. Indeed, from this moment until May 1947, the Commission 
played a disproportionate part in the attempt to deal with the problems 
of the Native Representative Council. 
The proposals which Smuts outlined to Co~cillors in May 1947 were 
based on a memorandum prepared by Mears and substantially altered by 
Smit. It was also undoubtedly due to Edgar Brookes that Hofmeyer un-
bent so far as to address the Council in November 1946, albeit in a 
tone which the Senator deplored and which led him to regret his efforts 
in that direction . 3) Early i n September 1946, Brookes wrote to his 
colleagues on the NAC, stressing the urgency of the NRC action and 
recommending that every effort should be made to meet the demands of 
the Council with tact and consideration and to persuade the government 
to have meaningful concessions to offer at the November Session, rather 
than encourage it to "stand on its dignity .,,4) 
1. P. Van der Byl, The_Sj1adows Le"gthel]., (Cape Town : Timmins, 1973), p . 12. 
2. Ibid. , and in an interview, Cape Town, March 1977. 
3. Paton, Hofmeyr:, pp. 437- 38 ; Brookes to HofmeYr-', 9 September 1946 
and 22 October 1946, Hofmeyr Papers, Dd. 
4. 2 September 1946, Smit Papers, 29/46 . 
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The Commission, however, was evidently standing on its own dignity, 
and its tone , when it met to consider the problem at the end of September, 
was anything but conciliatory . Smit himself took the lead in proposing 
that the government treat both the motion and the debate as ' insult ing ' , 
and that it should simply refuse to reply to the motion on that gro~nd . 
To r eply to such a motion, he contended, woul d result in a complete loss 
of face for authority, and this would "react detrimentally on our Native 
Administration. "I) With van der Merwe supporting him and asser ting that 
the "Native mind" would suffer untol d detrimental effects "if they do 
something wrong and are not made to apologize" and that on no account 
2) 
should the government "show weakness" , Smi t ' s motion easily carried 
the day over that of Brookes , who was still trying to persuade the Com-
mission of the necessity f or the Prime Minister or his deputy to address 
the Council at its next Session. 
Once again, Smit's seemingly inexplicable attitude has its roots 
in his preoccupation with admini str ative affairs. Never so happy as 
when exchanging compliments and blankets with a group of tribal dignita-
ries, or opening yet another Black school, secure in the knowledge that 
his consistent hard work was receiving the rewards it merited, he found 
it hard to swallow the slighting manner in which those efforts had been 
dismissed in the l ast NRC debate . He had complained to his wife earli er 
that the attitude of the Council "savours of ingratitude" and it was 
this, evidentl y , which moved him t o add to his 'no reply ' motion the 
fo llowing rider : 
In view of the statement made by members of the 
Council and the statement published in the press 
by Professor Matthews belittling the benefits 
which have been conferred upon the Native People 
by the government during recent years, an early 
1 . Notes of discussion by the NAC in regard to the NRC, 27 September 
1946, Smit Papers, 31/46 . 
2. I bid. 
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opportunity should· be taken by the government 
of informing the general public of all tlmt 
Ims been done f or the Native People of the 
Union since the inception of the Council. 1) 
Certainly, during his membership of the NAD, Smit could claim 
to have done a great deal "for the Native people" - particularly after 
Hofmeyr . took over the portfolio of Finance . As a member of the NAC, 
however , he was part of a body which could, and did, lay claim to a 
part in pol icy making, and it is in this context that his action - or 
inaction, his failure to support Brookes and to take advantage of an 
opportunity to put into practice the ideas with which liberal thinkers 
Imd long credited him, is curious . ~t is, however , consistent . His 
concern was with administr ative development and his fear, so far as 
the Council ' s adjournment was co.ncerned, was for the effects it might 
have on this development . 
Smit ' s attitude was also partly emotional : he Imd been a conscien-
tious administrator and the Council ' s attitude towards some of the 
i mprovements wrought during his office probably rankled more than its 
action. His stand was not without its political implications either . 
He had never been enthusiastic about either the Natives Representatives 
Councilor the Native Representatives . 2 ) He had, during the war years, 
spoken out publicl y against segregation, (see p . 40 ) and his experiences 
at the United Nations Conference in 1945 Imd only served to strengthen 
his convictions against it. The attitude of the Native Representatives 
provides an interesting contrast . "The decision of the Council," said 
Margaret Ballinger in a l etter to her colleagues , " ... concerns us 
intimately . Implicit in it is the repudiati on of the whole representation 
1. Ibid. 
2. Smit t o H. C. Lugg , CNC Pietermaritzburg , 11 November 1937, Smit 
Papers, 18/37 . The gist of this letter was to the effect that 
the NAD would brook no interference by the Native Representatives , 
and Brookes ,Jas to be informed of this attitude forthwith. 
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embodied in the 1936 Act under which we hold our seats . 11 1) This was 
clearly an understatement : the Council, during the course of debate, 
had quite explicitly rejected the segregation structure. Mrs. Ballinger 
went on to saY that 
The African people and their leaders have not 
yet come t o the point of feeling that the Act 
has served their purpose and should now be 
thrown overboard 2) 
and, working from this rather arbitrary premise , convinced that the 
1936 representative structure was better than the lack of any represen-
tation at all, which they feared would result if the Council were allowed 
to collapse, the Native Representatives devoted their efforts to salva-
ging what was left of it. Smit was quite clearly unconcerned about 
its threatened demise. 
Despite opposition from the NAC, Hofmeyr , in Smuts ' s absence , 
personally opened the November Session of the NRC, with Van der Byl as 
well as the entire Commission in attendance. His speech amounted to 
very little more than a recital of the impressive progress made in 
education and welfare, and an appeal for the ' co-operation ' of the 
Council. While he did refer t o the proposed legislation to provide 
for the limited recognition of Black Trade Unions , outside the struc -
ture of the , Industrial Conciliation Act and exclusive of mineworkers, 
his speech contained no further indication of what Native Policy might 
promise for the future. This sort of trade union legislation had been 
on the cards since the publication of the Smit Report in any event, 
and was clearly not a sympathetic response to the CO'Clnc il' s action, 
although the latter might have hastened its drafting . Hofme~' also 
condemned the "violence" of the discussion at the previous NRC Session 
1 . 22 August 1946, Ballinger Papers , A410 B2 (q). 
2. Ibid. 
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Very similar in tone and content to the kind of address which the 
NRC had been wont to hear from the chair throughout its existence, 
there was too much repetition about this speech and none of the 
political assurances which the adjournment motion had called for. It 
was not the kind of speech which Edgar Brookes had urged Hofmeyr 
not what the Council wanted to hear. l ) 
to 
make, and it was certainly The 
following day, with Mears in the chair and everyone else but Brookes 
conspicuously absent, the Councillors reiterated their inability to co-
operate with a government "which does all the operating while we do 
11 th . ,,2) a e cO-lng. They called on the government to offer a "more 
reassuring" reply to their original motion and assembled to hear Hof-
meYr's refusal the next day. The Council's reaction was an immediate 
mot i on of adjournment, though rather more pragmatically couched than 
the last one: 
Since its inception this Council has loyally 
co-operated with the government and would con-
tinue to do so as long as it is not expected ... 
to sacri fice in the process the legitimate rights 
and interests of the African people . 3) 
, 
It retired, after Matthews had put in a final plea for the "new South 
Africa" which the war had seemed to promise . 
On 11 February 1947, the NAC, on Smuts's instructions, rather 
grudgingly got down to the business of propitiating the NRC . Its 
deliberations provide a clear indication of the degree to which some 
of the members of the government ' s chief advisory body on Native 
Affairs were out of touch with political developments. In 1943, the 
Council had appointed a Recess Committee which drew up a memorandum 
1. Broo'~s to Hofmeyr, 22 October 1946, Hofmeyr Papers. He warned him 
that a "mere recapitulation of what the government has done will be 
worse than useless for that audience and at that time." 
2. NRC Verbatim Reports, 26th November 1946, p. 46. 
3. Ibi d. 
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outlining proposals for the reconstitution of the NRC. For the first 
time , the Commission now considered these proposals seriously, although 
their moderation made it plain that they were long out of date. The 
Commission, moreover , was not prepared to accede to all the proposals. 
It rejected the Recess Committee ' s suggestion that all adult males 
should be free to elect Councillors;as well as it s demand for an increase 
of seven in the number of Native Representatives in the House of Assembly . 
It was prepared to agree to the Commi ttee ' s sugges tion that the number 
of electoral areas be increased, though where the NRC had advocated 
six, the NAC was only prepared to concede five. It rejected absolutely 
the Committee ' s plea for legislative powers for the Council on topics 
affecting Blacks , along the lines of the 1926 Union Native Council Bill, 
and sai d that it would have to consider the question of Provincial Council 
representation. 
Smi t ' s own attitude to,lards the Counci l was clarified to some extent, 
by his willingness to accept all of the 1943 Committee ' s proposals. They 
would have the· effect of involving the Council far more seriously in the 
administrative pr ocess, and , with the NRC no longer a purely advisory 
body, he thought there was a chance that the Council might yet fulfi l 
a val uable administrative function . l ) 
Also in Febr uary , Mears produced two memoranda on ' A Progr essive 
Programme for Native Administration ' and , 'Progressive Native Policy ' 
on which Smit set to work with his pencil . The NRC , according to these 
memos , was henceforth to be the pinnacle of a much broader, more 
1. Notes of discussions on the Recess Committee's proposals, Smi t 
Papers, 4/47 . 
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representative and more political Council system. It was proposed to 
abolish the six White officials on the Council as well as the four 
nominated members, and to increase the number of elected· members to 
fifty, with an elected Black chairman. This was a revers ion to a 
Council the size of that allowed for in Hertzog's Union Native Council 
Bill - to which Smuts had objected and which the Re cess Committee had 
recommended in 1943. It was also proposed to add to the advisory powers 
of the Council by giving it the power of subs idiary legislation for 
Native Areas in such matters affecting Natives as the Governor General 
might approve, and to vest it in such proportion of the amount of the 
general tax as Parliament might decide, as well as the revenues of the 
General and Local Councils . Smit rejected the complicated electoral 
system proposed by Mears and sUbstituted a \;ard system, with an 
1) 
electorate consis ting of all adult general taxpayers. 
In March Smi t presented Mears vii th his notes, s tating that it was 
"desirable to make the Council a more effective instrument in Native 
Administration than has been possible under its present constitution. ,,2) 
Most of the changes he had made to Mears ' s original memorandum were 
minor, and made in the interests of smooth administration . Some were 
rather more important: while he conceded that the NRC would function 
better with an elected Black chairman, he objected to this idea for 
Local and General Co~ncils . He thought t hat it would hamper the 
District Commissioners and Magistrates in the execution of their duties, 
as they would no longer be closely associated with the Councils which 
woul d be working independently of them . He also obje cted to the 
powers of taxation which it was proposed to confer on the NRC,on 
the grounds that this would cause resentment at local levels and 
1 . Memoranda, 15 February 1947, Smit Papers, 5/47. 
2. Notes on Memoranda, Ibid., 9/47. 
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affect the smooth running of the Local and General Councils. This was 
an astute point and it was probably the reason why Smuts neglected to 
include this aspect of the proposed changes when he offered the rest 
of them to Councillors in May . 
Both Smit and Mears were agreed that the Location Advi sory Boards 
should continue to function under the terms of the 1945 Urban Areas 
Consolidation Act , and that the Union Advisory Boards Congress be 
granted official status . The latter, which had been oper ating unoffi-
cially since 1929, was to have twenty members on the reconstituted NRC, 
and to represent to the government , through the Council, the views of 
'urbanized natives ,.l) Mears 's suggestion of a rural Land Board was 
re j ected by Smi t on the grounds that this would only be "a SO"Jrce of 
nuisance to the administration.,,2 ) later that month, a letter to 
with 
Mears stressed the urgency of dealinjli "existing discontent before it 
becomes disaffection .,,3 ) Smit took the opportunity , again, of reitera-
ting his belief that Blacks should experience the responsibility and 
"odium" of administrative duties, and, through more active participa-
t ion, become aware of the difficulties involved in them. He also 
suggested that Blacks be given an active share in Trust developments 
"to make them accept some of the responsibility ." There is a note on 
Smit's copy of this letter which makes it clear that all aspects of 
the plans '"ere discussed wi th Ho fmeyr. The NAC, significantly , was 
not consulted as a group until Van der Byl presented them with the 
substance of the proposed developments early in May. 
In a note of April 1947, on the subject of Native Representation, 
Smit showed his impatience with the salvage operation on the segr egation 
1 . Memorandum of 15 February 1947, Smit Papers, 5/ 47 . 
2. Smit to Mears, 8 March 1947 , Ibid . , 9/47. 
3. Smit to Mears , 24 March 1947 , Ibid., 10/47 . 
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policy . He said , plainly enough, "We should do our utmost to abolish 
discriminatory legislation and to prevent such legislation from being 
1 ) placed on the statute book." Appended to the memorandum on the 
proposed changes in the Council system, this note finally found its 
way to the Prime Minister ' s office . Both memoranda were approved by 
Smuts towards the end of April, but Smit ' s addendum elicited no 
comment , although he must have struck the right chord when he refer red 
the Prime Minister specificallY to UN disapproval as an urgent incentive 
2) for change. Hi mself a founding member of the United Nations , 
Smit was prompted by adverse criticism of the Union to write several 
letters to Van der Byl, urging the Minister to stress the importance 
of urban policy to Smuts. Although the Fagan Commission had already 
be~~ its investigations, Smit was very much aware , by this stage , 
that time was running out . 
On 2 May 1947, Van der Byl, at the request of Mears and Smit, 
placed the revised memoranda on Native Councils , in which all Smit ' s 
al terations had been included, before a special meeting of the NAC. 
At the same time, he presented the Commission with a draft bill for 
the registration and regulation of Nat ive Trade Unions, the other 
half of the carrot which Smuts proposed to dangle before Councillors 
later in the month. The 
"in broad principle", t o 
Commission cautiously gave 
the Council memoranda . 3 ) 
its approval, 
I t could hardly have done anything else . The projected changes 
amounted to little more than a change in the foundations on which 
the Council was built. It could, under the revised constitution, 
1 . Additional Note on Native Representation, 5 April 1947 , Ibid . , 
10/47. 
2. 24 March 1947, Smit Papers, 12/47. 
3. Minutes of a special meeting of the NAC , Cape Town, 2 May 1947, 
Ibid . , 20/47 . 
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truly lay claim to being a representative body, but that its representa-
tions were going to meet with any more SUccess than they had hitherto 
done, was doubtful. 
The notes of the NAC discussion on the draft Trade Union bill provide 
a useful comment on the polarization in political opinion which had 
become concrete towards the end of the war. Half the Commission jibbed 
even at the careful draft legislation, while the other half thought 
that the legislatio'n did not go nearly far enough. As early as 1942 
Black leaders had made it clear that "half-way motions" on the question 
of Trade Union recognitio~ would not answerl ) - a fact of which both 
Brookes and Smit were fully aware. Their attempts to demonstrate the 
futility of the proposed legislation, however, and Brookes ' s plea 
for a complete overhaul of the Industrial Conciliation Act (under the 
terms of which the word ' employee ' was so defined as to exclude the 
majority of Black workers from its scope) met with no success. 
Five days after this meeting, Smuts met Councillors Thema, Mosaka, 
Poto, Dinizulu and Maserumule against Van der Byl's advice. In a 
conciliatory and sympathetic address he offered them the broad outline 
f th . t d han "b t h " 2) While the Councl'l'-o e proJec e c ges as a one 0 c ew on • 
lors went off to consider what had been offered them, and to report 
back to their colleagues in the Council and in Congress, Smit and 
Mears polished their memoranda into a final draft . 
In September, Smit, Van der Byl, Mears, Payn and Brookes met Smuts 
in the Prime Minister's office where official approval was bestowed 
on the draft. The NAC was instructed by Smuts to draw up a summary 
for pUblication in the press, while he himself proposed to send a 
1. Xuma to Smit, 3 June 1942, A.B. Xuma Papers, 420603a. 
2. Notes of interview, 8 May 1947, Smit Papers, 23/47. 
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circular letter to each Councillor in which a full description of the 
changes would be included. Brookes, Rodseth and Mears prepared a 
draft of this letter - to which Van der Byl took instant exception . 
In a letter to S~uts on 22 September he urged t he Prime Minister not 
to sign the letters personally. At the most, he said, they should be 
signed by the Secretary for Native Affairs and the "wording should 
certainly not be so ingratiating."l) Brookes knew how to strike the 
r ight chords however, he persuaded Smuts that such a letter would 
impress South African critics at UNO and the day was won. 
Councillors received their personal copies of the Prime Minister ' s 
letter in October, at the same time as the ' tentative proposals ' were 
released to the press. For the first time, the Fagan Commission was 
officially mentioned,2)and at the end of 1947, the political atmosphere 
in the Union was gravid with the load of pending events. The Native 
Laws Commission had stil l t o issue its report, the substance of which 
would affect the NRC changes . (The scope of the Union ~visory Boards. 
Congress, for instance, was to depend on the Commis sion ' s recommendations 
at Fagan's own suggestion. 3) In his September meeting with the NAC 
Smuts had decided to wait for the November NRC elections before summon-
ing Councillors to discuss changes in the NRC constitution, and there 
was, of course , the impending general election . 
I n the event, the NRC met again only twice . Although its r eaction 
to Smuts's proposals had been largely unfavourable, ahd an election 
1. Van der Byl to Smuts, 22 September 1947, roid., 63/47 . 
2. Both Hofmeyr and S~~ts had thus far failed to use the appointment of 
the Fagan Co~~ission, in their dealings with the NRC, as an indica-
tion of impending change . It was Smit, in May 1947, who strongly 
advised them to tell the Council that any sympathetic suggestions 
in the Report would receive immediate attention. (Memorandum on 
Native Administration, 4 May 1947, Smit Papers , 22 . 1/47). 
3. Fagan to Mears, 23 August 1947, Ibid., 45/47 . 
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boycott had been mooted , Councillors, for the most part, had allowed 
themsel ves to stand for re- election - a sign, as Matthews said later , 
of "a readiness on the part of the Council to meet the government in 
order to consider any statement pl aced before it ."l) Mears failed to 
persuade Jansen, the Nationali st Minister of Native Affairs, to address 
the Council in January 19492 ) and he himself had t he task of informing 
the NRC at this Session that its services would not be required by the 
new government. In 1950, the Council was formally dissolved. 
Smit, now a member of the cpposition and his party ' s chief spokesman 
on Native Affairs, did not extend himself in debate when the question 
of the abolition of the NRC was raised in the House, and clearly did 
not regard its passing as a matter for mourning . The Council had 
failed, he said l a t er , because it was "purely advisory,,,3) a statement 
with which it is hard to quarrel . It does seem, though, that if Smit 
had exerted himself to help NRC resolutions get off the ground and at 
least into the public eye, if not onto the statute book, something more 
might have been achieved by them. He did not do so , however , and while 
an attempt has been made in this chapter to account for his apparently 
ambivalent attitude towards the NRC, both the explanation · and Smit ' s 
behaviour remain unsatisfactory . Further conjecture would be purely 
speculative and it seems better to l eave it as a paradoxical and anomalous 
aspect of behaviour in a man whose ideas and actions were usually clear 
cut and direct. 
1. Matthe \;s to Mears , 8 March 1950, Ibid., 8/ 50. 
2 . G. Mears interviewed in Cape Town, March 1977 . 
3. Smit to Gray Hughes, 29 August 1954, Smit Papers, 32154. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NEW RECLAMATION SCHEME 
Limitation of stock to the carrying capacity 
of the land is still . . . the pivot on which 
impr"ovement of conditions in the Reserves 
must turn. 
(Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs 
Department, 1944- 45, p . 2) 
It is not a question of limitation of stock 
so much as a question of limitation of land. 
(Councillor Thema, August 1944, NRC Verbatim 
Reports, Seventh Session, 111:312) 
In June 1944 the Minister of Native Affairs annotmced in Parlia-
ment that the government proposed to embark on a vast ' New Reclamation 
Scheme ' in the Native Reserves . The scheme was conceived against 
the background of the Anti- Pass Law campaign, intermittent squatter 
movements, the labour influx into the urban areas and the failure 
of the measures designed to control it . It was one which Smit, out 
of real concern for the poverty which he had encountered on numerous 
tours of the rural areas, had long been advocating ; from the point of 
view of the administration, the move was long overdue. As far as the 
government was concerned, the decision to persuade Parliament to 
vote the necessary funds for an undertaking on this scale was viewed 
from an entirely different perspective . 
As early as 1932 the Holloway Commission Report had warned that 
poor conditions in the Reserves posed an urgent threat to the position 
of South Afri can Whites. l ) By 1944, the paralyzing Drought in the 
rural areas and the urban upheavals of the early war years had 
1 . Report of the Native Economic Commission, UG22- 1932, p. 12. 
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produced tangible evidence of the truth of this prophecy. The ' recla-
mation' of the reserves, then, represented also an attempt to strengthen 
the basis of the existing segregation structure, whose days, "evil" 
or not, were quite clearly numbered. 
Between 1936 and May 1940, when, for administrative reasons, a 
temporary . halt was called in the purchasing of more land, Parliament 
had voted a total of £6,000,000 to the Trust. Of this, by February 
1942, £4,627,371 had been used to buy 1,515,863 morgen of 'released' land. l ) 
In August 1936 1,056,415 morgen of Crown Land had been vested in the 
Trust , all of which, according to Smit, "carried a sufficiently large 
number of Natives" and "cannot be regarded as available for the accommo-
dation of landless Natives or of the surplus population from congested 
2) 
areas. " Of the actual 'released' areas, many were al ready crowded 
with squatters and Smit warned that "unless special measures are adopted 
to increase their carrying capacity ... they will not prove of any great 
assistance in the matter of settling dispossessed or landless Natives.,,3) 
With the same disconcerting frankness which embarrassed his superiors 
from time to time, he referred to the existing 10,410,210 morgen com-
prising the 'Native areas' as "congested, denuded, over-stocked, eroded 
and, for the most part, in a deplorable condition. ,,4) 
As far as the quality of the released areas was concerned, 
there were a number of them, in 1936, which possessed a climate and 
soil that were agriculturally favourable. Ten years later, when 
Edward Raux surveyed them for the Race Relations Handbook , he concluded 
1. Memorandum on Policy and Activities of the Native Affairs Department,1942. 
2. White Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 1936" p. 6. 
3. Ibid., p . 6. 
4. Ibid., p. 2. 
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that most of them, especially those in the Northern Cape and Northern 
Transvaal, consisted of poor land with a low rainfall . l ) The explana-
tion for this change lies in the activities of the Native Affairs 
Commission which, by virtue of its· largely political constitution 
after 1939, apparently went out of its way to soothe the ruffled feel-
ings of the rural White electorate . 
It is clear from all the NAC Report s before 1942 that "most of the 
time of the Commission was devoted to matters relating to the excision 
and acquisition of land. ,,2) Although annexures containing schedules 
of land purchased by the Trust were normally attached to these reports, 
they did not include details of excised land. In an issue of Forum, 
in August 1941, Senator Heaton Nicholls was moved to describe the bulk 
of the Reserves in terms of their "many streams" , "fertile valleys" , 
"luscious veld" and "rich soils". The Commission, however, of which 
Nicholls was a member, had excised a good ma~y of these places from 
the released areas in accordance with the provisions of Clause 2 of 
the 1936 Trust and Land Act. At the time Nicholls was writing, the 
Elands River, Leonbye, Letsitele and Pongola areas had all been excised 
at the request of White landowners, and a Race Relations paper, issued 
the following month, was able, with some effect, to point out that 
The released areas as they stand today are 
very much less favourable to the Africans than 
they were when the Natives Trust and Land 
Act was passed i n 1936 . . . 3) 
For Smit, once the 1936 legislation had become an irrevocable 
part of the system which it was his duty to administer, reclamation 
and development of Reserve land had become a prime consideration. 
1. "land and A'lriculture in the Reserves", Handbook, p. 175. 
2. Report of the Native Affairs Commi ssion for 1937-38 , UG54-1939 , p. 1. 
3. J . D. Rheinallt Jones and Edith B. Jones . "Interpretations of 
Trusteeship : A Study in Native Land Policies." SAIRR Papers, 
September 1941, B62(c) . 
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Stock limitation, 
the Reserves must 
"the pivot on which improvement of conditions in 
1) 
turn", was the consistently dominating theme 
of his numerous addresses to rural meetings, at official functions 
and in the Natives Representatives Council. In 1943, the land pOlicy 
of the government was subjected to a particularly virulent attack by 
the NRC with the result that, the following year, Van der Byl was 
persuaded to attend both Sessions, where he made a "special effort to 
obtain the active support of the Natives Representative Council in 
influencing the minds of the Native people towards acceptance of 
this essential step. ,,2) 
The Council, whose attacks centred as much on Departmental 
activities in the field as on the need for the provision of more 
land and the wartime cessation of land buying, were, not surprisingly, 
unsympathetic. The debate ranged from criticism of the Native Com-
missioners, described as "little kings in their own locality,,3) to 
4) 
a demand for the repeal of the Land Act. Their case was summed 
up by Godlo, who said " ... it is not a question of overstocking, it 
is a question of overpopulation, ,,5) and there was a great deal, be-
sides, about the "conditions of economic slavery" for which the Land 
t 11 dl 'bl 6) Ac was a ege y responSl e. "Though the case for limitation 
was carefully and sympathetically put Councillors were not pre-
pared to give a definite lead in this matter" was the cautious 
administrative transcription of the antagonistic reception with 
which Departmental overtures had been greeted. 7) 
1. Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs Department, 1944-5, 
p. 2. 
2. Ibid., p. 2. 
3. Councillor Thema, NRC Verbatim Reports, Seventh Session, 21 August 
1944- 5, p. 22 . 
4. Councillor Mosaka, Ibid., p. 27. 
5. Ibid., p. 316. 
6. Ibid., pp. 27-4l. 
7. Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs Department, 1944-5, 
p. 2. 
112 
The lead, although there is no actual evidence of this available, 
seems to have come from Smit himself: it was not, at any rate, until 
after he had taken over the Department, that the particular problem 
of stock limitation was tackled with any kind of system. Livestock 
Improvement Proclamation No. 31 of 1939 was purely an administrative 
affair, under whic~ the 'Betterment ' scheme was begun in an experimental 
way in the Ciskei and which, by 1944, had spread to over 170 areas . 
The scheme depended for its success on the co- operation of the Local 
and General Councils, which undertoo~ to bear certai.n of the costs , 
and met with most success in the Transkei , where, in the Butterworth 
area, Department, Bunga and village authority worked hand in hand to 
demonstr ate the beneficial effects of livestock limi tation and rota-
tional grazing . 
Out of all 170 areas which had voluntaril y opted to enter the 
scheme, however, Smit was able to cite only two instances in 1944 
where local compliance and Departmental money and supervision had been 
1) fully successful . The other one, ironically, was Thaba Nchu in 
the Orange Free State , where Dr . Moro~a, who was one of the most 
prominent critics of the government's l and policy on the NRC, was 
also a leading member of the Reserve Board. 
Despite the isol ated , successful cases of ' Betterment ' , the 
scheme ultimately incr eased rather than reduced local conservatism 
and hostility towards Departmental attempts at agricultural improve-
ment. Officials complained continuously that prejudice and suspicion 
were almost insuperable obstacles in the way of the 'educational 
programme ' to which they were committed in the Reserves, but, as 
money , manpower and materials became scarcer after 1939, there 
1. I bid . 
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was hardly any point in electing to join a scheme for whi ch the admin-
istrative tools were lacking . In all, between 1939 and 1945, the 
Trust spent a total of £39,107 on ' Betterment', which continued to be 
officially designated as Livestock Improvement. l ) Only a f raction of 
the number of proclaimed areas enjoyed the fruits of this expenditure 
though. Of the 53 areas in the Transkei for exrunpl e, which opted for 
' Betterment ' , 51, by 194Lf were still waiting for the erection of the 
fences which would fulfil the Department ' s obligations in terms of 
the Proclamation . 2 ) 
"Seeing will be believing," said Smi t optimistically in 1945, 
"and the movement will no doubt spread rapidly on its own merits. ,,3 ) 
He based this belief on the knowledge that the materials, the lack 
of which had hitherto hampered the scheme, woul d be more readily 
available at the end of the war , and hence put the onus where it belonged -
on the Department itself. His priorities, however, were quite clear: 
Criticism has been levelled at the Native Affairs 
Department f or releasing so many officers f or 
military service , but it was felt that vlhen the 
country waS at war, it was oar duty to make 
every possible effort to defeat the enemy . 4) 
' Betterment', then, was to be given a second chance , in the hope 
that with the Department once more at full strength, it would be able 
to provide sufficient evidence of the advantages of stock limitation 
to produce the wholesale conversion of conservative stockowners for 
which it had been designed. It was to be its last chanc e however. 
1 . South Afri can Native Trust, Revenue and Expenditure Account , Septem-
ber 1939- Narch 1945. 
2. Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs Department , 1944- 5, 
p. 3. 
3. Ibid . 
4 . Statement of Policy made by Smit at a special session of the Ciskei 
General Council at Kingwilliamstown, 8. January 1945, Smit Papers , 
2/95. 
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While all land acquired by the Trust was automatically proclaimed in 
terms of the Betterment proclamation it was clear by 1945 that over-
stocking in other areas was not going to remain voluntary and that 
compul sion, in the case of recalcitrance , would be speedily introduced. 
The Department will continue to do its utmost 
to gain the goodwill of the people in this matter, 
but it must be made clear that the extension of 
livestock limication must go nand in hand with 
the measures the government has in mind. 1) 
The measures which the government had "in mind" differed little 
in kind from those which the Department had been undertaking for 
some time. The difference, in 1944, was in the scale on which they 
were to be carried out , the urgency with which they were now considered 
to be necessary, and the amount of money which was to be spent on them. 
T2ey were to be planned on a lo~g term basis and to be executed within 
a twelve year period. Before 1942, the Department had embarked on 
a number of ambitious schemes for the economic development of the 
existing Re serves and Locations in addition to its normal Trust 
duties of purchase and resettlement . These had , however, been sporadic, 
dependent on revenue surplus and unsystematic. They included irrigation 
schemes , on a fairly large scale , at the Tugela and Moo:i River settle-
ments in Natal and on the Olifant s River in the Transvaal. Seventeen 
small irrigation snhemes (from 50 to 600 acres), had also been establ ished 
and plans for a major irrigation proj ect in the Taungs Native Reserve 
2) 
were underway. ("'The Native portion of the Vaal- Hartz irrigation scheme"). 
All irrigable land under these pro jects was leased to Blacks and cul -
tivated under the supervision of officers of the Trust. 
Other Trust ' works ' included the sinking of boreholes and the 
1. Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs Department, 1944- 45, p . 2 . 
2. Memorandum on Policy and Activities of the Native Affairs Depart-
ment, 1942, p . 6. 
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maintenance of pumping plants, the construction of stock dams and wells, 
the improvement of springs, establishment and maintenance of bull camps 
and stock sales, chicken rearing centres and dipping tanks . In addition, 
the Trust "did everything in its power to educate the Native peasant 
population in improved methods of cultivation and field husbandry . ,,1 ) 
It demarcated and maintained forest areas in consultation with the De-
partment of Agriculture and Forestry, built roads and bridges, distributed 
fruit from Trust- maintained fruit orchards, organized the marketing of 
Trust-gro\~ fruit and vegetables and carried out extensive anti- soil 
erosion works in the Reserves. 2 ) 
The grand total of Trust expenditure between 1936 and 1945 was 
£21,683,750, although land purchase and education accounted for more 
than half of this figure . The reports of the Industrial and Agricultural 
Requirements Commission were readily available however, with the break-
downs they contained of land and financial figures in which the disparity 
in expenditure between Black and Wnite was clearly outlined. State 
expenditure on Black agriculture represented a tiny fraction of its 
expenditure on agriculture in the Union as a whole,3) and it was in 
this light that the Department ' s activities failed to impress the NRC . 
Early in 1944, Dr . Hugh Bennett , Chief of the Soil Conservation 
Services in the United States, was invited to South Africa to advise 
the government on the development of the Reserves. After an extensive 
tour, he delighted Smit by urgi ng the necessity for immediate action, 
at whatever cost t o the country . I t was thus with expert backing, that 
Smit was able to add to the other pressures in 1945 when he said "the 
1. Ibid., p. 7. 
2. Up to February 1942 the Trust was responsible for the erection and main-
tenance of 1 , 300 pumping plants, 353 stock dams and about 100 wells . 
It had established 70 bull camps , 14 ram camps, 371 cattle tames and 
227 sheep tanks, besides being responsible fo r the maintenance and 
repair of some 1,171 dipping tanks . (Ibid) . 
3. In the ten year period 1931 to 1941, for example, the state had spent 
over £25,000,000 in direct assistance and subsidies to farmers. (3rd 
Interim Report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commis-
sion , UG40- 41, para . 88) . 
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Department is convinced that work on this scale is required to save 
the country from the imminent threat of the Native Reserves becoming 
sterile deserts. Ill) Even now Reserve conditions were not sufficiently 
attractive to prevent large numbers of Blacks from descending on the 
urban areas, so that the possible re~ults of this prediction were 
alarming. In June, Smit wrote to an old colleague from the Department, 
with some satisfaction, that reclamation of the ' Native areas' was to 
be one of the main planks in the programme of post war reconstruction,2) 
while. Van der Byl informed Parliament shortly afterwards that it was 
expected to finance this reclamation from general revenue . 
In the latter half of .1944 Smit undertook extensive tours of the 
Reserves , including a ten day visit to the Capri vi Strip . Stock and 
agricultural matters were high on the agenda of the Native Commissioners' 
Conference in Pietermaritzburg in November, towards the end of which 
month a committee appointed by the S.A. Agricultural Union met senior 
officers of the Department in Pretoria. The memorandum subsequently 
sent by Smit to the Minister of Native Affairs on the subject of this 
meeting was illuminating in that it showed quite clearly the difference 
in approach to the whole question of land and labour between the 
Secretary for Native Affairs and the White rural electorate. Van der 
Elf 1 , though, was himself a farmer and one time candidate for the port-
folio of agriculture. 
The S . A. Agricultural Union proposed that the Native PopUlation 
be henceforth categorically divided into two immoveable groups: urqan 
and rural. It demanded the abolition of the labour tenant system 
and suggested that rates of employment for farm labourers be determined 
1. Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs Department, 1944-45, 
p. l. 
2. Smit to E. R. Bray shaw , 2 June 1944, Smit Papers , 3/44. 
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by an Employers' Committee. It also went so far as to demand that the 
government should undertake the recruitment of farm labour. 
Smit's objections to these proposals, as well as the suggestions 
he outlined in his memorandum, represented a curious mixture of the 
practical and the moral. He maintained that the real solution to the 
problem of farm labour shortages had to be found in the improvement of 
conditions on the farms themselves. He refused to support the abolition 
of the labour tenant system on the grounds that there was simply not 
enough land to accommodate "displaced Natives" - the same, eminently 
practical bar which he had erected against m'micipal removal of 'redundant ' 
urban Blacks. The proposed autonomy in wage determination he saw 
simply as "unjsstifiable , " and pointed out, quite reasonably , that 
state labour recruitment would have to be accompanied by in loco inspec-
tions, wage control and supervision, all of which the delegates had 
1) flatly refused to accept . 
His counfer proposals included a suggestion that part of the enormous 
state expenditure on White agriculture should include substantial housing 
loans for the better accomodation of farm labourers, and that a special 
grant of £50,000 per annum be made to each Province for the establish-
ment of Native Schools on farms. His attitude, as he was to discover 
later when a member of the NAC, was jarringly out of tune with that of 
the rural electorate and there is no evidence that any attempt was ever 
made to give effect to his proposals . 
By 8 January 1945, the Department had dra~l the blueprint of the 
'New Reclamation Scheme ' which was aired publicly for the f irst time 
before a specially convened session of the Ciskei General Council. In 
1. Memorandum on Farm Labour, 24 November 1944, Smit Papers, 26/44. 
an unusually emotive speech, Smit presented Council members with the 
fruit of his efforts over the past few years. Although he said that 
the scheme had been placed before the NRC, it was the Ciskei Council 
which got the benefit of the personal touch, as well as a far more 
detailed exposition. It had always been Smit ' s contention that the 
Local and General CO'lncils were far more productive as far as Native 
Administration was concerned, mainly because their financial and super-
visory responsibilities kept them in touch with the problems it involved. 
It was the Ciskeian Councillors, then, who were privileged to hear the 
details of the 'New Era' of the reclamation of their land f rom its 
most ardent propagator. There is evidence here too , t hat Smit had 
learnt from Smuts the value of adjusting statements to the audiences 
for which they were intended. To the Ciskei Council, the scheme was 
represented as a product of long term concern for the cQnditions in 
the Reserves per se . The way in which it was presented for the con-
sumption of White audiences was subtly altered in that it appeared to 
be motivated by a healthy instinct of self preservation. l ) 
The Ciskei Council heard little of the visit of Dr. Bennett or 
of the threat to the country as a whole which was posed by the imminent 
possibili ty of "sterile deserts " in the Reserves . It did not hear, 
either, that the scheme was designed to provide a "wide field of 
employment " for Black ex- soldiers, WI:lO would be given preference in 
filling responsible posts in the rural areas rather than allowed to 
swell the mass of discontented urban dwellers which threatened to 
beseige the ~aite citadels . Nor was it suggested that the creation 
of rural industries would provide "new money and new ideas" for White 
1 t · 2) specu a lon . 
1. Comparison of the presentation of the scheme in the Policy Statement 
by Smi t, Ciskei Co·..tncil special session, 8 January 1945 (Smit Papers, 
2/45), and Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs Depart-
ment, 1944- 45. 
2 . Review of the Activities of the Native Affairs Department, 1944- 45,p.·1. 
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The Council heard, instead, the list of Departmental activity 
and Trust expenditure in miles of contour banks, numbers of dams built, 
1) fences erected and areas ' treated' . In the 35 Ciskei areas which 
it administered the Trust had spent, to date, a total of £260,000. 
(During the same period, for the same kind of undertakings, the 
Transkei Council had expended the sum of £205, 366. 2) It was now 
proposed to extend existing Trust activities on a grand scale. The 
country was to be divided into four Native Affairs 30nes, comprising 
the Northern Areas, (Transvaal, OFS , Bechuanaland, and part of the 
Cape), Natal, the Transkei and the Ciskei . In each of these areas 
a planning committee of experts, including surveyors, engineers and 
agricultural officers, would work o~t the requirements of the area 
and submit estimates t o the central planning council. 
For the number of objects which the scheme was designed to achieve, 
the sum of £10,000,000 estimated by Smit was a conservative one; so 
was the initial grant of £110,000 which Parliament was asked to 
vote in 1945. The land was to be settled "advantageously" and to be 
demarcated into residential , grazing and arable areas. Rural villages 
were to be established, and space found in them for the settlement 
of "surplus population. ,,3) Planning was to include afforestation on 
a large scale , fencing, soil conservation, water supplies, veld control, 
driftsand control, irrigation, sanitation, transport, local industries, 
supervision and control . Smit stressed that stock limitation was 
essential to the success of the scheme, altho:lgh there was no mention 
of the compulsive element in this regard which he had hinted at in 
his 1945 Review. On the question of village settlements, perhaps 
1. Policy Statement at special session of the Ciskei General Council, 
Smit Papers, 2/45. 
2 . Ibid . 
3. Ibid . 
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the most radical departure represented by the new scheme , Smit was at 
his most persuasive. 
The Department had three types of such settlements in mind. The 
idea, according to Van der Byl and to Smit, in later years, "as entirely 
Smit's . l) The first type, with "hich it was proposed to experiment 
immediately, was a peri- urban settlement, where workers would spend 
the day at neighbouring White centres and return to their homes at 
night and at weekends . The second type were those villages sited 
adjacent to industries where Blacks would ,work by day and return to 
their villages at night . The third type of village was to be established 
in purely rural areas , where workers in more distant centre s would 
maintain their families, returning home only periodically themselves . 
The rationale behind these projects was explicitly outlined by 
Smit : "It must be accepted that there will never be enough land to 
enable every Native in the Reserves to become a full time peasant 
farmer . ,,2) This "as the first time that such a conclusion had been 
publicly reached , and the idea was not widely accepted until ten years 
later. If Smit himself had worked out the full implications of this 
statement it is doubtful whether they had been fully considered by 
his superiors . Even the Holloway Report of 1932, while seeking a 
rural solution to Reserve poverty , confined itself to recommending 
agricultural remedies . Certainly, the idea of rural villages would, 
if implemented, have had to involve a reconsideration of the whole 
question of mine wages as the present position of the mines depended 
entirely on the supposition that the wages of migrant workers were 
supplemented by agricultural subsistence in the Reserves . The 
1 . Van der Byl, Top Hat to Velskoen, pp. 229- 239, and Smit ' s anno-
tation on Daily Dispatch cutting, 1959, Smit Papers, 83/59. 
2. Policy Statement, 8 January 1945, Smit Papers 2/45. 
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settlements represented no contradictions as far as actual policy 
was concerned: there was no idea of abandoning land segregation in 
favour of entrepeneurial farming . . They were designed, rather, to 
relieve congestion as well as the pressures which it exerted on pOlicy . 
It was proposed by Smit to establish the first peri- urban village 
settlement near Kingwilliamstown, although it was not until 1946 that 
the idea was accepted by the Ciskei Council. The village, on Trust 
land , was to be divided into quarter acre allotments, of which only 
one each per family was to be allowed. The process whereby families 
would be settled in the vill age, which was to be called Zwelitsha, 
(New Era) , was a highly selective one . Those selected would be re-
quired to occupy their plots fora minimum of five years, after which, 
if they had proved satisfactory tenants, "hey would be allowed to 
purchase the land with the assistance of Departmental loans . The 
Department , however, reserved the right to evict landowners if 
their subsequent behaviour merited such a move . 
a 
Although this representedAradical revision of the pattern of Trust 
tenure, it met with very little favour from those for whose ostensible 
benefit it had been designed. The day after the scheme had been put 
to them , the Councillors , without exception, rejected it . They 
deplored the idea on the ground that such settlements would create 
rural type ' locations ' where drinking would rapidly become the main 
pattern. They failed to see how, if the normal five morgen of l and 
did not adequately supplement urban wages, a quarter acre allotment 
would do so, and objected to the insecurity of tenure which the speci-
fications outlined to them had made clear. Even if the initial 
five years of insecurity were to be accepted, the retention of 
removal rights by the government was anathema. Despite Smit ' s 
122 
efforts to reassure them on this head, they remained implacably opposed 
to the scheme. For the first time since 1936 it was proposed to 
allow Blacks to own the Trust land on which they lived; the conditions 
of tenure were such, however, as to make the prospect just as unatract-
tive as existing conditions of tribal and individual tenure under the 
Trust . 
There is no concrete evidence as to the kinds of sources on which 
Smit depended for his Zwelitsha strategy, although, by 1944 there was 
plenty of precedent . Simil ar schemes, on a much larger scale, had 
been a feature of the attempts to rehabilitate 'poor Whites' in the 
early pre and post Union days, while village settlements of the kind 
envisaged by Smit had long been successfully established in Kenya, 
Tanganyika and Nyasaland. 
Despite the inauspicious reception of the ' New Era' in the Ciskei, 
Smit remained optimistic throughout 1945. In a White Paper presented 
to the Senate in March, he reiterated his belief that the partial 
solution to present ills lay in the development of the Reserves . 
He emphatically rejected the notion that "the problems of detribali-
zation and urbanization" ·were to be solved by increasing control and 
gave it as his opinion that "further repressive measures" would only 
aggr avate the situation. l ) With the imminent introduction of a Bill 
to provide for the state finance of Native Education and the knowledge 
that the first instalment of the millions necessary to finance land 
reclamation was to be voted that session, it was difficult t o keep 
a note of complacency from his words . Two months off his retirement 
as Secretary for Native Affairs, Smit was in a position to see the 
start of the fruition of some of his labours, and the future as one 
1 . White Paper, 30 March 1945, Smit Papers, 46/45. 
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OI endless possibilities. Out of all those involved in the administra-
tion of Native Affairs during this period, Smit, who had at first 
regarded the war as a necessary though unfortunate hiatus, had come, 
increasingly, to see it as the prelude to a really meaningful 'new 
era' in South African society. 
D~ring the course of his numerous interviews with various officials 
in the USA and Britain in August and September 1945, Smit concentrated 
his attention on those issues, such as education and the whole question 
of Black Trade Unions, which constituted particularly topical problems 
in South Afri ca at the time . He did not neglect to investigate aspects 
of rural development though, especially that of land tenure .. In 
August he interviewed Sir Frank Stockdale , British adviser on Colonial 
Development, and was gratified to discover that his views on that 
subject coincided perfectly with his own. Stockdale was in satisfac-
tory accord ,nth the Trust preference for Tribal tenure and for main-
taining control , and advised Smit to recommend it as his opinion 
that individual tenure should not be extended in the Reserves until 
a full education programme had been carried out with tangible results. 
He advocated a system of restricted freehold , (of the kind it was 
propo sed to adopt in the village settlements), or of ten year leases 
which would be subject to periodic review. It was, on the wDole, a 
most satisfactory interview. 1) 
On the question of Native Councils, Stockdale endorsed the views 
set out in Lord Hailey ' s pamphlet2 ) which suggested that powers of 
subsidiary legislation should eventually be granted to such bodies. 
Smit himself had "felt for a long time that this was the correct 
method of approach,,3 ) which was one of the reasons why he had come 
1 . Note of Interview with Sir Frank Stockdale, 1 August 1945, Smit 
Papers, 165/ 45. 
2 . "Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical 
Africa," 1945, Ibid. , 206/45. 
3· Stockdale interview, Ibid., 165/45. 
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to regard the NRC as a body which did little but illustrate the dangers 
inherent in a ' representative ' organ which had no responsible powers . 
1945 was an extremely f ull year for Smit . From Cape Town, East 
London and Pretoria, he had moved to San Francisco, London and Paris . 
December saw him, a new member of the Native Affairs Commission, t ouring 
.Natal with his fellow members . The NAC at this time had a rather 
heterogeneous composition. Apart from Smit , an ostensibly a-political 
member, Van der Men-Ie and Payn were both extremely conservative segre-
gationalists, while the fourth member, Brookes , represented Black 
Natalians in the Senate . Smit was probably the perfect foil in such 
a combination. Though his private views accorded better with those 
of Brookes than his other colleagues, he spoke fluent Afrikaans, had 
the ability to get on with almost everybody and brought with him to 
the Commission a long history of experience in Native Affairs which 
added considerable weight to his judgements in the eyes of the other 
Commissioners. It was while he was touring with the Commission for 
the first time, however, that its political nature was brought forcibly 
home to him . 
Since 1936, the NAC had found dealing with land problems in Natal 
by far the most complicated of their duties . The trouble, as Smit 
put it in 1945, was that "Natives in the early days were all owed to 
acquire farms allover the countryside ... which .. . became veritable 
locations. ,,1) Although on this particular tour the Commission was 
concerned only with the proposed expropri ation of the Umlazi Reserve, 
it received a great many requests from Whites and Blacks to investi-
gate matters outside the scope of its enquiry . All such requests were 
turned down, with the exception of those of two deputations of White 
farmers which, as Smit told his wife, "we cannot refuse f or political 
reasons. ,,2) This was his first encounter with the necessities of 
political life outside the precincts of the Native Affairs Department . 
1. To Mrs. Smi t from ladysmith, 4 December 191f5, Smi t Papers , 232/45. 
:1. 'lb !Ily~ S", ... t f rcl'l VolK~vuSl:") 3 Deie.l'\h~_'( J IgLp'o, Ib\d..) 2~1/45 . 
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As the Commission moved Northwards in Natal , it was subjected to 
constant deputations from angry farmers , demanding to know when their 
compl aints against the 'Native settlements ' in their midst were going 
t o be given some attention . As a result, the Commission spent a 
great deal of its time inspecting overcrowded settlements in predomi-
nantly White areas, and listening to successive representations for 
their removal . The vicious circles in which the segregation policy 
revolved are perhaps most clearly exposed at this level - the actual 
field activities of the NAC and the confrontations it experienced 
when Wbite and Black put their cases to i t at their most basic , grass 
roots level. Some of the frustration of his new position comes through 
in Smit's letters to his wife during th~s f irst t our with the NAC. 
Referring to the constant complaints of the White farmers, he com-
plained himself 
that there is never any concrete suggestion as 
to where land could be set aside to accommodate 
all these people ... and the only real solution 
would be to suspend them between Heaven and Earth 
like Mahomed ' s coffin. 1) 
At a farewell dinner given in his honour by Heads of Departments 
in Cape Town in 1946, Smit talked of Native Affai r s as 
one long fight for the underdog, with political 
odds often weighted against one .. , Discrimina-
tions make the life of a Native Affairs official 
very difficult and often unhappy . O~r difficul-
ties in this country will continue until we are 
prepared to mitigate •• disabilities. 2) 
The political odds, as far as the NAC was concerned, were heavily weigh-
ted in favour of the Wbite farming community . The Commission ' s tours 
of the Transvaal were interrupted in 1946 and 1947 by the necessity 
for reaching some agreement on the question of the NRC, but in 
1. Ibid. 
2 . Notes of address at the far ewell dinner, 5 M~rch 1946, Smit Papers, 
5/46. 
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September 1947 it embarked on a month long and uninterrupted tour of 
Natal, the Transkei, the Ciskei and Northern Transvaal areas . 
It was in Natal , again, that the Commission encountered the most 
vocal and stringent opposition from White and Black alike . Of its 
activities in that Province Ilanga- lase- Nat al said 
When it was considered des irable to get rid of the 
monkey s which have been causing so much t rouble on 
the Durban beach, there was an o~tcry from the 
European public - but when it i s a ques tion of 
moving Natives from their Reserves, nothing is 
said. 1) 
The support which the Commission had initially enjoyed among some rural 
Blacks, and which had been responsible for the divisions in opinion in 
the NRC when the NAC had come under fire, had been gradually replaced, 
as removals continued and released land was constantly excised , by 
mistrust, suspicion and open resentment. 
In the Dundee area, the day after these remarks were published , 
the NAC met a large gathering of farmers , mostly Afrikaans speaking, 
near Helpmekaar. The group, according to Smit , was unanimous "in 
refusing to agree to an inch of ground being bought in the European 
areas for Native settlement.,,2) I t was determined, instead, to "make 
poli tical capital" out of the whole land question3) and very much 
aware of the imminence of the general election. There was, he said, 
"no peace to be found ." The inhabitants of the Dundee area were 
intensely preoccupied with "the Native question and the forthcoming 
elections" and the Commission was unable to make any headway whatever 
in its unenviable task . 4 ) Confrontations with Black groups destined 
for removal 'Jere uncomplicated by electoral pressur~s and far simpler . 
Even when it came to the removal of the inhabitants of Kingsley Town-
1. Quoted by Smit in a letter to Mrs . Smi t, 18 A'lgust 1947, Ibid., 41/47 . 
2. To Mrs. Smit from Dundee , 19 August 1947, Ibid., 42/47. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid . 
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ship, a \;ell run and well known Black area whose removal had been de-
manded by Whites, the most painful aspect was merely that of being 
part of the agency through which the removal was to be effected: "I 
always feel sorry for these simple folk when the questions of removal 
have to be discussed. ,,1) 
At Paulpietersburg, later on in August, the NAC had more success 
wi th the White farming community . On the 23rd, Smi t wrote triumphantly 
to his wife that he had managed to persuade a deputation to drop their 
request that the Paul pieter sburg released areas be excised. He 
added: "It is a pity that the critics of Native Affairs cannot see 
this side of our work - the constant fight we put up to protect the 
interests of t he Natives . ,,2 ) This was the kind of statement which 
Smit had been wont to make throughout his career in the Native Affairs 
Department, and provides an interesting comment on the relation between 
policy and its administrat ion during this period. 
The Commission reported to the Mini ster of Native Affairs in 
October that it had managed to prevent the expropriation of the Umlazi 
Mission Reserve by the Durban Corporation . After h;o investigations 
into the Durban situation, during the course of which it became clear 
that the plural composition of Durban ' s population presented a com-
plicated problem for the Corporation, the Commission had decided 
that a Native Village Settl ement, under the auspices of the NAD and 
a competent Black council , should be established in the area. 
As late as October 1948, demands for the excision of land from the 
released areas were still plentiful . Representatives of the Potgieters-
rust Boere Unie , for example , presented the NAC with requests for 
1. To Mrs . Smi t, 20 August 1947, Ibid. , 44/47 . 
2 . To Mrs. Smit from Paulpietersburg , 23 August 1947, Ibid., 49/47. 
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the excision of a substantial number of farms when the Commission toured 
the Southern and North Eastern Transvaal in that month. l ) These demands, 
coming nearly twelve years after the 1936 Act had been passed and 
land first 'released ', were typical of the kind of problem with which 
the Commission had been confronted throughout the period. The agitation 
in the rural areas on the eve of the 1948 election provid@ some indica-
tion of the extent to which the system, by 1948, had fallen into dis-
repute. The Potgietersrust Unie demanded a total and final delimita-
2) tion of separation between White and Black , and they f ound it in the 
elaborate electoral proposals of the Nationalist Party. 
Although the most articulate and probably the most effective battles 
against segregation after 1939 were fought in the mines, in the over-
crowded urban locations, by Congress and in the council chamber of the 
NRC , it was on the l and that the policy ' s ineffectiveness produced the 
kind of tangible results which alienated considerabl e sections of the 
White farming community and helped to bridge the division of interests 
between urban and rural Blacks. While the White taxpayer , in 1945, 
finally dug his hand into his pocket to prevent the disintegration of 
the Reserves, -White farmers , allover the country, dug in their heels . 
Smit's blueprints for the alleviation of conditions in the urban areas 
in 1942 ~~d f or the salvation of the Reserves in 1944 were both unaccept-
able and too late. 
1. Report of the Native Affairs Commission on its visit to N. and N.E. 
Transvaal, 18-27 October 1948, Ibi d., 18.1/48. 
2. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ADMINISTRATOR TO POLITICIAN 
The change from administrator to politician was not a particularly 
happy one for Smit, who spent the last ten years of his life in bitter 
party wrangles, losing many of his old friends and growing increasingly 
pessimistic about the future of South Africa. Piece by piece, he watched 
the destruction of ~any of the results of his own work in the Native 
Affairs Department. 
Between 1934 and 1945, Smit had been in a very powerful position and 
had used it, when he chose, with considerable effect. In 1948, contrary 
to all expectations, he did not become Minister of Native Affairs but 
found himself, instead, a member of an articulate but ineffectual opposition. 
By 1950, the two avenues of administrative power which remained to him had 
been closed by the government and Smit, although freed at last from the 
alleged shackles of officialdom, was politically ine ffective for the rest 
of his life. His position was probably productive of even greater frus-
tration than that expressed by 'independent ' operators such as Hoernle 
in 1941,1) in that, throughout the 1950's at any rate, he remained loyal 
to the United Party, although he grew rapidly disillusioned with it after 
the death of his mentor, Smuts. 
Smit's successor in the Department was Gordon Mears, a man who was 
both emotionally and intellectually committed to the goal of a non-
differentiated, multi-racial society but who had far less time or oppor-
tunity than Smit to marshal his administrative forces in the realm of 
policy. In 1949 Malan's government replaced him as Secretary by 
1. "Whatever successes we have" he said, "whatever limited improvements 
we secure, are possible only because the pillars of our racial-caste 
society are not thereby shaken, let alone undermined" (Hoernle to 
Bishop Clayton, 21 October 1941, Smit Papers, 25/ 41a). 
Dr . W. M. Eisel en , one time Chief Dlspector for Native Education in 
the Transvaal . Eiselen ' s appointment was made over the head of 
Eodseth, the Under- secretary, and in the teeth of opposition from the 
Public Ser vice Commission . Although Jansen, the new Minister of Native 
Affai rs , had agreed to compromise on the choice of J. Steenkamp, who 
was attached to the Native Appeal Court, he was forced, in the end, 
1) to bow to pressure from a determi ned group in the Nationalist Caucus . 
The group incl uded Albert Hertzog, Dr . H. F . Verwoerd and P. W. Botha ; 
Jansen, who had served under J . B. H. Hertzog, f ound himself at odds 
with it throughout his short service as Minister of Native Affairs. 
In October 1949, Rheinallt Jones , presumably on the strength of 
his association with him i n Native Education in the Transvaal, wrote 
to Eiselen expressing some distress at his appointment on the ground 
that it was "a party political appointment".2) The new Secretary ' s 
reply was illuminating. He wrote that "Native Affairs has never i m-
pressed me as a department of development • .. " and stressed the neces-
sity of emphasizing its educative rather than its administrative 
function . 3) That then, was the succinct explanation of the difference 
between the administration that was and that which ,las to be . Under 
Smit, the key word in Native Affairs had been 'development ' - though 
this had been subject to widely different interpretations . For Smit 
himself, it was ' development ' in the sense of progress towards an 
inevitable political goal. For others , including Smuts, it was 
"practical social policy a,lay from politics" and dependent entirel.y on 
the goodwill of the white man. Eiselen ' s own views on the nature of 
1 . B. M. Schoeman , Van Malan tot Verwoerd , (Pretoria: Human and Rousseau , 
1973), p . 84 . 
2. 19 October 1949, Rheinallt Jone s Papers, C8/2. 
3. Eiselen to Rheinallt Jones , 21 October 1949, Ibid., C8/3. 
130 
this 'educative function' were shortly to become well known.' The Native 
Affairs Department, then , was at last to a ssume its proper place in the 
machinery of the South Afr ican system, now that the implications of that 
system had been more clearly worked out. Jansen himself was still some-
thing of a cautious Hertzogian segregationalist and it was the pressure 
group in the caucus which was responsible for the administrative changes 
which were bro~ght about during the period for which he was Minister of 
Nat ive Affairs. 
The Native Affairs Commission, an important administrative adjunct, 
was similarly purged, though not until the offending members' terms of 
office had expired. In September 1949, Jansen, under pressure again, 
from the caucus, wrote to both Smit and Brookes, stating that their 
anti- government attitude created "an anomalous and undesirable state of 
1) 
affairs a s far as membership of the Commission is concerned." Those 
two "opperste liberaliste", who were "obstructing and sabotaging t he 
administration of the law at every possible opportunity,,2) refused to 
resign, however, until their terms had run out. This was Smit's first 
encounter with the kind of political games which had been played by 
Brookes for years , and he was shocked and indignant. In his reply to 
Jansen he pointed out that membership of the NAC was not dependent on 
political affiliations, that provision for thi s eventuality had been 
the 
made in' 1920 Act and that previous governments had not only retained, 
but actually reappointed members whose sympathies were publicly known 
to lie with the opposition. 3 ) After his initial refusal t o resign, 
Brookes was content t o leave the matter and serve out the rest of his 
office while Smit continued an angry correspondence with Jansen until 
the end of October, when it "las the Minister who refused to pursue the 
1. Jansen to Smit, 21 September 1949, Smit Papers, 15/49 . 
2 . Schoeman, Malan tot Verwoerd, p. 42. 
3. Smit to Jansen, 24 September 1949, Smit Papers, 17/49 . 
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matter further. 
The only thing Jansen could do, before the expiry of Smit's office, 
was to relieve him of his position as deputy- chairman of the Commission. 
This he did , in 1949, and M.C. de Wet Nel, a member of the Nationalist 
pressure group, was appointed in his place . The new government was 
making a clean sweep in Native Affairs, and the Union Advisory Committee 
on Native Education did not escape either. Smit, despite his proven 
familiarity with this area of administration, was not reappointed to the 
Committee when his term of office expired at the end of 1949 - a decision 
which hurt him more than his eviction from the NAC and which stung him 
to make an uncharacteristically abrupt reply to the Secretary for 
Education: "Since when has education become a political matter?"l) 
Since the Nationalists came to power, it seemed, every aspect of 
administration had become "a party political matter. " Officials were 
chosen on the basis of their known sympathies rather than their proven 
capabilities - and with very good reason. As early as 1950, Rodseth 
wrote to Smit of "happenings which take 
the Service generally which disturb one 
place in the Department and in 
2) profoundly. " What, in fact, 
was ' disturbing ' to some members of the administration who had continued, 
after 1948, to serve the new government, was that their Department, for 
the first time, was applying itself effectively to carrying out govern-
ment pOlicy. This reorganization of the administration, while it by 
no means supports the thesis that the Nationalists were more strongly 
committed to the segregatory ideal than their predecessors had been, 
does suggest that they had thought it out better. 
The implication that the Native Affairs Department had been less 
than effective, before 1948, in putting government policy into practice, 
is inescapable. It was, in many respects, a custom "more honoured in 
1. Smit to Van der Walt, 24 December 1949, Ibid., 39/47. 
2. 31 December "-950, Ibid., 35/50. 
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the breach than the observance" - hence the reasons for the changes in 
personnel in the NAD immediately after the assumption of power by the 
exponents of a systematized 'apartheid' structure w},re clearly something 
more than 'party politics' . 
Although Smit was now deprived of official channels for action , the 
experience was salutory in at least two respects . With the removal of 
his official muzzle he was at last able to express openly his disapproval 
of those aspects of segregation which he had always loathed and he was 
forced, for the first time , to give form, substance and direction to his 
ideas on 'Native Policy '. As an administrator he had been able t o avoid 
painful formulations of this nature, and that he deliberately did so is 
cl ear not only from the evidence of his administrative career, but from 
his later correspondence . 
In 1954, when his Party was involved in yet another of its interminable 
disputes over the formulation of its Native Policy, he wrote: 
Throughout my career I have not bothered overmuch 
about the political development of the Native ... 
My line has been to do all I can to improve living 
conditions, education , health and social welfare 
services and to fight hard against any injustice . 1) 
Smit was, however, as conscientious a politician as he had been an adminis-
trator, and his commitment, when it was finally articulated , was predictable : 
If you base the superiority of the White man upon 
his civilization, then surely you cannot deny t o 
other men - of whatever race - who have attained 
his level in that re spect , the rights of a civilized 
man. The practical importance of this proposal is 
small, because thi s cl ass is limited and will be so 
for a long time . But the principle is fundamental 
we cannot exclude any man who reaches a civilized 
standard . .. from his full share in the government 
of the country. 2) 
I t was consistent too, from a man whose political heroes were ' Burke, 
L. Smit to Gray Hughes (MP for Griqualand East), 21 August 1954, Ibid. , 
26/ 54. 
2. Smit to Sir de Villiers Graaff, 9 November 1954, Ibid., 41/54. 
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Gladstone, Rhodes, "Sarlisle and Churchill, and whose notebooks were 
filled with extracts from their writings and speeches. l ) Cecil Rhodes's 
'Equal rights for every civilized man ' was Smit's maxim too, and to the 
question of whether this was a new departure, a marked change from his 
administrative position, the answer is almost certainly no. During 
Smit ' s membership of the Native Affairs Department, he undoubtedly saw 
its function in the political process as that of the agency through 
which the development of this 'civilization ' would come about. 
The shift in Departmental pOlicy and the changes in its personnel 
were by no means the only aspects of the new regime which Smit, poli-
t i cally impotent as he now was, found hard to bear . He had to stand 
and watch, too, as the Nationalist government began to reverse the 
pOlicy which its predecessor had finally and tentatively adopted towards 
Native Education. It was a policy which Smit, as an administrator, had 
been disproportionately instrumental in shaping, and the development of 
Native Education on the same basis as that provided for Whites in the 
Union had been the object of much of his activity during his long 
I 
administrative career . Of the total of £21 , 683,750 spent by the Trust 
during his administration of it, £10,648,037 had been allocated to 
Nati ve Education, including schoolfeeding, and a further £2,038,795 
to Mission Societies, Councils and Reserve Boards, mostly for educational 
2) purposes. Although he had been concerned to reduce Mission control 
of education in order to achieve a greater degree of centralization, 
he had appreciated the Mission contribution to education;'and had re-
commended increased grants to these societies whenever funds were 
available. From the moment the Nationalists came to power however, 
it seemed clea~ that the new government was prepared to dispense with 
1. Of his five notebooks, the fifth contained nothing else and was begun 
during his membership of the NAD. 
2. Roux, "Land and Agriculture in the Reserves," Handbook, p . 176. 
the Mission contribution in the interests of political conformity . 
Long before the Ei selen Commission reported in 1951, there was evidence 
that both individual Mission societies and the Provincial Advisory Boards 
were feeling the effects of this change in attitude. A plea to the 
Transvaal Education Department from a Miss~on representative in 1949 
alluded to the changed attitude t hus : 
The 
which it 
terms of 
ai ms for 
We are very grateful for all that has been done by 
the Department .•. but it is a matter of grave con-
cern that ... the policy of the Department appears 
~ to be one of deprivation as far as the mission 
schools are conc erned and one of increasingly gene-
rous treatment in relation to its own schools . ..• 
If, in fact, we are confronted \.i th a change in 
government policy then that fact should be clearly 
stated so that we know where we are . 1) 
government , however, was waiting for the report of the 
had appointed that year, under Eiselen's chairmanship, 
reference required it to formulate 
" 
the principles ... 
eliucation for Natives as an independent race . ,,2) 
Commission 
and whose 
and 
I t was not until 1952 that Smit became fully aware of the implications 
behind the appointment of the Eiselen Commission and of the rumblings of 
discontent which had come to hi s attention from Mission cir cle s in the 
Transvaal . In a l etter to R.H.W. Shepherd of Love dale , who was probably 
.his closest friend at this time and with whom he maintained a voluminous 
correspondence, he referred unfavourably to the Report which he was 
halfway through reading at the time . 3 ) Its conclus i ons, with which,. 
he said, "I cannot agree", were quite clearly designed to slot Bantu 
1. Rheinallt J ones Papers, c44/d/l3. The signature on this letter is unclear. 
2. Report of the Commi ssion on Native Education, 1949- 51, UG53-1951. 
(Hereinafter r eferred t o as the Eiselen Commi ssion ). 
3. Smit Paper s, 2/52 . 
135 
Education (as it was now called), into a vastly more systematic segre-
gation structure than had hitherto been conceived of. TIle exponents 
of Apartheid were cementing the ideological as well as the administra-
tive cracks which had threatened to crumble the walls of segregation. 
TIlere was nothing in the Eiselen Report of the tentativeness and 
the hesitancy which had characterized the "avowedly interim synthesis" 
of 1936. TIlen,the Welsh Committee members, all of them educational 
experts, had hesitated to prescribe permanent remedies for the educational 
ills of what they obviously regarded as a temporary social and political 
structure. TIlere was, by contrast, great confidence in the conclusions 
of the members of the later Commission, which advocated the immediate 
transfer of control of Bantu Education to the Department of Native 
Affairs. 
In its review of the development of Native Education, as well as 
its prescriptions for Bantu Education, the Eiselen Report turned always 
to the economy. By paragraph 223 it had concluded, after a "brief review 
of the function of Bantu Education from the State's viewpoint"l\hat 
the present state of affairs was economically undesirable for two 
reasons: the financing of Black Education was a drain on the General 
Revenue, and its content and structure were not designed to equip 
young Blacks for their "future work and surroundings. ,,2) TIle altera-
tions it proposed would solve both these problems. As the new system 
led the 'Bantu' into "habits of industry" so he would, increasingly, 
be able to psy for his own "social services". By para 764 it had 
been decided that "Bantu development and Bantu education must be 
largely synonomous terms" and that "the schools •.. must serve as effec-
tive agents in this process of development." TIle third of its 
1 . Eiselen Report, para 223. 
2. Ibid. , para 765 (lb) . 
guiding principles maintained that "education must be co-ordinated 
with a de finite and carefully planned policy for the development of 
Bantu societies. Such policy should pay special but not exclusive 
attention to the economic development of the Bantu . "l) 
These were the long term recommendations of the Apartheid strategists, 
similar.in general approach to the line of the 1937 NAC Report, and bear-
ing no relation to the kinds of makeshift and temporary policy decisions 
with which the exponents of the "wishy washy" legislation of 19362 ) 
attempted to Overcome the obstacles so frequently encountered by segre-
gation. The ' separateness' of Bantu Education was establ ished by the 
transfer of its control to the NAD. The "socio- economic development of 
the Bantu as a people •. . ,,3) 'was to be ensured by the introduction of 
vernacular teaching at all levels as soon as texts became available - a 
policy which had no precedent anywhere in Africa. The stage of develop-
ment at which 'Native Education ' had arrived by 1945 had been one of 
the greatest contradictions of the segregation policy and, quite as much 
as the reorganization of the Native Affairs Department, required the 
immediate attention of the new government. 
United Party opposition to the 1953 Bantu Education Bill, which gave 
statutory effect t o the recommendations of the Eiselen Report, was 
organized by Smi t, who found it "an interesting task, albeit disappoint -
ing.,,4) Not the least of its disappointing aspects was the varied 
level of response he encountered in his own party . Nothing, perhaps, 
so well illustrated the disjointed and unsystematized approach of the 
United Party as this sort of variation in the support whi ch Smit, as 
the Party ' s chief spokesman on Native Affairs, was able to muster on 
the frequent occasions on which he led the opposition to particular 
1 . Ibi d., para 766 (c) . 
2 . Smit's own description of the 1936 policy. 
3. Eiselen Report, para 1051. 
4. Smit to Shepherd, 28 September 1953, Smit Papers , 27/53. 
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Bills . In 1953, support for his campaign against the Bantu Education Bill 
came only from those who were "interested in education. ,,1) Apparently, 
the fact that the new differentiated education system for Blacks was to 
be one of the cornerstones of the apartheid policy was not of undue .con-
cern to the majority of Smit ' s colleagues in the UP hierarchy . 
The provision of state subsi dized schoolfeeding was .. according to 
Schoeman, another "remnant of the Smuts era" which suffered the attentions 
of the pressure group in the Nationalist caucus . Schoolfeeding had long 
been fiercely opposed by the "plattelanders". and in June 1949 the Min-
ister of Social Welfare, A.J. Stals , was shiU'ply attacked in the caucus 
for his failure to eliminate this source of friction between platteland 
constituents and their MP ' s . 2) Stals had undertaken, in 1948, that the 
amount expended on schoolfeeding would be reduced to £870, 000 and by 1950 
he had, under pressure, reduced it still further to £650,000. 3) The 
whole question of schoolfeeding was subsequently reviewed, the Eiselen 
Report came out strongly against ' free ' social services, and Smit saw yet 
another of his endeavours frustrated as administration s~~g into line 
wi th pOlicy . 
The final nail was hammered into the new structure of Black education 
in 1959 when the Extension of University Education Act was passed in June. 
Since this measure had first been mooted in 1957, Smit, together \1ith 
Margaret Ballinger and P.A. Moor e, had led an opposition Committee which 
sought, by means of the collec tion of a great deal of academic and other 
opinion, to stimulate opposition to the notion of segregation in higher 
education. Despite the many disappointments of previous years, Smit 
put a tremendous amount of hard work and energy into the work of this 
1. Ibid . 
2. Schoeman , Malan tot Verwoerd, p. 33. 
3. Ibid. 
1.38 
Committee,l) whose final report, along with the considerable amount of 
independent opposition encountered by the government during the past 
two years, it i gnored. With the creation of four new university 
colleges and the shutdown of university integration, the maintenance 
of ethnic division, from the lowest to the highest educational levels, 
was complete. 
The most paradoxical aspect of Smit ' s political career was his 
continued membership of the United Party long after he had finally 
realized that between his own political ideas and the vacillatory 
pOlicies of the majority of his colleagues there lay an unbridgeable 
gulf. The reasons for this strange loyalty, and p~r~ps for the 
vacillations of the Party as a whole, must be sought in the personality 
of General Smuts, whose influence continued as the mainstay of UP 
solidarity long after his death. There is an element of unreality 
about the UP after its fall from power and after the death of its 
leader which only emphasizes the extraordinary allegiance which t he 
latter's charisma had been able to command. Without Smuts, his 
surviving disciples lacked a central cohesion\ it was almost as though 
he himself, and not the policies he advocated, was the party 's raison 
d ' etre. 
The record of Smit's opposition, however, reveals nothing of the 
same sort of indecision, either in Parliament, or in the caucus, 
where some of his hardest battles were fought. An effusive compliment, 
in 1950, referred to Smit as " ••. a veritable St. George, ever ready 
to fight the awful dragon of racialism and narrow mindedness which 
tries to ruin the fair face of South Africa,II2 ) but there is little 
1. Bdth Mro. Ballinger and Mr. Moore, interviewed in Cape Town, April 
1977, credited Smit with the organization of the Committee and most 
of the content of the Memorandum which it subsequently submitted. 
2. Mrs. B.A. Steer, (an old friend) to Smit, 23 December 1950, Smit 
Papers, 33/50. 
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.doubt that a great deal of the "narrow mindedness~' with which he had 
to grapple came from the ranks of his own party. 
1) I t was not really until Jansen had been ousted by Verwoerd that the 
UPbegan to make a concerted effort to reach some sort of formula with· 
regard to 'Native Policy ' - and that the confusion of the Smuts legacy 
became apparent. The 1953 election found the party still unable to 
meet the test of Apartheid as far as its racial policies were concerned, 
and March the following year saw the first of a series of UP meetings 
to decide on the party ' s official 'Native Policy '. Provincial sub-
committees were appointed to consider the matter, as well as a central 
Research Division, which issued its final statement in November . Not 
surprisingly, Smit found himself at odds with the proceedings from the 
start . 
For the Cape sub-committee, at any rate, the start was naturally 
the 1936 legi slation, from which it saw no reason to depart. For Smit, 
the 1936 legislation had failed the test of administration2 ) and in a 
letter to Graaff he urged that it be scrapped from party policy on the 
grounds that it had already failed . 3) He saw little point , he said, in 
4) 
adopting "the same old wishy washy policy as before . " His earlier, 
cavalier attitude towards the NRC was also clarified to some extent when 
he refused to support a half hearted pl an to rescucitate the Council in 
UP policy - a move which he was not prepared to approve unless the NRC 
waS to be given administrative and executive pOI.ers as well. 
Another aspect of Smit ' s attempts to guide his party in its formula-
tion of a Native Policy goes a long way towards explaining some of his 
1. Schoeman, Halan tot Verwoerd, describes how the caucus got rid of 
Jansen in 1950, pp . 42- 45. 
2. Minutes of UP sub-committee meeting, Cape Town, 28-29 April 1954, 
Smit Papers, 13/54. 
3. Smit to Graaff, 29 April 1954, Ibid . , 14/54. 
4. Ibid . 
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actions as an administrator . He saw Smuts ' s ambiguous remarks to the 
SAIRR in 1942 as "the complete answer " which "stands out as a landmark 
i n the evolution of the Union. ,,1 ) 1942 also stands out as a landmark 
i n Smit ' s own administrative career and it seems that it was definitely 
due in part at least to this speech that he boldly took the initiative 
in that year ; not because he had undergone any ki nd of revolutionary 
change in his thinking, but because he had been given the green light 
to take off some of the brakes. The history of opposition politics 
during the period after 1948 is peppered with references to this par-
t i cular one of Smuts's many oratorical utterances ; the rUling Nationa-
list Party delighted in claiming it as evidence of the dangers of the 
pOlicies of its political opponents while the latter were often hard 
put to it to interpret the speech in a manner designed to demonstrate 
that segregation as laid down in 1936 was still a vi~ble proposition. 2 ) 
During his administrative career, ' control ' had seldom been a 
concept at which Smit had baulked. Influx control, control in the rural 
areas - these had been necessary , if temporary aspects, as he saw it, 
of Native Administration and of the whole 'development ' process. The 
exercise of such control had been one of his prime concerns and he had 
not been averse, on occasion, to resorting to the extraordinary powers 
which the habit of edictal l egisl ation had conferred on his Department . 
I t was only when he became a politi cian that his political perspectives 
moved increasingly towards the position which would have justified 
earlier designations of ' liberalism. ' 
His letters to Shepherd and his annotations of the various documents 
in his possession show quite clearly that his ' liberalism' developed 
1 . Memorandum on Native Policy , 29 April 1959, Ibid . , 13/59 . 
2. All things to all men, these remarks of Smuts' were later taken up 
by the Progressive Party, which, in 1961, claimed them as evidence 
that Smuts, had he been alive, would have supported its stand. 
(Smit to Van der Elf 1 , 18 July 1961, Ibid. , 35/61) . 
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commensurately with his disaffection with the United Party . He was 
beginning to rely more and more heavily for support in the House on 
people like Margaret Ballinger rather than on the members of his own 
Par ty, l ) while the words ' r i ght ' and ' freedom ' were beginning to feature 
prominently in his political vocabulary. In 1952, after .the third 
readi ng of the Natives Abolition of Passes and Co- ordination of Documents 
Bill, he complained that "Neither the Press nor the public have hitherto 
understood the implications of the measure, which is just another step 
in the deprivation of rights. ,,2) 
There was still a great deal of the old administrative caution in 
Smit ' s attitude however . When asked in 1952 to contribute an articl e 
on the Pass Laws to Bantu World, he wrote to Roland Paver, its editor, 
and refused: " .•• at the moment ther e is so much unrest among the 
Natives that I feel we ought to be careful not to aggravate a situation 
that is already causing grave apprehension. ,,3) ' Outside agitation ' 
and the bogey of Communism were still greater evils than the reductive 
policies of the Nationali st Party . 
From 1953 onwards, Smit battled to get his Party to oppose Nationa-
list measures . There were , he discovered, relatively few points at 
which the UP found itself at var iance with the government . His notes 
on a copy of the Public Safety Bill reflected the pattern which was 
beginni ng to develop in the caucus : 
Another bad bill which I opposed in caucus 
without success •.. I wish to express my regret 
that it should be at all necessary to pl ace a 
provision of this kind on the statute book - a 
provision from which the Executive will derive 
wide powers of interference . 4) 
1 . Smit to Shepherd , 1 Jul y 1952, I bid. , 10/52. 
2 . Ibid. 
3. 26 July 1952, Ibid., 11/ 52 . 
4. Ibid . , 3/53 
r 
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The Criminal law Amendment Bill was similarly castigated: "A bad piece 
of legislation which I opposed in caucus without avail. I was over-
ruled by caucus and not allowed to express my views."l) 
By 1954, his letters to his wife provide evidence of the distance 
which he had travelled from conservative UP thinking. He deplored the 
prevailing talk of co- operation with the Nationalists, and described 
a caucus meeting at which he had unsuccessfully urged his colleagues 
t o "fight the government at every turn. ,,2) That his efforts had 
been unfavourably received is clear from the despondency with which 
he talked of his growing unpopularity with the "powers that be" as 
a result of his outspokeness. 3) During this time , too, he was working 
hard for the cause of t he Roman Cathol ic Missions, which had been 
hard hit by the 1953 Bantu Education Act - another project which found 
little support in UP ranks. 
In 1956, C.M. van Coller , the ex- Speaker, congratulated Smit on 
his "noble efforts" in the House "which I fear did not get the support 
4) 
of the Party that they deserved. " The situation reflected in his 
letter was not confined to Native Affairs alone. Smit had moved to 
a position of cautious l iberalism by this time and usually found him-
self among a small minority which opposed all legislation designed 
to increase the power of the Executive. Along with other 'liberals ' 
too, he had pinned his faith on the economy, and while he found the 
1958 election results disappointing he was optimistic enough to write, 
in a letter to Shepherd, " that most of our problems will be solved by 
economics in the end . ,,5) 
1. Ibid., 4/53. 
2 . Cape Town, 29 January 1954, Ibid., 3/54• 
3. 30 January 1954, Ibid . , 4/54. 
4. 15 June 1956, Ibid., 37/56. 
5. 19 April 1958, Ibid. , 6/58 . 
The economy was unable to solve one aspect of "our problems" though, 
and that was republicanism. Throughout his career Smit had evidenced 
an attachment to the Commonwealth tradition to a degree which was 
unusual even among like-thinking South Africans . More than anything 
el se, it was the Nationalist attitude towards the imperial connection 
which finally destroyed most of his optimism and confidence in the 
future. He was the only member of the United Party who refused to 
attend the official opening· of Parliament in 19~, when the government 
decided to omit ' God Save the Queen ' from the ceremonial proceedings . 
By June 1959, an uncharacteristic bitterness had begun to flavour Smit ' s 
outlook. While there had been many disappointments during the past 
ten years, he had never seemed to lose his faith in the prospect of 
a better future . He was, moreover, a deeply religious man, and although 
this ",as one faith he never lost, there were unprecedented accents of 
despair in his attitude when he said 
There has been a lot of talk about the 1960 
Union celebrations ..• I think it should be a 
day for sackcloth and ashes ... Parliament as 
we kne", it is being destroyed, and there is 
no dignity or respect for tradition l eft . 1) 
Of the 1959 Parliamentary Session he wrote to Bob Shepherd, now 
Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edin-
burgh, that it had been "the most tragic session since Union ... it 
has brought about the most revol utionary changes in our system of 
2) government." The 1959 Session was the first under Verwoerd ' s 
premiership and had taken place against the background of violent 
anti-Pass demonstrations and rural opposition to the system of Bantu 
Authorities. In the face of unusually strong opposition the Promotion 
of Bantu Self- Government Bill had been introduced as the Nationalists 
1. Smit to· Judge Gardner, 23 June 1959, Ibid., 21/59 . 
2. 28 July 1959, Ibid . , 28/59· 
finally committed themselves to a policy of independence for the Bantu-
stans. With the prospect of a republic now imminent , and the future 
fragmentation of South Africa becoming a reality, Smit's despair had 
reached its nadir . 
So far as Smit's association with the United Party was concerned, 
the bitterest blow of all fell in the latter half of 1959, when twelve 
of its former members broke away to form the Progressive Party. Most 
of those "/ho thus finally cast themselves off had been his only allies 
in interminable CaUCUs wrangling. Although Smit, who had turned seventy-
four that year, decided to "stick to the party in which I have grown 
old"l) it was with extreme reluctance and 'distaste that he faced the 
prospect of a "United Party in which men like Mitchell, Raw and 
Steenkarnp have the upper hand and in which there can no longer be a 
place for men like me.,,2) He himself had sided with the rebels over 
the particular issue on which the Party split, but, faithful still t o 
his image of Smut s , remai ned a member of it. The break devolved on 
the land issue : the hard core deciding to oppose any future land pur-
chases for Blacks on the part of the government in view of its new 
pOlicy of independent Bantustans and the minority refusing to support 
this on the ground that, whatever its policies, the government's 
obligation to provide more land was still an essential one . 
I t appeared that the issue on which the party split had actually 
been forced by Messrs Mitchell, Raw and Steenkarnp in order to provoke 
just such a confrontation as had occurred . After the 1958 election, 
at yet another of the Party's interminable committee meetings on 
' Native Policy' they had decided that, in order that consensus on 
1 . Smit to John Cope, 9 September 1959, Ibid., 31/59 . 
2. Smit to Van der Byl, 5 September 1959 , Ibid., 33/59 . 
policy be reached, the Party should purge itself of "liberals".l) 
The United Party split came after ten years of Party in-fighting , 
frui tless attempts to reach agreeme.nt on 'Native Policy' and divided 
opposition to many of the measures by means of which the apartheid 
system was bolstered by extraordinary executive powers. The establishment 
of the Progressive Party provided the measure both of the frustration 
of the dissident elements with this unsatisfactory record, and of the 
success of the efforts of men such as Raw and Mitchell to restore con-
servative harmony in the caucus. There is no doubt n.owever, that while 
it began as a party of principle, the Progressive Party very soon also 
acquired all the elements of a party of interest . The hist.orical 
evidence does little to support Van der ~l ' s rather naive summary 
in 1959: 
In sh.ort , mlnlng capitalism now has a party in 
parliament subsidized by them to raise the 
native worker s.o he can be on equal terms with 
the white worker ..• 2) 
(His remark, moreover, was based on an assumption that Oppenheimer had 
engineered the break himself.) There were many, however, who did subscribe 
to this viewpoint, and although the Progressive split at that time did 
nothing substantial to reduce United Party support, it probably in-
creased support for the ruling Nati.onalist Party. 
Smit lived to fight against the republican campaign in South Africa 
in 1960, and to see the results of the referendum. By this time there 
the 
was nothing at all left of his earlier optimism - of ) good will triumph 
over evil' attitude which had been a marked characteristic of his 
political approach during the early years in opposition. The last 
1. John Cope to Smit, 9 September 1959, Ibid., 32/59. 
2. Van der Byl to Smit, 10 September 1959 , Ibid., 33/59. 
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months of his life, although he rather reluctantly allowed himself to 
be persuaded to stand for re- election to Parliament, were ones in 
which the zealousness of the earlie·r "St. George" was replaced with a 
resignation and admission of defeat best expressed in his own words : 
To me it is as if the things for which we have 
given our lives have broken down and there is 
nothing left for those of us who hOPed for a 
brighter dawn. 1) 
In one important aSpect, however , Smit' s life's work had not been 
thrown out by the new system: ironically, his land policy proved to 
be one of its cornerstones. There had been no attempt on the part of 
the new government to revert to the idea of the Reserves as an agricul-
tural Utopia . That this and therefore the whole rationale of the 
original 1936 settlement was an impossibility had been proved by adminis-
trative experience. early as 1944 and was accepted by the Nationalists, 
who appointed the Tomlinson Commission in 1953 to find other alternative 
means by which the Reserves could become partially self supporting. The 
village settlement scheme conceived by the former administration was one 
of the first means by which the new regime proposed to solve the land 
problem. In a major policy speech to the Transkei Bunga in 1949, Mears, 
in a eulogy of the growth and development of the Council system, re-
ferred to the Transkei system of administration as "the cradle of Native 
Administration in the Union . ,,2) Reserve residents were henceforth to 
be separated into landless and landed classes , the former to be sorted 
into different kinds of villages, where their tenure would depend on 
the way in which they earned their living (i.e. migrants or local 
1. Smit to Bob Shepherd, 8 October 1960, Ibid . , 42/60. 
2 . Native Affairs Fact Paper IV, April 1949, Ibi d. , 5/49. 
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industrial workers). For the landed classes, allotments were to be 
increased, and there was to be selective placement of full time farmers 
who could make their living from the soil . l ) 
The experimental village of Zwelitsha, four miles South East of 
Kingwilliamstown, had been laid out in 1947, following its acceptance by 
the Ciskei Council. A large textile factory was built nearby and by 
1950 350 of the village's proposed 2,000 houses had been built - largely 
with Black labour and under the supervision of the Native Affairs De-
partment . The village , which was designed t o accommodate 10,000 people was 
an attempt to increase the carrying capacity of 
the reserves by offering the landless population 
the opportunity to group themselves in an orderly, 
clean urban community generating its own economy, 
and from which the wage earners can go to work 
either in the textile factory or wherever they 
like, without leaving their families to be a 
burden on the soil of the reserves. 2) 
The theme of the later Tomlinson Commission echoed this kind of idea, and 
began the era of border industry, Union investment, extensive village 
settlements and the official recognition of a large landless class within 
the homeland economy. 
In one other respect, too, the new government continued to promote a 
campaign in which Smit, as an administrator, had taken an active part. 
Smuts's desire to see the incorporation of the High Commission territories 
was shared by his Nationalist successors, who continued to hope for 
their inclusion in the Union under the apartheid system until the establish-
ment of the Republic made this a remote possibility. During Smit's office 
in the Native Affairs Department he had been part of a delegation to a 
conference between Union and High Commission officials, which had been 
1. Although this was also the majority recomm,endation of the Tomlinson 
Commission, the government adhered to a policy of 'one man one lot'. 
2. The Star, 21 July 1950. (Cutting in Smit Papers, 21/50). 
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anxious to promote incorporation . By 1951 however, while general UP 
policy still tended to favour such incorporation, the measure of Smit ' s 
revulsion at the political changes in South Africa was provided by 
his volte face on this issue . Not only did he make a strong speech 
at East kmdon ag.rlnst incorporation, but wrote an urgent letter t o 
Clarendon in London, stressing that the British government had no 
power to transfer the protectorates to the Union without the agreement 
of their inhabitants. l ) Clearly, his confidence in his own administra-
tion did not extend to the administration which had replaced it . 
The Nationalists, as they picked their way through the administrative 
legacy of their predecessors, discarded a great deal more, in the way 
of personnel and policy , than they retained, discarding, in the process, 
m·any of those things on which Smi t had centred his efforts and his 
hopes . By the time of his death, he had seen the destruction of most 
of his life's work. 
Significantly, the numerous tributes paid to Smit after his death 
in December 1961, dwelt far more on his office in Native Affairs than 
his subsequent parliamentary career. (Although the Daily Dispatch, 
with considerable acumen, described this latter period in terms of 
his "enduring loyalty to Field Marshal Smuts .. • and consequently to 
2) the party which Smuts once led." The Cape Times epitomized Smit's 
attitude towards his administrative duties when they described him 
as "quite without mawkishness and sentimentality, ,,3) and the Daily 
Dispatch evidently concurred with Smit's own views on the changes 
which had taken place in his country as it lamented the loss of 
1. 3 December 1951, Ibid., 36/51. 
2. 20 December 1961 , Smit Papers, 42/61. 
3. Ibid. , 41/61. 
"a symbol of former days , when tolerance and reason meant more in 
our politics . ,,1) 
His good friend, Dr . Shepherd,· provided an eloquent last word at 
his funeral : 
Sometimes he did not agree with the legislation 
it was his duty to enforce, but by his humanity 
he eased the burden of those on whom it would 
fall. No man did more than he did to cause it 
to be said that South Africa's administration 
was better than its law making. 2) 
1. Ibid., 42/61. 
2. Copy of speech, Ibid., 40/61. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing chapters help to. sho", some of the ways in which 
Smit, as a government servant of enormous individual initiative, with 
the ability to influence those with whom he worked, was able to use 
his administrative position to bring these qualities to bear on 
government pOlicy. They have also thrown some interesting light on 
the activities of the Native Affairs Department which undoubtedly 
constituted an important, even crucial, factor in the development of 
the segregation policy after 1936. It seems clear from the available 
evidence that the Department ' s contribution fell a good deal short of 
the requirements of the policy makers: its operations, at a number of 
different levels, were inimical to the successful development of the 
policy inaugurated under the 1936 legislation. 
The history of the Natives Representative s Council contains some 
of the clearest evidence of the Department ' s failure to meet the demands 
of pOlicy . It is, in a sense, the history in microcosm of the official 
' segregation ' era. In 1937 the Council, as has been described, was 
clearly divided into particular interest groups . The division , generally, 
was between urban and rural members and stemmed initially from the fact 
that the latter, mainly the chiefs, had high hopes of the 1936 Natives 
Land and Trust Act. Much of the disenchantment revealed by the NRC over 
the years, its growing unity and the rapid po1iticization of its 
hitherto quiescent rural members was fostered by administrative contact 
and administrative action - more particularly as the NAC was popularly 
associated with the Department of Native Affairs. 
Quite apart from the differences in approach to the question of 
land and stock limitation, it was in the field that the attitude of 
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White officials of the NAD and the Department of Justice towards 
their administrative duties helped to quench ini t ial enthusiasm for 
the prospects held out under the Land Act. By 1944, the Council was 
not only united in its opposition to the NAC, but in its censure of 
the officials whose duty it was to administer the Act which they had 
greeted with cautious optimism in 1936 : 
Some of them hate the Natives , they call them 
'kaffirs ' and they show ... their hatred in 
their administration of Native Affairs 1) 
was Thema's opinion of the situation. Observations such as the following : 
. •• we find Native Commissioners throughout the 
country being little kings in their own locality 
The very fact that some of these Native Commissioners 
and Magistrates demand the Royal salute from the 
Zulus .• . shows the way things are going ••. These 
people demand the Bayete salute . 2 ) 
are a clear indication of the extent t o which , purely at the level of 
contact , government officials were destroying the kind of confidence and 
co- operation upon which the successful implementation of policy depended. 
It was not only at this level that the Native Affairs Department 
contr ibuted to the general di sillusionment with what had been regarded 
as the only positive aspect of the 1936 legislation: it was Smit's 
decision to release so many members of his Department for military 
service which had resulted in the cessation of land buying during the 
war , and it was the halt in the purchase of land which deprived the 
rural members of the NRC of a vested interest in the maintenance of 
the segregation pOlicy . Further, Smit did nothing to prevent the break-
down of the Council, on which the policy depended not only for credi-
bility but for the nucleus of its well disposed Black middle cl ass . 
1 . NRC Verbatim Reports, Seventh Session, 21 August 1944, Vol . III, p . 33. 
2 . Ibid., p . 22. 
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White farmers, too, were not impressed by their contact with 
officials of the Native Affairs Department . They were clearly alienated 
by Smit ' s unsympathetic response to their petitions in 1944 (see p . 116) 
and increasingly impatient and sceptical about the successful imple-
mentation of the Land Act. After 1945, when the NAC became considerably 
more intransigent about fulfilling Parliamentary promises with regard 
to excision, and evasive about meeting demands for the resettlement of 
'black spots' , segregation lost a great deal more of its rural White 
support . In addition, Smit ' s interference with the ' efflux ' provisions 
of the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act solved neither urban overcrowding 
nor the problem of farm labour . The Nationalist administration had 
been swift to r emedy this state of affairs, and by June 1949 Jansen 
was able to report of Johannesburg that "steps are already being taken 
to supply the farmers as far as possible with Natives who do not belong 
1) there." 
At all its levels of contact then, as well as in some of its actions, 
the NAD contributed to the general disaffection with the segregation 
pOlicy - in the locations , where Superintendents were ill- chosen and 
unpopular, in reserves and on White farms. As far as the Whites were 
concerned, the Nationalist Party offered promisingly clear alternatives 
of action and clear outlines of policy. Smit ' s encounters with Natal 
farmers while a member of the NAC in 1947 show both the extent of White 
rural dissatisfaction with the progress of segregation and the fact 
that farmers ,Jere going to express it by voting for the Nationalist 
Party. From the Black point of view, Nationalist alternatives were 
even less attractive than the devil t hey knew; baulked of constitutional 
channels as an expression of dissatisfaction, it was manifested, instead , 
1. Senate Hansard, 2 June 1949, col. 3544. 
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by an intensification .in the proceGs of political polarization among 
hitherto 'moderate ' Black leaders which had begun after the disil lusion-
ments of 1943. It meant, in effect and as legassick has pointed out,l) 
that attempts to exerci se social and political control through the agency 
of a well disposed bourgeois elite had come to an end - a development 
which, on the evidence, owed much to the activities of the Department 
of Native Affairs. 
I t has been suggested that the United Par ty ' s commitment. to the 
poli cy of segregation was less wholehearted than the parliamentary 
majori ties of 1936 indicated . 2 ) There is little evidence for this 
thesis, however , particularly as the indications cited, such as the 
Pass Law moratorium of 1942 , can be traced to administrative and 
economic rather than polit i cal sources ; indeed, much of the impetus 
f or the reforms initiated during the war years came neither from the 
government , nor f rom Black or White pressure groups, but from t he 
Department itself . The Nationalist purge of ~he civil service then, 
was no indication that their commitment to segregation was any stronger 
than that of their predecessors ; they had merely worked it out better 
and given it a catchy name . The significance of the administrative 
reorganization after 1948 seems, clearly , to be the r ecognition that 
the NAD had been totally ineffective in putting the poli cy of segre-
gation i nto practice . Hardworking, conscientious civil servant though 
he was , the picture of Smit in this role becomes somewhat altered : 
did he in fact do his job? Official government policy was segregation 
and a review of Smit's activities at this level show quite clearly 
that he was personally responsible for contributing to some of the 
1. Martin Legassick, "Legislation, ideology and economy in post 1948 
South Africa . " Journal of South African Studies, Vol. 1, no . 1, p . 34, 
N. 71 . 
2. T.R. H. Davenport , "The Smut s Government and the Afri cans", Universi::y 
of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers : 
The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 
Vol. 5. 
154 
more basic contradictions in the pOlicy which had emerged by 1946. 
The segregation policy was also the policy of mainta~ning White 
supremacy in South Africa. The Native Affairs Commission, in whose 
reports can be found some of the clearest expositions on segregation 
before 1945, was totally opposed to non- differentiated education for 
Blacks and to the recognition of Black Trade Unions - both of which it 
saw as inimical to the success of the policy . The NAC was apparently 
the only official body , be fore 1945, which had actually thought out 
the long term implications of the segregation policy and which refused 
to be fazed -by the wartime economic developments in the country - or, 
as Jansen put it, to "take the line of least resistance . ,,1). Indeed, 
there are discernible similarities between the approach of the Commission 
and that of the powerful Nationalist caucus pressure group , from 
whose ranks there emerged the leading strategists of Apartheid. 
While industrial developments did have a strong influence on the 
peripheral structure of the industrial colour bar, they made no chinks 
in the armour of what F.A. Jonstone calls the ' hard core ' structure 
of labour discrimination :2) that is, differentiated, non compulsOry 
education, lack of effective bargaining facilities and low wage '. structures. 
Though it would be absurd t o imagine Smit grinning evilly to himself 
and embarking on the methodical destruction of the roo ts of White 
power in South Africa , nevertheless as this study has shown, a great 
deal of his energy as Secretary for Native Affairs was devoted to 
the elimination of just these factors. 
The Smit Report of 1942, for example, contained the recommendation. 
1. Senat e Hansard, 2 June 19119, col. 354[1. 
2. Frederick A. Johnstone, "Whi te Prosperity and White Supremacy in 
South Afri ca Today ." African Affairs , Vol. LXIX, 274 , 1970, p . 134. 
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that Black Trade Unions be given statutory recognition in all spheres other 
than mining, and strongly advocated a progressive raise in the level of 
Black wages. The Report probably had more effect on Blacks than on Whitee. 
both political bodies such as the ARC, and constitutional organs such as 
the NRC, referred frequently to those of its recommendations which fell 
outside the frame of reference of most Whites. Although some attempt'was 
made to deal with the question of the Pass Laws, it satisfied neither the 
White farmers or mining magnates; similarly, although some individual 
concerns, of their own volition, were moved to raise the level of their 
wages, legislation for the very limited recognition of Black Trade Unions, 
which was mooted in 1946 and 1947, was given no statutory effect. 
Smit ' s own /atti tude towards the necessity for trade union recognition 
was purely pragmatic, although his evidence before the Industrial Legis-
lation Commission in 1950 makes it clear that he recognised the political 
implications of such recognition . In evidence before the same Commission, 
the views of Dr. Ei selen, now Secretary f or Native Affairs, were also 
clear on this point: 
His view was that, if he were dealing with this 
subject in any other country where the set up as 
between Europeans and Natives is different (sic) 
he would have no objection to the recognition of 
Native Trade Unions but in South Africa the for-
mation of strong Native Trade Unions which are 
legally recognised can only lead to Natives 
claiming equality with t he Europeans and the 
same political rights . 1) 
Smit ' s consi dered arguments were eminently practical: 
1. these bodies ar e in existence 
2. they do form a negotiating body of which use 
can be made when disputes arise 
3. government officers have been forced to make 
use of them "hen strikes take place 
4. the unions had in many cases fallen into the 
wrong hands and control over them was necessary, 
1. Summary of Evidence given by Officers and ex- Office r s of the Native 
Affairs Department, 2 August 1950, p. 2. 
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and, 
5. the development of trade unions among industria-
lized Natives was inevitable .. Whether they were 
recognized or not they would'continue to grow 
and it would be better to regulate the movement 
with sympathy and understanding, rather than to 
wait until you are forced to recognize the move-
ment . He expressed the view that recognition 
would be forced on the government sooner or later. 1) 
This was much the same sort of reasoning as that behing his 1942 
Repor t and reveals something of the defeatist atcitude with which the 
policy makers had greeted the war time developments in the country . 
Segregation , i n 1936, had si mply not catered for the industrialization 
and urbanization with which it was confronted during the war, and 
while various commissions were belatedly appointed to remedy this 
omission , it was left to the Nationalists to develop a more self con-
sistent and electorally attractive solution. While it would be 
stretching the imagination to argue that Smit was in favour of the 
recognition of Black Trade Unions because such action woul d hasten 
the alteration of the pr evai ling power structure in South Africa, it 
is safe to assume that he did not mind if it did. In 1942, then, 
instead of devoting himself t o the promotion of such recognition, 
he would best have served the inte~ests of policy, as the Nationalists 
wer e later to do, by seeking alternative solutions which would accom-
modate the new developments within the framework of White supremacy . 
I t was in the third of the pre- requi sites for the maintenance of 
White supremacy in the Union that Smit ' s impact as an administrator 
was most strongly felt . I t is difficul t to understand why Legassick , 
in his comparative analysis of pre and post 1948 policy , dismisses 
educational changes as "some welfare legislation. ,,2)The Eiselen Report 
1. Ibid., p. 4. 
2 . Legassick, "Legislation, ideology and economy in post 1948 South 
Africa", p . 8. 
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on Bantu Education made no bones about the economic necessity for 
differentiation and NAD control ; the changes in the finance and control 
of Black education were probably the most significant of all the appa-
rent contradictions in the segregation policy before 1948 in that they 
owed nothing to the exigencies of wartime industrialization and urban-
ization. As early as 1937 the NAC had attacked the system of Native 
Education, which, it said, "could not be better calculated to destroy 
the aims of Native Policy ," (see p . 67 ). By 1945, thanks to Smi t ' s 
efforts, it was a great deal better ' calculated ' to this end , with the 
prospect, if Smit and Hofmeyr had continued in their harmonious 
partnership, of state administered, non- differentiated education f or 
all races on the cards. It was not until after 1948 that the Nationa-
list government responded to the Commission's 1937 injunction to direct 
"Native Education in conformity with Native Policy," by "hich time the 
., 
system of Black Education threatened the foundations of the entire 
1936 policy. Smit himself had acted as deputy-chairman of the·NAC 
throughout the period covered by its 1937 Report and was therefore 
well aware of the implications behind his activities in the f ield of 
education. He pressed on, nevertheless, in his own direction, despite 
the fact that this was clearly not the direction demanded by policy 
and that "a proper education for citizenship" as the NAC called it, 
represented one of the biggest s ingle contradictions in the whole 
structure of segregation. 
This dichotemy of interests, the apparently widening gap between 
Native Policy and its administration during this period, was thrown 
into strong relief by a rather curious statement made by Van der Byl 
in 1944. His advice was sought by H.R. Raikes of Wits University in 
the matter of selecting a name for the new ' Bantu stUdents Hostel'. 
The choice appeared to be between D.L. Smit and Livingstone and the 
l~ 
Minister's advice was eloquent in its advancement of the claims of 
the former : Smit, he said, had always been the "friend and protector 
behind the scenes ... of the Native ... although he has had frequently 
to appear in public as being against their immediate interests."l) 
There was a rather frightening naivete about this statement from the 
political head of the Department of Native Affairs: it not only revealed 
the lack of any kind of systemati zed approach to the problems of ad-
ministering the 1936 policy, but implicit in it was the acknowledgement 
of the conflict of interests between Black and White - a conflict which 
segregationalists and Apartheid idealogues alike had always refused to 
recognize. As far as Smit's 'behind the scenes ' activities were 
concerned, they were geared, however haphazardly, to the ultimate 
destr uction of the set. 
The point could simply be made that Smit, although a practical 
administrator, was without any kind of political cunning; he acted from 
instincts of compassion and humanity, and where these qualities influenced 
his administrative actions, the latter invariably conflicted with the 
interests of the segregation policy . Nowhere, perhaps, is this more 
clearly evident than in the contrast between the attitude of the Native 
Affairs Commission before and after his membership of it . The NAC 
was an important official body as far as policy making was concerned, 
and Smit ' s influence, and that of Brookes, was immediately felt there. 
The following extracts from the Commission Reports of 1941 (before 
Smit and Brookes were appointed) and 1947 (during their membership of 
the Commission) show how profound this conflict was - it struck at 
the roots of the segregation policy. In 1941 the NAC opined that : 
'" if European industry should draw too largely 
on the Reserves' population by converting the 
1. Van der Byl to H. R. Raikes, 14 August 1944, Smit Papers, 14/44. 
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temporary single male workers, into permanent 
\<orkers, living with their families alongside 
their places of work, the \<hole economic pOlicy 
will break down and \<e arrive, willy nilly, at 
that economic assimilation which was accepted by 
the Economic and Wage Commission (1925), as 
inevitable. 1) 
Elf 1946, the changes in the Commission's membership were reflected 
in its Report, in which the NAC was said to be considering the 
possibility of encouraging the more permanent 
settlement of industrial workers on a family 
basis, in or near the urban areas . 2) 
Again, it was with the pre- 1945 Commission that the designers of Apartheid 
were in accord. The 'more permanent ' settlement of Blacks in White 
areas was clearly out side the compass of Apartheid strategy, and in 
1950 it was Jansen ' s readiness to sanction the idea of Bl ack urban 
freehold, albeit with a maximum 30 year lease, which led to his replace-
ment as Minister of Native Affairs after less than three years in office. 3 ) 
Administration and policy, during Smit's office as Secretary for 
Native Affairs were quite clearly in conflict at a variety of levels, 
of which it has been possible to examine only a few here. The Native 
Affairs Department, with its w~de range of executive freedom of action, 
was a powerful machine which required skilled operators . Interestingly, 
the Nationalist Government made no attempt to reduce Departmental power ; 
on the contrary, it steadily increased it . It was not, then , the machinery 
inherited from the collaborat ors of 1909 which had become o.bsolescent : 
its full potential had simply never been realized . Harmony between 
administration and pol icy , after 1948, was ensured, for the first time , 
by the careful selection of committed personnel in whose hands the operation 
of the administrative machi ne had a far greater chance of political 
success. 
1. Report of the Native Affairs Commission for 1939- 40, UG42-1941 , p . 15. 
2. Report of the Native Affairs Commission for 1945-6, UG14- 1947, p. 5· 
3. Schoeman, Malan. tot Verwoerd,_ p·34. 
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